

KraneShares Trust

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

August 1, 2023

QUADRATIC INTEREST RATE VOLATILITY AND INFLATION HEDGE ETF – (IVOL)

QUADRATIC DEFLATION ETF – (BNDD)

Shares of each Fund are traded on the NYSE Arca, Inc.

This Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) relates to the above listed funds (the “Funds”), a series of the KraneShares Trust (the “Trust”). This SAI is not a prospectus and should be read in conjunction with the current prospectus for the Funds, dated August 1, 2023, as it may be revised from time to time (the “Prospectus”). Capitalized terms used herein that are not defined have the same meaning as in the Prospectus, unless otherwise noted. The audited financial statements with respect to the Funds for the most recent fiscal year or period are incorporated in this SAI by reference to the Funds’ March 31, 2023 Annual Report to Shareholders. A copy of the Prospectus, this SAI, and/or the most recent annual and semi-annual reports to shareholders may be obtained, without charge, by calling 1.855.857.2638, visiting www.ivoletf.com for IVOL or www.bnddedtf.com for BNDD, or writing to the Trust at 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017.

<u>GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUST AND THE FUNDS</u>	1
<u>INVESTMENT POLICIES, TECHNIQUES AND RISK FACTORS</u>	2
<u>INVESTMENT LIMITATIONS</u>	25
<u>CONTINUOUS OFFERING</u>	26
<u>MANAGEMENT OF THE TRUST</u>	26
<u>INVESTMENT ADVISER</u>	34
<u>SUB-ADVISER</u>	36
<u>PORTFOLIO MANAGER</u>	37
<u>CODES OF ETHICS</u>	38
<u>PROXY VOTING POLICY</u>	39
<u>ADMINISTRATOR</u>	39
<u>CUSTODIAN AND TRANSFER AGENT</u>	39
<u>DISTRIBUTOR AND DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENTS</u>	40
<u>CONTROL PERSONS AND PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF SECURITIES</u>	42
<u>EXCHANGE LISTING AND TRADING</u>	43
<u>BOOK ENTRY ONLY SYSTEM</u>	43
<u>BROKERAGE TRANSACTIONS</u>	45
<u>CREATION AND REDEMPTION OF CREATION UNITS</u>	49
<u>TAXES</u>	57
<u>DETERMINATION OF NAV</u>	65
<u>DIVIDENDS AND DISTRIBUTIONS</u>	67
<u>OTHER INFORMATION</u>	67
<u>COUNSEL</u>	69
<u>INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM</u>	69
<u>FINANCIAL STATEMENTS</u>	69
<u>APPENDIX A – PROXY VOTING POLICY</u>	A-1
<u>APPENDIX B – DESCRIPTION OF RATINGS</u>	B-1

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUST AND THE FUNDS

The Trust was organized as a Delaware statutory trust on February 3, 2012 and is permitted to offer multiple, separate series (*i.e.*, funds). As of the date of this SAI, the Trust offers 36 separate funds, including the Funds and other funds not offered in this SAI. The Trust is an open-end management investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “1940 Act”), and each Fund is a non-diversified series of the Trust. The offering of the Trust’s shares is registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”). All payments received by the Trust for shares of any fund belong to that fund. Each Fund will have its own assets and liabilities. Shares of each Fund will only be issued against full payment, as further described in the Prospectus and this Statement of Additional Information.

Adviser and Sub-Adviser

Krane Funds Advisors, LLC (“Krane” or the “Adviser”) serves as the investment adviser to each Fund and is responsible for continuously reviewing, supervising and administering each Fund’s investment program. Quadratic Capital Management LLC (“Quadratic” or “Sub-Adviser”) serves as the investment sub-adviser to each Fund and is responsible for making investment decisions for each Fund’s assets and trading portfolio securities. SEI Investments Distribution Co. serves as the distributor (the “Distributor”) of the shares of each Fund.

Exchange-Traded Fund (“ETF”) Operations

The Fund issues and redeems Shares at net asset value (“NAV”) only in aggregations of a specified number of Shares (“Creation Units”), generally in exchange for a basket of securities (“Basket”), together with a specified cash payment, or, in certain circumstances, for an all cash payment. Unlike mutual funds, Shares are not individually redeemable.

Certain employees of the Adviser are responsible for interacting with market participants that transact in Baskets for one or more Creation Units. As part of these discussions, these employees may discuss with a market participant the securities a Fund is willing to accept in connection with a purchase (“creation”) of shares, and securities that the Fund will provide on a redemption of shares. The Adviser’s employees may also discuss portfolio holdings-related information with broker/dealers in connection with settling the Fund’s transactions, as may be necessary to conduct business in the ordinary course.

Shares of each Fund are listed on NYSE Arca, Inc. (the “Exchange”) and trade in the secondary market, where most investors will buy and sell them at market prices that change throughout the day. Such market prices may be lower, higher or equal to NAV. Accordingly, when transacting in the secondary market, investors may pay more than NAV when purchasing shares and receive less than NAV when selling shares. They may also be subject to brokerage commissions and charges.

INVESTMENT POLICIES, TECHNIQUES AND RISK FACTORS

General

Each Fund's principal investment strategies and risks are discussed in its Prospectus. The investment techniques discussed below and in the Prospectus may, consistent with a Fund's investment objectives and investment limitations, be used by a Fund. Each Fund is free to reduce or eliminate its activity with respect to any of the investment techniques discussed below consistent with its fundamental investment policies. There is no assurance that a Fund's strategies or any other strategies and methods of investment available to the Fund will result in the achievement of the Fund's objective.

Cash and Cash Equivalents

Each Fund may hold cash or cash equivalents. Generally, such positions offer less potential for gain than other investments. Holding cash or cash equivalents, even strategically, may lead to missed investment opportunities. This is particularly true when the market for other investments in which a Fund may invest is rapidly rising. If a Fund holds cash uninvested it will be subject to the credit risk of the depositing institution holding the cash.

Debt Securities

Each Fund may invest in debt securities. A debt security is a security consisting of a certificate or other evidence of a debt (secured or unsecured) on which the issuer promises to pay the holder thereof a fixed, variable, or floating rate of interest for a specified length of time, and to repay the debt on the specified maturity date. Some debt securities, such as zero coupon bonds, do not make regular interest payments but are issued at a discount to their principal or maturity value. Debt securities include a variety of fixed income obligations, including, but not limited to, corporate bonds, government securities, municipal securities, convertible securities, mortgage-backed securities, and asset-backed securities. Debt securities include investment-grade securities, non-investment-grade securities, and unrated securities. Debt securities are subject to a variety of risks, such as interest rate risk, income risk, call/prepayment risk, inflation risk, and credit risk.

The market value of the debt securities in which a Fund invests will change in response to interest rate changes and other factors. During periods of falling interest rates, the values of outstanding debt securities generally rise. Conversely, during periods of rising interest rates, the values of such securities generally decline. Moreover, while securities with longer maturities tend to produce higher yields, the prices of longer maturity securities are also subject to greater market fluctuations as a result of changes in interest rates. Changes in the value of these securities will not necessarily affect cash income derived from these securities but will affect a Fund's NAV. Additional information regarding debt securities is described below.

Credit risk. Debt securities are subject to the risk of an issuer's (or other party's) failure or inability to meet its obligations under the security. Multiple parties may have obligations under a debt security. An issuer or borrower may fail to pay principal and interest when due. A guarantor, insurer or credit support provider may fail to provide the agreed upon protection. A counterparty to a transaction may fail to perform its side of the bargain. An intermediary or agent interposed between the investor and other parties may fail to perform the terms of its service. Also, performance under a debt security may be linked to the obligations of other persons who may fail to meet their obligations. The credit risk associated with a debt security could increase to the extent that the Fund's ability to benefit fully from its investment in the security depends on the performance by multiple parties of their respective contractual or other obligations. The market value of a debt security is also affected by the market's perception of the creditworthiness of the issuer.

The Fund may incur substantial losses on debt securities that are inaccurately perceived to present a different amount of credit risk than they actually do by the market, the Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, or the rating agencies. Credit risk is generally greater where less information is publicly available, where fewer covenants safeguard the investors' interests, where collateral may be impaired or inadequate, where little legal redress or regulatory protection is available, or where a party's ability to meet obligations is speculative. Additionally, any inaccuracy in the information used by the Fund to evaluate credit risk may affect the value of securities held by the Fund.

Obligations under debt securities held by the Fund may never be satisfied or, if satisfied, only satisfied in part.

Credit ratings risk. The Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, performs its own independent investment analysis of securities being considered for the Fund's portfolio, which includes consideration of, among other things, the issuer's financial resources, its sensitivity to economic conditions and trends, its operating history, the quality of the issuer's management and regulatory matters. The Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, also considers the ratings assigned by various investment services and independent rating agencies, such as Moody's and S&P, which publish ratings based upon their assessment of the relative creditworthiness of the rated debt securities. Generally, a lower rating indicates higher credit risk. Higher yields are ordinarily available from debt securities in the lower rating categories.

Using credit ratings to evaluate debt securities can involve certain risks. For example, ratings assigned by the rating agencies are based upon an analysis completed at the time of the rating of the obligor's ability to pay interest and repay principal. Rating agencies typically rely to a large extent on historical data which may not accurately represent present or future circumstances. Ratings do not purport to reflect the risk of fluctuations in market value of the debt security and are not absolute standards of quality and only express the rating agency's current opinion of an obligor's overall financial capacity to pay its financial obligations. A credit rating is not a statement of fact or a recommendation to purchase, sell or hold a debt obligation. Also, credit quality can change suddenly and unexpectedly, and credit ratings may not reflect the issuer's current financial condition or events since the security was last rated. Rating agencies may have a financial interest in generating business, including from the arranger or issuer of the security that normally pays for that rating, and providing a low rating might affect the rating agency's prospects for future business. While rating agencies have policies and procedures to address this potential conflict of interest, there is a risk that these policies will fail to prevent a conflict of interest from impacting the rating.

Duration. Duration is a measure of the expected change in value of a debt security for a given change in interest rates. For example, if interest rates changed by one percent, the value of a security having an effective duration of two years generally would vary by two percent. Duration takes the length of the time intervals between the present time and time that the interest and principal payments are scheduled, or in the case of a callable bond, expected to be received, and weighs them by the present values of the cash to be received at each future point in time.

Income risk. The Fund is subject to income risk, which is the risk that the Fund's income will decline during periods of falling interest rates or when the Fund experiences defaults on debt securities it holds. The Fund's income declines when interest rates fall because, as the Fund's higher-yielding debt securities mature or are prepaid, the Fund must re-invest the proceeds in debt securities that have lower, prevailing interest rates. The amount and rate of distributions that the Fund's shareholders receive are affected by the income that the Fund receives from its portfolio holdings. If the income is reduced, distributions by the Fund to shareholders may be less.

Fluctuations in income paid to the Fund are generally greater for variable rate debt securities. The Fund will be deemed to receive taxable income on certain securities which pay no cash payments until maturity, such as zero-coupon securities. The Fund may be required to sell portfolio securities that it would otherwise continue to hold in order to obtain sufficient cash to make the distribution to shareholders required for U.S. tax purposes.

Inflation risk. The market price of debt securities generally falls as inflation increases because the purchasing power of the future income and repaid principal is expected to be worth less when received by the Fund. Debt securities that pay a fixed rather than variable interest rate are especially vulnerable to inflation risk because variable-rate debt securities may be able to participate, over the long term, in rising interest rates which have historically corresponded with long-term inflationary trends.

Interest rate risk. The market value of debt securities generally varies in response to changes in prevailing interest rates. Interest rate changes can be sudden and unpredictable. In addition, short-term and long-term rates are not necessarily correlated to each other as short-term rates tend to be influenced by government monetary policy while long-term rates are market driven and may be influenced by macroeconomic events (such as economic expansion or contraction), inflation expectations, as well as supply and demand. During periods of declining interest rates, the market value of debt securities generally increases. Conversely, during periods of rising interest rates, the market value of debt securities generally declines. This occurs because new debt securities are likely to be issued with higher interest rates as interest rates increase, making the old or outstanding debt securities less attractive. In general, the market prices of long-term debt securities or securities that make little (or no) interest payments are more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations than shorter-term debt securities. The longer the Fund's average weighted portfolio duration, the greater the potential impact a change in interest rates will have on its share price. Also, certain segments of the fixed income markets, such as high quality bonds, tend to be more sensitive to interest rate changes than other segments, such as lower-quality bonds.

Variable and Floating Rate Securities. Variable and floating rate instruments involve certain obligations that may carry variable or floating rates of interest, and may involve a conditional or unconditional demand feature. Such instruments bear interest at rates which are not fixed, but which vary with changes in specified market rates or indices. The interest rates on these securities may be reset daily, weekly, quarterly, or some other reset period, and may have a set floor or ceiling on interest rate changes. There is a risk that the current interest rate on such obligations may not accurately reflect existing market interest rates. A demand instrument with a demand notice exceeding seven days may be considered illiquid if there is no secondary market for such security.

Corporate Debt Securities. The Fund may invest in corporate debt securities. Corporate debt securities are typically fixed-income securities issued by businesses to finance their operations, but may also include bank loans to companies. Notes, bonds, debentures and commercial paper are the most common types of corporate debt securities. The primary differences between the different types of corporate debt securities are their maturities and secured or un-secured status. Commercial paper has the shortest term and is usually unsecured. The broad category of corporate debt securities includes debt issued by domestic or foreign companies of all kinds, including those with small-, mid- and large-capitalizations. Corporate debt may be rated investment-grade, below investment-grade or unrated and may carry variable or floating rates of interest.

Because of the wide range of types, and maturities, of corporate debt securities, as well as the range of creditworthiness of its issuers, corporate debt securities have widely varying potentials for return and risk profiles. For example, commercial paper issued by a large established domestic corporation that is rated investment-grade may have a modest return on principal, but is intended to carry relatively limited risk. On the other hand, a long-term corporate note issued by a small foreign corporation from an emerging market country that has not been rated may have the potential for relatively large returns on principal, but carries a relatively high degree of risk.

Corporate debt securities carry both credit risk and interest rate risk. Credit risk is the risk that a Fund could lose money if the issuer of a corporate debt security does not pay interest or principal when it is due. The credit risk of a particular issuer's debt security may vary based on its priority for repayment. For example, higher ranking (senior) debt securities have a higher priority than lower ranking (subordinated) securities. This means that the issuer might not make payments on subordinated securities while continuing to make payments on senior securities. In addition, in the event of bankruptcy, holders of higher-ranking senior securities may receive amounts otherwise payable to the holders of more junior securities. Interest rate risk is the risk that the value of certain corporate debt securities will tend to fall when interest rates rise. In general, corporate debt securities with longer terms tend to fall more in value when interest rates rise than corporate debt securities with shorter terms.

U.S. Government Securities. The Funds may invest in U.S. government securities. Securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government or its agencies or instrumentalities include U.S. Treasury securities, which are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury and which differ only in their interest rates, maturities, and times of issuance. U.S. Treasury bills have initial maturities of one-year or less; U.S. Treasury notes have initial maturities of one to ten years; and U.S. Treasury bonds generally have initial maturities of greater than ten years. Certain U.S. government securities are issued or guaranteed by agencies or instrumentalities of the U.S. government including, but not limited to, obligations of U.S. government agencies or instrumentalities such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae"), the Small Business Administration, the Federal Farm Credit Administration, the Federal Home Loan Banks, Banks for Cooperatives (including the Central Bank for Cooperatives), the Federal Land Banks, the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Federal Financing Bank, the National Credit Union Administration and the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation.

Some obligations issued or guaranteed by U.S. government agencies and instrumentalities, including, for example, Ginnie Mae pass-through certificates, are supported by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury. Other obligations issued by federal agencies, such as those securities issued by Fannie Mae, are not guaranteed by the U.S. government. No assurance can be given that the U.S. government will provide financial support to such issuers since the U.S. government is not so obligated by law. U.S. Treasury notes and bonds typically pay coupon interest semi-annually and repay the principal at maturity.

Since 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been in conservatorship and have received significant capital support through U.S. Treasury preferred stock purchases, as well as U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve purchases of their mortgage-backed securities. The Federal Housing Finance Agency ("FHFA") and the U.S. Treasury (through its agreement to purchase Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac preferred stock) have imposed strict limits on the size of their mortgage portfolios. The mortgage-backed security purchase programs ended in 2010. An FHFA stress test suggested that in a "severely adverse scenario" significant additional Treasury support might be required. No assurance can be given that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will remain successful in meeting their obligations with respect to the debt and mortgage-backed securities that they issue.

In addition, the problems faced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, resulting in their being placed into federal conservatorship and receiving significant U.S. government support, have sparked serious debate among federal policy makers regarding the continued role of the U.S. government in providing liquidity for mortgage loans. In December 2011, Congress enacted the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 which, among other provisions, requires that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac increase their single-family guaranty fees by at least 10 basis points and remit this increase to Treasury with respect to all loans acquired by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac on or after April 1, 2012 and before January 1, 2022. Nevertheless, discussions among policymakers have continued as to whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should be nationalized, privatized, restructured, or eliminated altogether. Fannie Mae reported in the third quarter of 2017 that there was “significant uncertainty regarding the future of our company, including how long the company will continue to exist in its current form, the extent of our role in the market, how long we will be in conservatorship, what form we will have and what ownership interest, if any, our current common and preferred stockholders will hold in us after the conservatorship is terminated, and whether we will continue to exist following conservatorship.” Freddie Mac faces similar uncertainty about its future role. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also are the subject of several continuing legal actions and investigations related to certain accounting, disclosure, or corporate governance matters, which (along with any resulting financial restatements) may continue to have an adverse effect on the guaranteeing entities. Congress is currently considering several pieces of legislation that would reform U.S. government sponsored enterprises, proposing to address their structure, mission, portfolio limits, and guarantee fees, among other issues.

U.S. Treasury Obligations. U.S. Treasury obligations consist of bills, notes and bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury and separately traded interest and principal component parts of such obligations that are transferable through the federal book-entry system known as Separately Traded Registered Interest and Principal Securities (“STRIPS”) and Treasury Receipts (“TRs”).

Inflation-Indexed Bonds. Inflation-indexed bonds, such as U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (“TIPS”), are debt securities whose principal value is periodically adjusted according to the rate of inflation. Two structures are common. The U.S. Treasury and some other issuers use a structure that accrues inflation into the principal value of the bond. When TIPS mature, investors are paid the adjusted principal or original principal, whichever is greater. Most other issuers pay out the Consumer Price Index accruals as part of a semiannual coupon. Inflation-indexed bonds generally pay a lower nominal interest rate than a comparable non-inflation-indexed bond.

Inflation-indexed securities issued by the U.S. Treasury have maturities of five, ten or thirty years, although it is possible that securities with other maturities will be issued in the future. The U.S. Treasury securities pay interest on a semi-annual basis, equal to a fixed percentage of the inflation-adjusted principal amount. For example, if the Fund purchased an inflation-indexed bond with a par value of \$1,000 and a 3% real rate of return coupon (payable 1.5% semi-annually), and inflation over the first six months were 1%, the mid-year par value of the bond would be \$1,010 and the first semi-annual interest payment would be \$15.15 (\$1,010 times 1.5%). If inflation during the second half of the year resulted in the whole years’ inflation equaling 3%, the end-of-year par value of the bond would be \$1,030 and the second semiannual interest payment would be \$15.45 (\$1,030 times 1.5%).

If the periodic adjustment rate measuring inflation falls, the principal value of inflation-indexed bonds will be adjusted downward, and consequently the interest payable on these securities (calculated with respect to a smaller principal amount) will be reduced. Repayment of the original bond principal upon maturity (as adjusted for inflation) is guaranteed in the case of U.S. Treasury inflation-indexed bonds, even during a period of deflation. However, the current market value of the bonds is not guaranteed and will fluctuate. The Fund may also invest in other inflation related bonds which may or may not provide a similar guarantee. If a guarantee of principal is not provided, the adjusted principal value of the bond repaid at maturity may be less than the original principal.

The value of inflation-indexed bonds is expected to change in response to changes in real interest rates. Real interest rates in turn are tied to the relationship between nominal interest rates and the rate of inflation. Therefore, if inflation were to rise at a faster rate than nominal interest rates, real interest rates might decline, leading to an increase in value of inflation-indexed bonds. In contrast, if nominal interest rates increased at a faster rate than inflation, real interest rates might rise, leading to a decrease in value of inflation-indexed bonds.

While these securities are expected to be protected from long-term inflationary trends, short-term increases in inflation may lead to a decline in value. If interest rates rise due to reasons other than inflation (for example, due to changes in currency exchange rates), investors in these securities may not be protected to the extent that the increase is not reflected in the bond's inflation measure.

The periodic adjustment of U.S. inflation-indexed bonds is tied to the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers ("CPI-U"), which is calculated monthly by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The CPI-U is a measurement of changes in the cost of living, made up of components such as housing, food, transportation and energy. Inflation-indexed bonds issued by a foreign government are generally adjusted to reflect a comparable inflation index, calculated by that government. There can be no assurance that the CPI-U or any foreign inflation index will accurately measure the real rate of inflation in the prices of goods and services. Moreover, there can be no assurance that the rate of inflation in a foreign country will be correlated to the rate of inflation in the United States.

Any increase in the principal amount of an inflation-indexed bond will be considered taxable ordinary income, even though investors do not receive their principal until maturity.

Interests in separately traded interest and principal component parts of U.S. government obligations that are issued by banks or brokerage firms and are created by depositing U.S. government obligations into a special account at a custodian bank. The custodian holds the interest and principal payments for the benefit of the registered owners of the certificates or receipts. The custodian arranges for the issuance of the certificates or receipts evidencing ownership and maintains the register. TRs and STRIPS are interests in accounts sponsored by the U.S. Treasury. Receipts are sold as zero coupon securities.

U.S. Government Zero Coupon Securities. STRIPS and receipts are sold as zero coupon securities, that is, fixed income securities that have been stripped of their unmatured interest coupons. Zero coupon securities are typically sold at a (usually substantial) discount and redeemed at face value at their maturity date without interim cash payments of interest or principal. The amount of this discount is accreted over the life of the security, and the accretion constitutes the income earned on the security for both accounting and tax purposes. Because of these features, the market prices of zero coupon securities are generally more volatile than the market prices of securities that have similar maturity but that pay interest periodically. Zero coupon securities are likely to respond to a greater degree to interest rate changes than are non-zero coupon securities with similar maturity and credit qualities.

U.S. Government Agencies. Some obligations issued or guaranteed by agencies of the U.S. government are supported by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury, others are supported by the right of the issuer to borrow from the U.S. Treasury, while still others are supported only by the credit of the instrumentality. Guarantees of principal by agencies or instrumentalities of the U.S. government may be a guarantee of payment at the maturity of the obligation so that in the event of a default prior to maturity there might not be a market and thus no means of realizing on the obligation prior to maturity. Guarantees as to the timely payment of principal and interest do not extend to the value or yield of these securities nor to the value of a Fund's shares.

Derivatives

The Funds may use derivative instruments as part of their investment strategies. Generally, derivatives are financial contracts the value of which depends upon, or is derived from, the value of an underlying asset, reference rate or index, and may relate to bonds, interest rates, currencies, commodities, and related indexes. Examples of derivative instruments include forward currency contracts, currency and interest rate swaps, currency options, futures contracts, including index futures, options on futures contracts, structured notes, and swap contracts. A Fund's use of derivative instruments may be collateralized by investments in short term, high-quality U.S. money market securities.

Because a Fund may enter into (or "open") certain derivatives contracts with an initial investment that is less than the notional value of the contract, such contracts provide inherent economic leverage equal to the difference between the initial investment requirement (also known as initial margin requirement) and the notional value of the contract. A Fund's use of derivatives may be limited by the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code") for qualification as a regulated investment company for U.S. federal tax purposes.

The SEC adopted Rule 18f-4 under the 1940 Act, which regulates the use of derivatives for certain funds registered under the Investment Company Act ("Rule 18f-4"). Unless a fund qualifies as a "limited derivatives user" as defined in Rule 18f-4, Rule 18f-4, among other things, requires the fund to establish a comprehensive derivatives risk management program, to comply with certain value-at-risk based leverage limits, to appoint a derivatives risk manager and to provide additional disclosure both publicly and to the SEC regarding its derivatives positions. For funds that qualify as limited derivatives users, Rule 18f-4 requires a fund to have policies and procedures to manage its aggregate derivatives risk.

To the extent a Fund transacts in commodity interests (e.g., futures contracts, swap agreements, non-deliverable forward contracts), it will do so only in accordance with Rule 4.5 of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). Krane, on behalf of each Fund, has filed or will file a notice of eligibility for exclusion from the definition of the term "commodity pool operator" in accordance with Rule 4.5 so that it is not subject to registration or regulation as a commodity pool operator under the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA").

Swap Contracts. Generally, swap agreements are contracts between the Fund and another party (the swap counterparty) involving the exchange of payments on specified terms over periods ranging from a few days to multiple years. A swap agreement may be negotiated bilaterally and traded OTC between the two parties (for an uncleared swap) or, in some instances, must be transacted through a Futures Commission Merchant ("FCM") and cleared through a clearinghouse that serves as a central counterparty (for a cleared swap). In a basic swap transaction, the Fund agrees with the swap counterparty to exchange the returns (or differentials in rates of return) and/or cash flows earned or realized on a particular "notional amount" or value of predetermined underlying reference instruments. The notional amount is the set dollar or other value selected by the parties to use as the basis on which to calculate the obligations that the parties to a swap agreement have agreed to exchange. The parties typically do not actually exchange the notional amount. Instead, they agree to exchange the returns that would be earned or realized if the notional amount were invested in given investments or at given interest rates. Examples of returns that may be exchanged in a swap agreement are those of a particular security, a particular fixed or variable interest rate, a particular non-U.S. currency, or a "basket" of securities representing a particular index. Swaps can also be based on credit and other events.

The Fund will generally enter into swap agreements on a net basis, which means that the two payment streams that are to be made by the Fund and its counterparty with respect to a particular swap agreement are netted out, with the Fund receiving or paying, as the case may be, only the net difference in the two payments. The Fund's obligations (or rights) under a swap agreement that is entered into on a net basis will generally be the net amount to be paid or received under the agreement based on the relative values of the obligations of each party upon termination of the agreement or at set valuation dates. The Fund will accrue its obligations under a swap agreement daily (offset by any amounts the counterparty owes the Fund). If the swap agreement does not provide for that type of netting, the full amount of the Fund's obligations will be accrued on a daily basis.

Comprehensive swaps regulation. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the "Dodd-Frank Act") and related regulatory developments imposed comprehensive regulatory requirements on swaps and swap market participants. The new regulatory framework includes: (1) registration and regulation of swap dealers and major swap participants; (2) requiring central clearing and execution of standardized swaps; (3) imposing margin requirements on swap transactions; (4) regulating and monitoring swap transactions through position limits and large trader reporting requirements; and (5) imposing record keeping and centralized and public reporting requirements, on an anonymous basis, for most swaps. The CFTC is responsible for the regulation of most swaps. The SEC has jurisdiction over a small segment of the market referred to as "security-based swaps," which includes swaps on single securities or credits, or narrow-based indices of securities or credits.

Uncleared swaps. In an uncleared swap, the swap counterparty is typically a brokerage firm, bank or other financial institution. The Fund customarily enters into uncleared swaps based on the standard terms and conditions of an International Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA") Master Agreement. ISDA is a voluntary industry association of participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets that has developed standardized contracts used by such participants that have agreed to be bound by such standardized contracts. In the event that one party to a swap transaction defaults and the transaction is terminated prior to its scheduled termination date, one of the parties may be required to make an early termination payment to the other. An early termination payment may be payable by either the defaulting or non-defaulting party, depending upon which of them is "in-the-money" with respect to the swap at the time of its termination. Early termination payments may be calculated in various ways, but are intended to approximate the amount the "in-the-money" party would have to pay to replace the swap as of the date of its termination.

During the term of an uncleared swap, the Fund is required to pledge to the swap counterparty, from time to time, an amount of cash and/or other assets equal to the total net amount (if any) that would be payable by the Fund to the counterparty if all outstanding swaps between the parties were terminated on the date in question, including any early termination payments ("variation margin"). Periodically, changes in the amount pledged are made to recognize changes in value of the contract resulting from, among other things, interest on the notional value of the contract, market value changes in the underlying investment, and/or dividends paid by the issuer of the underlying instrument. Likewise, the counterparty will be required to pledge cash or other assets to cover its obligations to the Fund. However, the amount pledged may not always be equal to or more than the amount due to the other party. Therefore, if a counterparty defaults in its obligations to the Fund, the amount pledged by the counterparty and available to the Fund may not be sufficient to cover all the amounts due to the Fund and the Fund may sustain a loss.

Currently, the Fund does not typically provide initial margin in connection with uncleared swaps. However, rules requiring initial margin for uncleared swaps have been adopted and are being phased in over time. When these rules take effect, if the Fund is deemed to have material swaps exposure under applicable swap regulations, the Fund will be required to post initial margin in addition to variation margin.

Uncleared OTC contracts. In an uncleared OTC contract, the counterparty is typically a brokerage firm, bank or other financial institution. The Fund customarily enters into uncleared OTC contract based on the standard terms and conditions of an ISDA Master Agreement. ISDA is a voluntary industry association of participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets that has developed standardized contracts used by such participants that have agreed to be bound by such standardized contracts. In the event that one party to the OTC transaction defaults and the transaction is terminated prior to its scheduled termination date, the counterparty may be required to make an early termination payment to the fund. An early termination payment may be payable by either the defaulting or non-defaulting party. Early termination payments may be calculated in various ways, but are intended to approximate the amount the “in-the-money” party would have to pay to replace the OTC contract as of the date of its termination.

Currently, the Fund does not typically provide initial margin in connection with an uncleared OTC contract. However, rules requiring initial margin for uncleared OTC contracts have been adopted and are being phased in over time. When these rules take effect, if the Fund is deemed to have material swaps exposure under applicable swap regulations, the Fund will be required to post initial margin.

Cleared swaps. Certain standardized swaps are subject to mandatory central clearing and exchange-trading. The Dodd-Frank Act and implementing rules will ultimately require the clearing and exchange-trading of many swaps. Mandatory exchange-trading and clearing will occur on a phased-in basis based on the type of market participant, CFTC approval of contracts for central clearing and public trading facilities making such cleared swaps available to trade. To date, the CFTC has designated only certain of the most common types of credit default index swaps and interest rate swaps as subject to mandatory clearing and certain public trading facilities have made certain of those cleared swaps available to trade, but it is expected that additional categories of swaps will in the future be designated as subject to mandatory clearing and trade execution requirements. Central clearing is intended to reduce counterparty credit risk and increase liquidity, but central clearing does not eliminate these risks and may involve additional costs and risks not involved with uncleared swaps. See “Risks of cleared swaps” below.

In a cleared swap, the Fund’s ultimate counterparty is a central clearinghouse rather than a brokerage firm, bank or other financial institution. Cleared swaps are submitted for clearing through each party’s FCM, which must be a member of the clearinghouse that serves as the central counterparty. Transactions executed on a swap execution facility (“SEF”) may increase market transparency and liquidity but may require the Fund to incur increased expenses to access the same types of swaps that it has used in the past. When the Fund enters into a cleared swap, it must deliver to the central counterparty (via the FCM) an amount referred to as “initial margin.” Initial margin requirements are determined by the central counterparty, and are typically calculated as an amount equal to the volatility in market value of the cleared swap over a fixed period, but an FCM may require additional initial margin above the amount required by the central counterparty. During the term of the swap agreement, a “variation margin” amount may also be required to be paid by the Fund or may be received by the Fund in accordance with margin controls set for such accounts. If the value of the Fund’s cleared swap declines, the Fund will be required to make additional “variation margin” payments to the FCM to settle the change in value. Conversely, if the market value of the Fund’s position increases, the FCM will post additional “variation margin” to the Fund’s account. At the conclusion of the term of the swap agreement, if the Fund has a loss equal to or greater than the margin amount, the margin amount is paid to the FCM along with any loss in excess of the margin amount. If the Fund has a loss of less than the margin amount, the excess margin is returned to the Fund. If the Fund has a gain, the full margin amount and the amount of the gain are paid to the Fund.

Interest rate swaps. An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange interest rate payment obligations. Typically, one party's obligation is based on an interest rate fixed to maturity while the other party's obligation is based on an interest rate that changes in accordance with changes in a designated benchmark (for example, SOFR, prime rate, commercial paper rate, or other benchmarks). Alternatively, both payment obligations may be based on an interest rate that changes in accordance with changes in a designated benchmark (also known as a "basis swap"). In a basis swap, the rates may be based on different benchmarks (for example, SOFR versus commercial paper) or on different terms of the same benchmark (for example, one-month SOFR versus three-month SOFR). Each party's payment obligation under an interest rate swap is determined by reference to a specified "notional" amount of money. Therefore, interest rate swaps generally do not involve the delivery of securities, other underlying instruments, or principal amounts; rather they entail the exchange of cash payments based on the application of the designated interest rates to the notional amount. Accordingly, barring swap counterparty or FCM default, the risk of loss in an interest rate swap is limited to the net amount of interest payments that the Fund is obligated to make or receive (as applicable), as well as any early termination payment payable by or to the Fund upon early termination of the swap.

By swapping fixed interest rate payments for floating payments, an interest rate swap can be used to increase or decrease the Fund's exposure to various interest rates, including to hedge interest rate risk. Interest rate swaps are generally used to permit the party seeking a floating rate obligation the opportunity to acquire such obligation at a rate lower than is directly available in the credit markets, while permitting the party desiring a fixed-rate obligation the opportunity to acquire such a fixed-rate obligation, also frequently at a rate lower than is directly available in the credit markets. The success of such a transaction depends in large part on the availability of fixed-rate obligations at interest (or coupon) rates low enough to cover the costs involved. Similarly, a basis swap can be used to increase or decrease the Fund's exposure to various interest rates, including to hedge against or speculate on the spread between the two indexes, or to manage duration. An interest rate swap transaction is affected by change in interest rates, which, in turn, may affect the prepayment rate of any underlying debt obligations upon which the interest rate swap is based.

Inflation index swaps. An inflation index swap is a contract between two parties, whereby one party makes payments based on the cumulative percentage increase in an index that serves as a measure of inflation (typically, the Consumer Price Index) and the other party makes a regular payment based on a compounded fixed rate. Each party's payment obligation under the swap is determined by reference to a specified "notional" amount of money. Typically, an inflation index swap has payment obligations netted and exchanged upon maturity. The value of an inflation index swap is expected to change in response to changes in the rate of inflation. If inflation increases at a faster rate than anticipated at the time the swap is entered into, the swap will increase in value. Similarly, if inflation increases at a rate slower than anticipated at the time the swap is entered into, the swap will decrease in value.

Risks of swaps generally. The use of swap transactions is a highly specialized activity, which involves investment techniques and risks different from those associated with ordinary portfolio securities transactions. Whether the Fund will be successful in using swap agreements to achieve its investment goal depends on the ability of the Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, to correctly predict which types of investments are likely to produce greater returns. If the Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, in using swap agreements, is incorrect in its forecasts of market values, interest rates, inflation, currency exchange rates or other applicable factors, the investment performance of the Fund will be less than its performance would have been if it had not used the swap agreements.

The risk of loss to the Fund for swap transactions that are entered into on a net basis depends on which party is obligated to pay the net amount to the other party. If the counterparty is obligated to pay the net amount to the Fund, the risk of loss to the Fund is loss of the entire amount that the Fund is entitled to receive. If the Fund is obligated to pay the net amount, the Fund's risk of loss is generally limited to that net amount. If the swap agreement involves the exchange of the entire principal value of a security, the entire principal value of that security is subject to the risk that the other party to the swap will default on its contractual delivery obligations. In addition, the Fund's risk of loss also includes any margin at risk in the event of default by the counterparty (in an uncleared swap) or the central counterparty or FCM (in a cleared swap), plus any transaction costs.

Because bilateral swap agreements are structured as two-party contracts and may have terms of greater than seven days, these swaps may be considered to be illiquid and, therefore, subject to the Fund's limitation on investments in illiquid securities. If a swap transaction is particularly large or if the relevant market is illiquid, the Fund may not be able to establish or liquidate a position at an advantageous time or price, which may result in significant losses. Participants in the swap markets are not required to make continuous markets in the swap contracts they trade. Participants could refuse to quote prices for swap contracts or quote prices with an unusually wide spread between the price at which they are prepared to buy and the price at which they are prepared to sell. Some swap agreements entail complex terms and may require a greater degree of subjectivity in their valuation. However, the swap markets have grown substantially in recent years, with a large number of financial institutions acting both as principals and agents, utilizing standardized swap documentation. As a result, the swap markets have become increasingly liquid. In addition, central clearing and the trading of cleared swaps on public facilities are intended to increase liquidity. The Adviser or sub-adviser, as applicable, under the supervision of the Board, is responsible for determining and monitoring the liquidity of the Fund's swap transactions.

Rules adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act require centralized reporting of detailed information about many swaps, whether cleared or uncleared. This information is available to regulators and also, to a more limited extent and on an anonymous basis, to the public. Reporting of swap data is intended to result in greater market transparency. This may be beneficial to funds that use swaps in their trading strategies. However, public reporting imposes additional recordkeeping burdens on these funds, and the safeguards established to protect anonymity are not yet tested and may not provide protection of fund's identities as intended.

Certain Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") positions may limit the Fund's ability to use swap agreements in a desired tax strategy. For more information about taxes, see "Taxes" below. It is possible that developments in the swap markets and/or the laws relating to swap agreements, including potential government regulation, could adversely affect the Fund's ability to benefit from using swap agreements, or could have adverse tax consequences. For more information about potentially changing regulation, see "Developing government regulation of derivatives" below.

Risks of uncleared swaps. Uncleared swaps are typically executed bilaterally with a swap dealer rather than traded on exchanges. As a result, swap participants may not be as protected as participants on organized exchanges. Performance of a swap agreement is the responsibility only of the swap counterparty and not of any exchange or clearinghouse. As a result, the Fund is subject to the risk that a counterparty will be unable or will refuse to perform under such agreement, including because of the counterparty's bankruptcy or insolvency. The Fund risks the loss of the accrued but unpaid amounts under a swap agreement, which could be substantial, in the event of a default, insolvency or bankruptcy by a swap counterparty. In such an event, the Fund will have contractual remedies pursuant to the swap agreements, but bankruptcy and insolvency laws could affect the Fund's rights as a creditor. If the counterparty's creditworthiness declines, the value of a swap agreement would likely decline, potentially resulting in losses. The Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, will only approve a swap agreement counterparty for the Fund if the Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, deems the counterparty to be creditworthy. However, in unusual or extreme market conditions, a counterparty's creditworthiness and ability to perform may deteriorate rapidly, and the availability of suitable replacement counterparties may become limited.

Risks of cleared swaps. As noted above, under recent financial reforms, certain types of swaps are, and others eventually are expected to be, required to be cleared through a central counterparty, which may affect counterparty risk and other risks faced by the Fund.

Central clearing is designed to reduce counterparty credit risk and increase liquidity compared to uncleared swaps because central clearing interposes the central clearinghouse as the counterparty to each participant's swap, but it does not eliminate those risks completely. There is also a risk of loss by the Fund of the initial and variation margin deposits in the event of bankruptcy of the FCM with which the Fund has an open position, or the central counterparty in a swap contract. The assets of the Fund may not be fully protected in the event of the bankruptcy of the FCM or central counterparty because the Fund might be limited to recovering only a pro rata share of all available funds and margin segregated on behalf of an FCM's customers. If the FCM does not provide accurate reporting, the Fund is also subject to the risk that the FCM could use the Fund's assets, which are held in an omnibus account with assets belonging to the FCM's other customers, to satisfy its own financial obligations or the payment obligations of another customer to the central counterparty. Credit risk of cleared swap participants is concentrated in a few clearinghouses, and the consequences of insolvency of a clearinghouse are not clear.

With cleared swaps, the Fund may not be able to obtain as favorable terms as it would be able to negotiate for a bilateral, uncleared swap. In addition, an FCM may unilaterally amend the terms of its agreement with the Fund, which may include the imposition of position limits or additional margin requirements with respect to the Fund's investment in certain types of swaps. Central counterparties and FCMs can require termination of existing cleared swap transactions upon the occurrence of certain events, and can also require increases in margin above the margin that is required at the initiation of the swap agreement.

Finally, the Fund is subject to the risk that, after entering into a cleared swap with an executing broker, no FCM or central counterparty is willing or able to clear the transaction. In such an event, the Fund may be required to break the trade and make an early termination payment to the executing broker.

Combined transactions. The Fund may enter into multiple derivative instruments, and any combination of derivative instruments as part of a single or combined strategy (a "Combined Transaction") when the Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, believes it is in the best interests of the Fund to do so. A Combined Transaction will usually contain elements of risk that are present in each of its component transactions.

Although Combined Transactions are normally entered into based on the Adviser's, or sub-adviser's, as applicable, judgment that the combined strategies will reduce risk or otherwise more effectively achieve the desired portfolio management goal(s), it is possible that the combination will instead increase such risks or hinder achievement of the portfolio management objective.

Developing government regulation of derivatives. The regulation of cleared and uncleared swaps, as well as other derivatives, is a rapidly changing area of law and is subject to modification by government and judicial action. In addition, the SEC, CFTC and the exchanges are authorized to take extraordinary actions in the event of a market emergency, including, for example, the implementation or reduction of speculative position limits, the implementation of higher margin requirements, the establishment of daily price limits and the suspension of trading.

It is not possible to predict fully the effects of current or future regulation. However, it is possible that developments in government regulation of various types of derivative instruments, such as speculative position limits on certain types of derivatives, or limits or restrictions on the counterparties with which the Fund engages in derivative transactions, may limit or prevent the Fund from using or limit the Fund's use of these instruments effectively as a part of its investment strategy, and could adversely affect the Fund's ability to achieve its investment goal(s). The Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, will continue to monitor developments in the area, particularly to the extent regulatory changes affect the Fund's ability to enter into desired swap agreements. New requirements, even if not directly applicable to the Fund, may increase the cost of the Fund's investments and cost of doing business.

Options. An option is a contract that gives the purchaser of the option, in return for the premium paid, the right to buy an underlying reference instrument, such as a specified security, currency, index, or other instrument, from the writer of the option (in the case of a call option), or to sell a specified reference instrument to the writer of the option (in the case of a put option) at a designated price during the term of the option. The premium paid by the buyer of an option will reflect, among other things, the relationship of the exercise price to the market price and the volatility of the underlying reference instrument, the remaining term of the option, supply, demand, interest rates and/or currency exchange rates. An American style put or call option may be exercised at any time during the option period while a European style put or call option may be exercised only upon expiration or during a fixed period prior thereto. Put and call options are traded on national securities exchanges and in the OTC market.

Options traded on national securities exchanges are within the jurisdiction of the SEC or other appropriate national securities regulator, as are securities traded on such exchanges. As a result, many of the protections provided to traders on organized exchanges will be available with respect to such transactions. In particular, all option positions entered into on a national securities exchange in the United States are cleared and guaranteed by the Options Clearing Corporation, thereby reducing the risk of counterparty default. Furthermore, a liquid secondary market in options traded on a national securities exchange may be more readily available than in the OTC market. There is no assurance, however, that higher than anticipated trading activity or other unforeseen events might not temporarily render the capabilities of the Options Clearing Corporation inadequate, and thereby result in the exchange instituting special procedures which may interfere with the timely execution of the Fund's orders to close out open options positions.

Purchasing call and put options. As the buyer of a call option, the Fund has a right to buy the underlying reference instrument at the exercise price at any time during the option period (for American style options). The Fund may enter into closing sale transactions with respect to call options, exercise them, or permit them to expire. For example, the Fund may buy call options on underlying reference instruments that it intends to buy with the goal of limiting the risk of a substantial increase in their market price before the purchase is effected. Unless the price of the underlying reference instrument changes sufficiently, a call option purchased by the Fund may expire without any value to the Fund, in which case the Fund would experience a loss to the extent of the premium paid for the option plus related transaction costs.

As the buyer of a put option, the Fund has the right to sell the underlying reference instrument at the exercise price at any time during the option period (for American style options). Like a call option, the Fund may enter into closing sale transactions with respect to put options, exercise them or permit them to expire. The Fund may buy a put option on an underlying reference instrument owned by the Fund (a protective put) as a hedging technique in an attempt to protect against an anticipated decline in the market value of the underlying reference instrument. Such hedge protection is provided only during the life of the put option when the Fund, as the buyer of the put option, is able to sell the underlying reference instrument at the put exercise price, regardless of any decline in the underlying instrument's market price. The Fund may also seek to offset a decline in the value of the underlying reference instrument through appreciation in the value of the put option. A put option may also be purchased with the intent of protecting unrealized appreciation of an instrument when the Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, deems it desirable to hold the instrument because of tax or other considerations. The premium paid for the put option and any transaction costs would reduce any short-term capital gain that may be available for distribution when the instrument is eventually sold. Buying put options at a time when the buyer does not own the underlying reference instrument allows the buyer to benefit from a decline in the market price of the underlying reference instrument, which generally increases the value of the put option.

If a put option was not terminated in a closing sale transaction when it has remaining value, and if the market price of the underlying reference instrument remains equal to or greater than the exercise price during the life of the put option, the buyer would not make any gain upon exercise of the option and would experience a loss to the extent of the premium paid for the option plus related transaction costs. For the purchase of a put option to be profitable, the market price of the underlying reference instrument must decline sufficiently below the exercise price to cover the premium and transaction costs.

Writing call and put options. Writing options may permit the writer to generate additional income in the form of the premium received for writing the option. The writer of an option may have no control over when the underlying reference instruments must be sold (in the case of a call option) or purchased (in the case of a put option) because the writer may be notified of exercise at any time prior to the expiration of the option (for American style options). In general, though, options are infrequently exercised prior to expiration. Whether or not an option expires unexercised, the writer retains the amount of the premium. Writing “covered” call options means that the writer owns the underlying reference instrument that is subject to the call option. Call options may also be written on reference instruments that the writer does not own.

If the Fund writes a covered call option, any underlying reference instruments that are held by the Fund and are subject to the call option will be earmarked on the books of the Fund as segregated to satisfy its obligations under the option. The Fund will be unable to sell the underlying reference instruments that are subject to the written call option until it either effects a closing transaction with respect to the written call, or otherwise satisfies the conditions for release of the underlying reference instruments from segregation. As the writer of a covered call option, the Fund gives up the potential for capital appreciation above the exercise price of the option should the underlying reference instrument rise in value. If the value of the underlying reference instrument rises above the exercise price of the call option, the reference instrument will likely be “called away,” requiring the Fund to sell the underlying instrument at the exercise price. In that case, the Fund will sell the underlying reference instrument to the option buyer for less than its market value, and the Fund will experience a loss (which will be offset by the premium received by the Fund as the writer of such option). If a call option expires unexercised, the Fund will realize a gain in the amount of the premium received. If the market price of the underlying reference instrument decreases, the call option will not be exercised and the Fund will be able to use the amount of the premium received to hedge against the loss in value of the underlying reference instrument. The exercise price of a call option will be chosen based upon the expected price movement of the underlying reference instrument. The exercise price of a call option may be below, equal to (at-the-money), or above the current value of the underlying reference instrument at the time the option is written.

As the writer of a put option, the Fund has a risk of loss should the underlying reference instrument decline in value. If the value of the underlying reference instrument declines below the exercise price of the put option and the put option is exercised, the Fund, as the writer of the put option, will be required to buy the instrument at the exercise price, which will exceed the market value of the underlying reference instrument at that time. The Fund will incur a loss to the extent that the current market value of the underlying reference instrument is less than the exercise price of the put option. However, the loss will be offset in part by the premium received from the buyer of the put. If a put option written by the Fund expires unexercised, the Fund will realize a gain in the amount of the premium received.

Closing out options (exchange-traded options). If the writer of an option wants to terminate its obligation, the writer may effect a “closing purchase transaction” by buying an option of the same series as the option previously written. The effect of the purchase is that the clearing corporation will cancel the option writer’s position. However, a writer may not effect a closing purchase transaction after being notified of the exercise of an option. Likewise, the buyer of an option may recover all or a portion of the premium that it paid by effecting a “closing sale transaction” by selling an option of the same series as the option previously purchased and receiving a premium on the sale. There is no guarantee that either a closing purchase or a closing sale transaction may be made at a time desired by the Fund. Closing transactions allow the Fund to terminate its positions in written and purchased options. The Fund will realize a profit from a closing transaction if the price of the transaction is less than the premium received from writing the original option (in the case of written options) or is more than the premium paid by the Fund to buy the option (in the case of purchased options). For example, increases in the market price of a call option sold by the Fund will generally reflect increases in the market price of the underlying reference instrument. As a result, any loss resulting from a closing transaction on a written call option is likely to be offset in whole or in part by appreciation of the underlying instrument owned by the Fund.

OTC options. Like exchange-traded options, OTC options give the holder the right to buy from the writer, in the case of OTC call options, or sell to the writer, in the case of OTC put options, an underlying reference instrument at a stated exercise price. OTC options, however, differ from exchange-traded options in certain material respects.

OTC options are arranged directly with dealers and not with a clearing corporation or exchange. Consequently, there is a risk of non-performance by the dealer, including because of the dealer’s bankruptcy or insolvency. While the Fund uses only counterparties, such as dealers, that meet its credit quality standards, in unusual or extreme market conditions, a counterparty’s creditworthiness and ability to perform may deteriorate rapidly, and the availability of suitable replacement counterparties may become limited. Because there is no exchange, pricing is typically done based on information from market makers or other dealers. OTC options are available for a greater variety of underlying reference instruments and in a wider range of expiration dates and exercise prices than exchange-traded options.

There can be no assurance that a continuous liquid secondary market will exist for any particular OTC option at any specific time. The Fund may be able to realize the value of an OTC option it has purchased only by exercising it or entering into a closing sale transaction with the dealer that issued it. When the Fund writes an OTC option, it generally can close out that option prior to its expiration only by entering into a closing purchase transaction with the dealer with which the Fund originally wrote the option. The Fund may suffer a loss if it is not able to exercise (in the case of a purchased option) or enter into a closing sale transaction on a timely basis.

Closing out options (OTC options). If the holder of an option wants to close out its position, the holder may effect a “novation” by selling short (borrowing) an option of the same series as the option previously purchased from a different counterparty. The effect of the sale/borrowing is the cancellation of the option writer’s position once a novation among the counterparties has been completed to close out the position. There is no guarantee that either a closing purchase or a closing sale transaction may be made at a time desired by the Fund. Closing transactions allow the Fund to terminate its positions in written and purchased options. The Fund will realize a profit from a closing transaction if the price of the transaction is less than the premium received from writing the original option (in the case of written options) or is more than the premium paid by the Fund to buy the option (in the case of purchased options). For example, increases in the market price of a call option sold by the Fund will generally reflect increases in the market price of the underlying reference instrument. As a result, any loss resulting from a closing transaction on a written call option is likely to be offset in whole or in part by appreciation of the underlying instrument owned by the Fund.

Interest rate cap options. An interest rate cap is a type of OTC option. The buyer of an interest rate cap option pays an up-front premium to the seller in exchange for a promise by that counterparty to pay at expiration the difference between the floating interest rate at expiration and the strike of the option if the floating rate is above the strike at expiry.

The floating interest rate may be tied to a reference rate or the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”) or other benchmark. The amount of each payment is determined by reference to a specified number of options contracts and the amount of in the moneyness. Interest rate cap options are cash settled at expiration and do not involve the delivery of securities, other underlying instruments, or principal amounts. Accordingly, barring counterparty risk, the risk of loss to the purchaser of an interest rate cap is limited to the amount of the premium paid.

Interest rate cap options can be used to increase or decrease exposure to various interest rates, including to hedge interest rate risk. By purchasing an interest rate cap option, the buyer of the cap option can benefit from a higher reference rate if that rate rises. If the reference rate falls below the strike rate, the interest rate cap option will expire worthless.

The risks of owning interest rate cap options include the risk of loss from changes in the value of interest rate forwards, implied correlation, and market implied volatility. Interest rate cap options also involve the risks associated with derivative instruments generally, as described herein, including the risks associated with OTC options. Interest rate cap options owned by the Fund may not generate positive returns, may lose money or may expire worthless, causing losses to the Fund.

Interest rate floor option. An interest rate floor is a type of OTC option. The buyer of an interest rate floor option pays an up-front premium to the seller in exchange for a promise by that counterparty to pay at expiration the difference between the floating interest rate at expiration and the strike of the option if the floating rate is below the strike at expiry.

The floating interest rate may be tied to a reference rate or the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”) or other benchmark. The amount of each payment is determined by reference to a specified number of options contracts and the amount of in the moneyness. Interest rate floor options are cash settled at expiration and do not involve the delivery of securities, other underlying instruments, or principal amounts. Accordingly, barring counterparty risk, the risk of loss to the purchaser of an interest rate floor is limited to the amount of the premium paid.

Interest rate floor options can be used to increase or decrease exposure to various interest rates, including to hedge interest rate risk. By purchasing an interest rate floor option, the buyer of the floor option can benefit from a lower reference rate if that rate falls. If the interest rate rises above the strike rate, the interest rate floor option will expire worthless.

Options on swap agreements. An option on a swap agreement generally is an OTC option (see the discussion above on OTC options) that gives the buyer of the option the right, but not the obligation, in return for payment of a premium to the seller, to enter into a previously negotiated swap agreement, or to extend, terminate or otherwise modify the terms of an existing swap agreement. The writer (seller) of an option on a swap agreement receives premium payments from the buyer and, in exchange, becomes obligated to enter into or modify an underlying swap agreement upon the exercise of the option by the buyer. When the Fund purchases an option on a swap agreement, it risks losing only the amount of the premium it has paid should it decide to let the option expire unexercised, plus any related transaction costs.

There can be no assurance that a liquid secondary market will exist for any particular option on a swap agreement, or at any particular time, and the Fund may have difficulty affecting closing transactions in particular options on swap agreements. Therefore, the Fund may have to exercise the options that it purchases in order to realize any profit and take delivery of the underlying swap agreement. The Fund could then incur transaction costs upon the sale or closing out of the underlying swap agreement. In the event that the option on a swap is exercised, the counterparty for such option would be the same counterparty with whom the Fund entered into the underlying swap.

However, if the Fund writes (sells) an option on a swap agreement, the Fund is bound by the terms of the underlying swap agreement upon exercise of the option by the buyer, which may result in losses to the Fund in excess of the premium it received. Options on swap agreements involve the risks associated with derivative instruments generally, as described above, as well as the additional risks associated with both options and swaps generally.

Options on swap agreements are considered to be swaps for purposes of CFTC regulation. Although they are traded OTC, the CFTC may in the future designate certain options on swaps as subject to mandatory clearing. For more information, see “Cleared swaps” and “Risks of cleared swaps.”

An option on an interest rate swap (also sometimes referred to as a “swaption”) is a contract that gives the purchaser the right, but not the obligation, in return for payment of a premium, to enter into a new interest rate swap. A pay fixed option on an interest rate swap gives the buyer the right to establish a position in an interest rate swap where the buyer will pay (and the writer will receive) the fixed-rate cash flows and receive (and the writer will pay) the floating-rate cash flows. In general, most options on interest rate swaps are “European” exercise, which means that they can only be exercised at the end of the option term. Depending on the movement of interest rates between the time of purchase and expiration, the value of the underlying interest rate swap and therefore also the value of the option on the interest rate swap will change.

An option on a credit default swap is a contract that gives the buyer the right (but not the obligation), in return for payment of a premium to the option seller, to enter into a new credit default swap on a reference entity at a predetermined spread on a future date. This spread is the price at which the contract is executed (the option strike price). Similar to a put option, in a payer option on a credit default swap, the option buyer pays a premium to the option seller for the right, but not the obligation, to buy credit protection on a reference entity (e.g., a particular portfolio security) at a predetermined spread on a future date. Similar to a call option, in a receiver option on a credit default swap the option buyer pays a premium for the right, but not the obligation to sell credit default swap protection on a reference entity or index. Depending on the movement of market spreads with respect to the particular referenced debt securities between the time of purchase and expiration of the option, the value of the underlying credit default swap and therefore the value of the option will change. Options on credit default swaps currently are traded OTC and the specific terms of each option on a credit default swap are negotiated directly with the counterparty.

Risks of options. The Fund’s options investments involve certain risks, including general risks related to derivative instruments. There can be no assurance that a liquid secondary market will exist for any particular option, or at any particular time, and the Fund may have difficulty effecting closing transactions in particular options. Therefore, the Fund would have to exercise the options it purchased in order to realize any profit, thus taking or making delivery of the underlying reference instrument when not desired. The Fund could then incur transaction costs upon the sale of the underlying reference instruments. When trading options on non-U.S. exchanges or in the OTC market, many of the protections afforded to exchange participants will not be available. For example, there may be no daily price fluctuation limits, and adverse market movements could therefore continue to an unlimited extent over an indefinite period of time.

The effectiveness of an options strategy for hedging depends on the degree to which price movements in the underlying reference instruments correlate with price movements in the relevant portion of the Fund's portfolio that is being hedged. In addition, the Fund bears the risk that the prices of its portfolio investments will not move in the same amount as the option it has purchased or sold for hedging purposes, or that there may be a negative correlation that would result in a loss on both the investments and the option. If the Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, is not successful in using options in managing the Fund's investments, the Fund's performance will be worse than if the Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, did not employ such strategies.

Structured Notes and Securities

The Funds may invest in structured instruments, including, without limitation, participation notes, certificates and warrants and other types of notes on which the amount of principal repayment and interest payments are based on the movement of one or more specified factors, such as the movement of a particular stock or stock index. Structured instruments may be derived from or based on a single security or securities, an index, a commodity, debt issuance or a foreign currency (a "reference"), and their interest rate or principal may be determined by an unrelated indicator. Structured securities may be positively or negatively indexed, so that appreciation of the reference may produce an increase or a decrease in the value of the structured security at maturity, or in the interest rate of the structured security. Structured securities may entail a greater degree of risk than other types of securities because a Fund bears the risk of the reference in addition to the risk that the counterparty to the structured security will be unable or unwilling to fulfill its obligations under the structured security to a Fund when due. A Fund bears the risk of loss of the amount expected to be received in connection with a structured security in the event of the default or bankruptcy of the counterparty to the structured security. Structured securities may also be more volatile, less liquid, and more difficult to accurately price than less complex securities or more traditional debt securities.

Exchange-Traded Notes

A Fund may invest in exchange-traded notes ("ETNs"). ETNs are senior, unsecured, unsubordinated debt securities whose returns are linked to the performance of a particular market benchmark or strategy, minus applicable fees. ETNs are traded on an exchange (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")) during normal trading hours; however, investors can also hold the ETN until maturity. At maturity, the issuer pays to the investor a cash amount equal to the principal amount, subject to the day's market benchmark or strategy factor. ETNs do not make periodic coupon payments or provide principal protection. ETNs are subject to credit risk, including the credit risk of the issuer, and the value of the ETN may drop due to a downgrade in the issuer's credit rating, despite the underlying market benchmark or strategy remaining unchanged. The value of an ETN may also be influenced by time to maturity, level of supply and demand for the ETN, volatility and lack of liquidity in underlying assets, changes in the applicable interest rates, changes in the issuer's credit rating, and economic, legal, political, or geographic events that affect the referenced underlying asset. When a Fund invests in ETNs, it will bear its proportionate share of any fees and expenses borne by the ETN. A decision by a Fund to sell ETN holdings may be limited by the availability of a secondary market. In addition, although an ETN may be listed on an exchange, the issuer may not be required to maintain the listing, and there can be no assurance that a secondary market will exist for an ETN.

ETNs are also subject to tax risk. No assurance can be given that the IRS will accept, or a court will uphold, how a Fund characterizes and treats ETNs for tax purposes.

An ETN that is tied to a specific market benchmark or strategy may not be able to replicate and maintain exactly the composition and relative weighting of securities, commodities or other components in the applicable market benchmark or strategy. Some ETNs that use leverage can, at times, be relatively illiquid, and thus they may be difficult to purchase or sell at a fair price. Leveraged ETNs are subject to the same risk as other instruments that use leverage in any form.

The market value of ETNs may differ from their market benchmark or strategy. This difference in price may be due to the fact that the supply and demand in the market for ETNs at any point in time is not always identical to the supply and demand in the market for the securities, commodities or other components underlying the market benchmark or strategy that the ETN seeks to track. As a result, there may be times when an ETN trades at a premium or discount to its market benchmark or strategy.

Investments in Other Investment Companies

The Funds may invest in the securities of other investment companies to the extent that such an investment would be consistent with the requirements of Section 12(d)(1) of the 1940 Act, or any rule, regulation or order of the SEC or interpretation thereof. Generally, a Fund may invest in the securities of another investment company (the “acquired company”) provided that a Fund, immediately after such purchase or acquisition, does not own: (i) more than 3% of the total outstanding voting stock of the acquired company; (ii) securities issued by the acquired company having an aggregate value in excess of 5% of the value of the total assets of a Fund; or (iii) securities issued by the acquired company and all other investment companies having an aggregate value in excess of 10% of the value of the total assets of a Fund. Section 12(d)(1)(B) prohibits another investment company from selling its shares to a Fund if, after the sale (i) a Fund owns more than 3% of the other investment company’s voting stock or (ii) a Fund and other investment companies, and companies controlled by them, own more than 10% of the voting stock of such other investment company.

The Fund, however, is permitted to invest in shares of certain investment companies beyond the limits contained in the 1940 Act and the rules and regulations thereunder, if the Fund complies with the adopted framework for fund of funds arrangements under Rule 12d1-4. Pursuant to Rule 12d1-4, the Fund is permitted to exceed the limits of Section 12 of the 1940 Act if the Fund complies with Rule 12d1-4’s conditions, which contain elements from the SEC prior exemptive orders permitting fund of funds arrangements, including (i) limits on control and voting; (ii) required evaluations and findings; (iii) required fund of funds investment agreements; and (iv) limits on complex structures.

If a Fund invests in, and thus, is a shareholder of, another investment company, a Fund’s shareholders will indirectly bear a Fund’s proportionate share of the fees and expenses paid by such other investment company, including advisory fees, in addition to both the management fees payable directly by a Fund to its own investment adviser(s) and the other expenses that a Fund bears directly in connection with its own operations.

Consistent with the restrictions discussed above, a Fund may invest in several different types of investment companies from time to time, including mutual funds, ETFs, closed-end funds, foreign investment companies and business development companies (“BDCs”). For example, a Fund may elect to invest in another investment company when such an investment presents a more efficient investment option than buying securities individually. A BDC is a less common type of closed-end investment company that more closely resembles an operating company than a typical investment company. BDCs generally focus on investing in, and providing managerial assistance to, small, developing, financially troubled, private companies or other companies that may have value that can be realized over time and with management assistance. Similar to an operating company, a BDC’s total annual operating expense ratio typically reflects all of the operating expenses incurred by the BDC, and is generally greater than the total annual operating expense ratio of a mutual fund that does not bear the same types of operating expenses.

The main risk of investing in other investment companies is that a Fund will be exposed to the risks of the investments held by the other investment companies. The market prices of ETFs will fluctuate in accordance with both changes in the market value of their underlying portfolio securities and due to supply and demand for the instruments on the exchanges on which they are traded (which may result in their trading at a discount or premium to their NAVs). Index-based investment companies may not replicate exactly the performance of their specific index because of transaction costs, and because of the temporary unavailability of certain component securities of the index, or strategy used to track the index.

Krane and a sub-adviser are subject to a conflict of interest in allocating a Fund's assets to investment companies, if any, from which they or their affiliates receive compensation, such as an advisory fee, or other benefits.

Illiquid Securities

The Fund may invest up to an aggregate amount of 15% of its net assets in illiquid investments. An illiquid investment is any investment that the Fund reasonably expects cannot be sold or disposed of in current market conditions in seven calendar days or less without the sale or disposition significantly changing the market value of the investment. Illiquid securities may be difficult to value, and a Fund may have difficulty or be unable to dispose of such securities promptly or at reasonable prices.

The SEC has adopted Rule 22e-4 under the 1940 Act, which requires the Fund to adopt a liquidity risk management program to assess and manage its liquidity risk. Under its program, the Fund will be required to classify its investments into specific liquidity categories and monitor compliance with limits on investments in illiquid securities. The Fund does not expect Rule 22e-4 to have a significant effect on investment operations. While the liquidity risk management program attempts to assess and manage liquidity risk, there is no guarantee it will be effective in its operations and may not reduce the liquidity risk inherent in the Fund's investments.

If illiquid investments exceed 15% of the Fund's net assets (including, for example, because of changes in the market value of its investments or because of redemptions), Rule 22e-4 and the liquidity risk management program will require that certain remedial actions be taken. The Fund may not acquire illiquid investments if, immediately after the acquisition, more than 15% of the Fund's net assets would be illiquid investments.

Portfolio Turnover

In general, Krane or a sub-adviser manages the Fund without regard to restrictions on portfolio turnover. The Fund's investment strategies, however, may produce high portfolio turnover rates. To the extent a Fund invests in derivative instruments with short-term maturities, such derivative instruments would be excluded from the calculation of portfolio turnover. The value of portfolio securities received or delivered as a result of in-kind creations or redemptions of a Fund's shares also is excluded from the calculation of the Fund's portfolio turnover rate. As a result, a Fund's reported portfolio turnover may be low despite relatively high portfolio activity which would, in turn, produce correspondingly greater expenses for a Fund, including brokerage commissions or dealer mark-ups and other transaction costs on the sale of securities and reinvestments in other securities. Generally, the higher the rate of portfolio turnover of a fund, the higher these transaction costs borne by a fund and its long-term shareholders. Such sales may result in the realization of taxable capital gains (including short-term capital gains, which, when distributed, are generally taxed to shareholders at ordinary income tax rates) for certain taxable shareholders.

“Portfolio Turnover Rate” is defined under the rules of the SEC as the lesser of the value of the securities purchased or of the securities sold, excluding all securities whose maturities at the time of acquisition were one-year or less, divided by the average monthly value of such securities owned during the year. Based on this definition, derivatives and instruments with a remaining maturity of less than one-year are excluded from the calculation of the portfolio turnover rate. Instruments excluded from the calculation of portfolio turnover may include commercial paper, futures contracts and option contracts because they generally have a remaining maturity of less than one-year.

Borrowing

The Funds may borrow money to the extent permitted by the 1940 Act. Borrowing for investment purposes is a form of leverage. Leveraging investments, by purchasing securities with borrowed money, is a speculative technique that increases investment risk. Because substantially all of a Fund’s assets will fluctuate in value, whereas the interest obligations on borrowings may be fixed, the NAV of a Fund will increase more when a Fund’s portfolio assets increase in value and decrease more when a Fund’s portfolio assets decrease in value than would otherwise be the case. Moreover, interest costs on borrowings may fluctuate with changing market rates of interest and may partially offset or exceed the returns on the borrowed funds. A Fund also may be required to maintain minimum average balances in connection with a borrowing or to pay a commitment or other fee to maintain a line of credit, which would further increase the cost of borrowing. Under adverse conditions, a Fund might have to sell portfolio securities to meet interest or principal payments at a time when investment considerations would not favor such sales.

Although it has not entered into any sort of credit facility, a Fund may borrow money to facilitate management of a Fund’s portfolio by enabling a Fund to meet redemption requests when the liquidation of portfolio instruments would be inconvenient or disadvantageous, and for temporary or emergency purposes, such as trade settlements and as necessary to distribute to shareholders any income required to maintain the Fund’s status as a RIC. In this regard, a Fund may enter into a credit facility to borrow money for temporary or emergency purposes, including the funding of shareholder redemption requests, trade settlements, and as necessary to distribute to shareholders any income required to maintain a Fund’s status as a RIC. Such borrowing is not for investment purposes and will be repaid by a Fund promptly. As required by the 1940 Act, a Fund must maintain continuous asset coverage (total assets, including assets acquired with borrowed funds, less liabilities exclusive of borrowings) of 300% of all amounts borrowed. If, at any time, the value of a Fund’s assets should fail to meet this 300% coverage test, a Fund, within three days (not including Sundays and holidays), will reduce the amount of a Fund’s borrowings to the extent necessary to meet this 300% coverage requirement. Maintenance of this percentage limitation may result in the sale of portfolio securities at a time when investment considerations otherwise indicate that it would be disadvantageous to do so.

While the Funds do not anticipate doing so, each Fund is authorized to pledge (*i.e.*, transfer a security interest in) portfolio securities in an amount up to one-third of the value of the Fund’s total assets in connection with any borrowing.

Bank Deposits and Obligations

The Funds may invest in deposits and other obligations of U.S. and non-U.S. banks and financial institutions. Deposits and obligations of banks and financial institutions include certificates of deposit, time deposits, and bankers' acceptances. Certificates of deposit and time deposits represent an institution's obligation to repay funds deposited with it that earn a specified interest rate. Certificates of deposit are negotiable certificates, while time deposits are non-negotiable deposits. A banker's acceptance is a time draft drawn on and accepted by a bank that becomes a primary and unconditional liability of the bank upon acceptance. Investments in obligations of non-U.S. banks and financial institutions may involve risks that are different from investments in obligations of U.S. banks. These risks include future unfavorable political and economic developments, seizure or nationalization of foreign deposits, currency controls, interest limitations or other governmental restrictions that might affect the payment of principal or interest on the securities held in a Fund. All investments in deposits and other obligations are subject to credit risk, which is the risk that a Fund may lose its investments in these instruments if, for example, the issuing financial institution collapses and is unable to meet its obligations. This risk is more acute for investments in deposits and other obligations that are not insured by a government or private entity.

Repurchase Agreements

The Fund may enter into repurchase agreements. A repurchase agreement is a transaction in which a Fund purchases securities or other obligations from a bank or securities dealer (or its affiliate) and simultaneously commits to resell them to a counterparty at an agreed-upon date or upon demand and at a price reflecting a market rate of interest unrelated to the coupon rate or maturity of the purchased obligations. A Fund maintains custody of the underlying obligations prior to their repurchase, either through its regular custodian or through a special "triparty" custodian or sub-custodian that maintains separate accounts for both a Fund and its counterparty. Thus, the obligation of the counterparty to pay the repurchase price on the date agreed to or upon demand is, in effect, secured by such obligations.

Repurchase agreements carry certain risks not associated with direct investments in securities, including a possible decline in the market value of the underlying obligations. If their value becomes less than the repurchase price, plus any agreed-upon additional amount, the counterparty must provide additional collateral so that at all times the collateral is at least equal to the repurchase price plus any agreed-upon additional amount. The difference between the total amount to be received upon repurchase of the obligations and the price that was paid by a Fund upon acquisition is accrued as interest and included in its net investment income. Repurchase agreements collateralized by instruments other than U.S. government securities (such as commercial paper and corporate bonds) are subject to special risks as they may not have the benefit of certain protections in the event of the counterparty's insolvency. If the seller or guarantor becomes insolvent, a Fund may suffer delays, costs and possible losses in connection with the disposition of collateral.

Reverse Repurchase Agreements

The Funds may enter into reverse repurchase agreements, which involve the sale of securities held by a Fund subject to its agreement to repurchase the securities at an agreed-upon date or upon demand and at a price reflecting a market rate of interest. Reverse repurchase agreements are subject to a Fund's limitation on borrowings and may be entered into only with banks or securities dealers or their affiliates.

Reverse repurchase agreements involve the risk that the buyer of the securities sold by a Fund might be unable to deliver them when a Fund seeks to repurchase. If the buyer of securities under a reverse repurchase agreement files for bankruptcy or becomes insolvent, the buyer or trustee or receiver may receive an extension of time to determine whether to enforce the Fund's obligation to repurchase the securities, and the Fund's use of the proceeds of the reverse repurchase agreement may effectively be restricted pending such decision.

Other Short-Term Instruments

In addition to repurchase agreements, the Fund may invest in short-term instruments, including money market instruments, on an ongoing basis to provide liquidity or for other reasons. Money market instruments are generally short-term investments that may include but are not limited to: (i) shares of money market funds; (ii) obligations issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, its agencies or instrumentalities (including government-sponsored enterprises); (iii) negotiable certificates of deposit ("CDs"), bankers' acceptances, fixed time deposits and other obligations of U.S. and foreign banks (including foreign branches) and similar institutions; (iv) commercial paper rated at the date of purchase "Prime-1" by Moody's or "A-1" by S&P or, if unrated, of comparable quality as determined by the Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable; (v) non-convertible corporate debt securities (e.g., bonds and debentures); and (vi) short-term U.S. dollar-denominated obligations of foreign banks (including U.S. branches) that, in the opinion of the Adviser, or sub-adviser, as applicable, are of comparable quality to obligations of U.S. banks which may be purchased by the Fund. Any of these instruments may be purchased on a current or a forward-settled basis. Money market instruments also include shares of money market funds. Time deposits are non-negotiable deposits maintained in banking institutions for specified periods of time at stated interest rates. Bankers' acceptances are time drafts drawn on commercial banks by borrowers, usually in connection with international transactions.

Cyber-Security Risk

Each Fund, and its service providers, may be prone to operational and information security risks resulting from cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks include, among other behaviors, stealing or corrupting data maintained online or digitally, denial of service attacks on websites, the unauthorized release of confidential information or various other forms of cyber security breaches. Cyber-attacks affecting a Fund or its advisors, custodian, transfer agent, intermediaries and other third-party service providers may adversely impact a Fund. For instance, cyber-attacks may interfere with the processing of shareholder transactions, impact a Fund's ability to calculate its NAV, cause the release of private shareholder information or confidential business information, impede trading, subject a Fund to regulatory fines or financial losses and/or cause reputational damage. A Fund may also incur additional costs for cyber security risk management purposes. While a Fund's service providers have established business continuity plans, there are inherent limitations in such plans and systems including the possibility that certain risks have not been identified. Furthermore, a Fund cannot control the cyber security plans and systems put in place by its service providers or any other third parties whose operations may affect a Fund or its shareholders. Similar types of cyber security risks are also present for issues or securities in which a Fund may invest, which could result in material adverse consequences for such issuers and may cause a Fund's investment in such companies to lose value.

INVESTMENT LIMITATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, whenever a fundamental investment policy or limitation states that a maximum percentage of a Fund's assets that may be invested in any security or other asset, or sets forth a policy regarding quality standards, such standard or percentage limitation will be determined immediately after and as a result of a Fund's acquisition of such security or other asset. Accordingly, other than with respect to a Fund's limitations on borrowings, any subsequent change in values, net assets, or other circumstances will not be considered when determining whether the investment complies with a Fund's investment policies and limitations.

Fundamental Policies

The Trust has adopted the following investment restrictions as fundamental policies with respect to the Funds. These restrictions cannot be changed with respect to the Funds without the approval of the holders of a majority of the Fund's outstanding voting securities. For the purposes of the 1940 Act, a "majority of outstanding shares" means the vote of the lesser of: (1) 67% or more of the voting securities of a Fund present at the meeting if the holders of more than 50% of a Fund's outstanding voting securities are present or represented by proxy; or (2) more than 50% of the outstanding voting securities of a Fund.

Except with the approval of a majority of the outstanding voting securities, each Fund may not:

1. Issue senior securities, except as permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules, regulations and interpretations thereunder, and any applicable exemptive relief.
2. Concentrate its investments (*i.e.*, hold more than 25% of its total assets) in any industry or group of related industries. For purposes of this limitation, securities of the U.S. government (including its agencies and instrumentalities), investment companies, repurchase agreements collateralized by U.S. government securities, and tax-exempt securities of state or municipal governments and their political subdivisions are not considered to be issued by members of any industry.
3. Borrow money, except as permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules, regulations and interpretations thereunder, and any applicable exemptive relief.
4. Lend any security or make any other loan except as permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules, regulations and interpretations thereunder, and any applicable exemptive relief. This limitation does not apply to purchases of debt securities or to repurchase agreements, or to acquisitions of loans, loan participations or other forms of debt instruments permissible under the Fund's investment policies.
5. Purchase or sell real estate unless acquired as a result of ownership of securities or other instruments, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act. This shall not prevent the Fund from investing in securities or other instruments backed by real estate, real estate investment trusts or securities of companies engaged in the real estate business.
6. Purchase or sell physical commodities unless acquired as a result of ownership of securities or other instruments, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act. This shall not prevent the Fund from purchasing or selling options and futures contracts or from investing in securities or other instruments backed by physical commodities.
7. Underwrite securities issued by other persons, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act.

Each Fund's fundamental policies will be interpreted broadly. For example, the policies will be interpreted to refer to the 1940 Act and the related rules as they are in effect from time to time, and to interpretations of or relating to the 1940 Act by the SEC and others as they are given from time to time. When a policy provides that an investment practice may be conducted as permitted by the 1940 Act, the policy will be interpreted to mean either that the 1940 Act expressly permits the practice or that the 1940 Act does not prohibit the practice.

CONTINUOUS OFFERING

The method by which Creation Units of shares are created and traded may raise certain issues under applicable securities laws. Because new Creation Units of shares are issued and sold by a Fund on an ongoing basis, at any point a “distribution,” as such term is used in the Securities Act, may occur. Broker-dealers and other persons are cautioned that some activities on their part may, depending on the circumstances, result in their being deemed participants in a distribution in a manner which could render them statutory underwriters and subject them to the prospectus delivery requirement and liability provisions of the Securities Act.

For example, a broker-dealer firm or its client may be deemed a statutory underwriter if it takes Creation Units after placing an order with the Funds’ Distributor, breaks them down into constituent shares, and sells such shares directly to customers, or if it chooses to couple the creation of a supply of new shares with an active selling effort involving solicitation of secondary market demand for shares. A determination of whether one is an underwriter for purposes of the Securities Act must take into account all the facts and circumstances pertaining to the activities of the broker-dealer or its client in the particular case, and the examples mentioned above should not be considered a complete description of all the activities that could lead to a categorization as an underwriter.

Broker-dealer firms should also note that dealers who are not “underwriters” but are effecting transactions in shares, whether or not participating in the distribution of shares, generally are required to deliver a prospectus. This is because the prospectus delivery exemption in Section 4(3) of the Securities Act is not available in respect of such transactions as a result of Section 24(d) of the 1940 Act.

MANAGEMENT OF THE TRUST

Board Responsibilities

The Board of Trustees is responsible for overseeing the management and affairs of each Fund and the Trust. The Board considers and approves contracts, as described herein, under which certain companies provide essential management and administrative services to the Trust. Like most ETFs, the day-to-day business of the Trust, including the day-to-day management of risk, is performed by third-party service providers, such as Krane, a sub-adviser where applicable, the Distributor and the Administrator (as defined below). The Board oversees the Trust’s service providers and overall risk management. Risk management seeks to identify and eliminate or mitigate the potential effects of risks, *i.e.*, events or circumstances that could have material adverse effects on the business, operations, shareholder services, investment performance or reputation of the Trust or a Fund. Under the overall supervision of the Board and the Audit Committee (discussed in more detail below), the service providers to the Funds employ a variety of processes, procedures and controls to identify risks relevant to the operations of the Trust and a Fund to lessen the probability of their occurrence and/or to mitigate the effects of such events or circumstances if they do occur. Each service provider is responsible for one or more discrete aspects of the Trust’s business (*e.g.*, Krane is responsible for the oversight of a sub-adviser) and, consequently, for managing the risks associated with that activity.

Consistent with its responsibility for oversight of the Trust and the Funds, the Board oversees the management of risks relating to the administration and operations of the Trust and the Funds. Krane, as part of its responsibilities for the day-to-day operations of the Funds, is responsible for day-to-day risk management for the Funds. The Board performs its risk management oversight directly and, as to certain matters, through its committees. The following provides an overview of the principal, but not all, aspects of the Board’s oversight of risk management for the Trust and the Funds.

In general, each Fund’s risks include, among others, investment risk, liquidity risk, valuation risk and operational risk. The Funds’ service providers, including Krane and sub-adviser, as applicable, are responsible for adopting policies, procedures and controls designed to address various risks within their purview. Further, Krane is responsible for overseeing and monitoring the investments and operations of each sub-adviser. The Board also oversees risk management for the Trust and the Funds through review of regular reports, presentations and other information from officers of the Trust and other persons. In addition to reports from Krane, the Board also receives reports regarding other service providers to the Trust on a periodic or regular basis.

The Board is responsible for overseeing the nature, extent and quality of the Funds services provided to the Funds by Krane and any sub-adviser and receives information from them on a periodic basis. In connection with its consideration of whether to approve and/or renew the advisory agreements with Krane and any sub-adviser, the Board will request information allowing the Board to review such services. The Board also receives reports related to Krane's and any sub-adviser's adherence to each Fund's investment restrictions and compliance with the stated policies of a Fund. In addition, the Board regularly receives information about each Fund's performance and investments.

The Trust's Chief Compliance Officer meets regularly with the Board to review and discuss compliance and other issues. At least annually, the Trust's Chief Compliance Officer provides the Board with a report reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of the Trust's policies and procedures and those of its service providers, including the Adviser and any sub-adviser. The report generally seeks to address: the operation of the policies and procedures of the Trust and each service provider since the date of the last report; material changes to the policies and procedures since the date of the last report; any recommendations for material changes to the policies and procedures; and material compliance matters since the date of the last report.

The Board normally also receives reports from the Trust's service providers regarding Fund operations, portfolio valuation and other matters. Annually, an independent registered public accounting firm reviews with the Audit Committee its audit of the Trust's financial statements, focusing on certain areas of risk to the Trust and the Trust's internal controls.

The Board recognizes that not all risks that may affect a Fund can be identified, that it may not be practical or cost-effective to eliminate or mitigate certain risks, that it may be necessary to bear certain risks (such as investment-related risks) to achieve a Fund's goals, and that the processes, procedures and controls employed to address certain risks may be limited in their effectiveness. Moreover, despite the periodic reports the Board receives and the Board's discussions with the service providers to a Fund, it may not be made aware of all relevant information about certain risks. Most of the Trust's investment management and business affairs are carried out by or through Krane and other service providers, each of which has an independent interest in risk management but whose policies and methods by which one or more risk management functions are carried out may differ from the Trust's and each other's in the setting of priorities, the resources available or the effectiveness of relevant controls. As a result of the foregoing and other factors, the Board's risk management oversight is subject to substantial limitations.

Members of the Board and Officers of the Trust

Set forth below are the names, years of birth, position with the Trust, term of office, the principal occupations for a minimum of the last five years, number of portfolios overseen by, and other directorships of each of the persons currently serving as members of the Board and as Executive Officers of the Trust. Also included below is the term of office for each of the Executive Officers of the Trust. The members of the Board serve as Trustees for the life of the Trust or until retirement, removal, or their office is terminated pursuant to the Trust's Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust.

The Chairman of the Board, Jonathan Krane, is an interested person of the Trust as defined in the 1940 Act. No single Independent Trustee serves as a lead Independent Trustee. The Board has determined its leadership structure is appropriate given the specific characteristics the Trust and its operations. The Board made this determination in consideration of, among other things, Trustees who are not interested persons of the Trust (*i.e.*, "Independent Trustees") constitute at least fifty percent (50%) of the Board, the Audit Committee is composed of the Independent Trustees, and the Board oversees only a certain number of funds (and classes of shares).

Name, Address and Year of Birth of Trustee/Officer	Position(s) Held with the Trust, Term of Office and Length of Time Served	Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years	Number of Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee/Officer	Other Directorships Held by Trustee/Officer During Past 5 Years
Interested Trustee				
Jonathan Krane* (1968) 280 Park Avenue 32nd Floor New York, New York, 10017	Trustee and Chairman of the Board, No set term; served since 2012	Chief Executive Officer of Krane Funds Advisors, LLC from 2011 to present. Chief Executive Officer of Gobe Wealth Management, LLC from 2018 to present.	36	None
Independent Trustees				
Patrick P. Campo (1970) 280 Park Avenue 32nd Floor New York, New York, 10017	Trustee, No set term; served since 2017	Managing Director of Ibis Global AM LLC from 2023 to present. From 2019 to 2023, Director of Research and from 2013 to 2019 Director of Long Short Equity, Titan Advisors.	36	None
John Ferguson (1966) 280 Park Avenue 32nd Floor New York, New York, 10017	Trustee, No set term; served since 2012	Independent Director of K2 Advisors Offshore Fund Complex from 2022 to present. Chief Compliance Officer of Covey Advisors LLC 2023 to present. Chief Operating Officer of Shrewsbury River Capital from 2017 to 2020. Chief Operating Officer of Kang Global Investors LP (hedge fund adviser) from 2014 to 2016. President of Alden Global Capital, LLC (hedge fund adviser) from 2012 to 2014 (formerly, Chief Operating Officer from 2011 to 2012). Senior Managing Director and Chief Operating Officer of K2 Advisors, LLC from 2005 to 2011.	36	None
Matthew Stroyman (1968) 280 Park Avenue 32nd Floor New York, New York, 10017	Trustee, No set term; served since 2012	Founder and President of BlackRidge Ventures from 2018 to present (principal investment activities and strategic advisory services in a variety of industries to clients and partners that include institutional investment firms, family offices and high net-worth individuals). Co-Founder, President and Chief Operating Officer of Arcturus (real estate asset and investment management services firm) from 2007 to 2017.	36	None

Name, Address and Year of Birth of Trustee/Officer	Position(s) Held with the Trust, Term of Office and Length of Time Served	Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years	Number of Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee/Officer	Other Directorships Held by Trustee/Officer During Past 5 Years
Officers				
Jonathan Krane (1968) 280 Park Avenue 32nd Floor New York, New York, 10017	Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer, No set term; served since 2012	Chief Executive Officer of Krane Funds Advisors, LLC from 2011 to present. Chief Executive Officer of Gobe Wealth Management, LLC from 2018 to present.	36	None
Jennifer Tarleton (formerly Krane) (1966) 280 Park Avenue 32nd Floor New York, New York, 10017	Vice President and Secretary, No set term; served since 2012	Vice President of Krane Funds Advisors, LLC from 2011 to present.	36	None
Michael Quain (1957) 280 Park Avenue 32nd Floor New York, New York, 10017	Chief Compliance Officer and Anti-Money Laundering Officer, No Set Term; served since 2015	Principal/President of Quain Compliance Consulting, LLC from 2014 to present.	36	None
Eric Olsen (1970) SEI Investments Company One Freedom Valley Drive Oaks, PA 19456	Assistant Treasurer, No set term; served since 2021	Director of Accounting, SEI Investments Global Fund Services from March 2021 to present; Deputy Head of Fund Operations, Traditional Assets, Aberdeen Standard Investments from August 2013 to February 2021.	36	None
David Adelman (1964) 280 Park Avenue 32nd Floor New York, New York, 10017	Assistant Secretary, No set term; served since 2021	Managing Director and the General Counsel, Krane Fund Advisors, LLC from 2021. Partner, Reed Smith LLP from 2015 to 2021.	36	None
Jonathan Shelon (1974) 280 Park Avenue 32nd Floor New York, New York, 10017	Assistant Secretary, No set term; served since 2019	Chief Operating Officer, Krane Funds Advisors, LLC from 2015 to present. Chief Operating Officer, Gobe Wealth Management, LLC from 2018 to present. Chief Investment Officer of Specialized Strategies, J.P. Morgan from 2011 to 2015.	36	None

* Mr. Krane is an “interested” person of the Trust, as that term is defined in the 1940 Act, by virtue of his ownership and controlling interest in Krane.

Board Standing Committees

The Board has established the following standing committees:

Audit Committee. Messrs. Campo, Ferguson and Stroyman are members of the Trust's Audit Committee (the "Audit Committee") and Mr. Ferguson is the Chairman of the Audit Committee. The principal responsibilities of the Audit Committee are the appointment, compensation and oversight of the Trust's independent auditors, including the review of any significant disputes regarding financial reporting between Trust management and such independent auditors. Under the terms of the Audit Committee charter adopted by the Board, the Audit Committee is authorized to, among other things, (i) oversee the accounting and financial reporting processes of the Trust and its internal control over financial reporting; (ii) oversee the quality and integrity of a Fund's financial statements and the independent audits thereof; (iii) oversee, or, as appropriate, assist Board oversight of, the Trust's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements that relate to the Trust's accounting and financial reporting, internal control over financial reporting and independent audits; (iv) approve, prior to appointment, the engagement of the Trust's independent auditors and, in connection therewith, review and evaluate the qualifications, independence and performance of the Trust's independent auditors; and (v) act as a liaison between the Trust's independent auditors and the full Board. The Board of the Trust has adopted a written charter for the Audit Committee. During the fiscal year ended March 31, 2023, the Audit Committee held four meetings.

The Audit Committee also serves as the Qualified Legal Compliance Committee ("QLCC") for the Trust. The function of the QLCC is to receive, review and recommend resolution with respect to any report made or referred to the QLCC by an attorney of evidence of a material violation of applicable U.S. federal or state securities law, material breach of a fiduciary duty under U.S. federal or state law or a similar material violation by the Trust or by any officer, trustee, employee, or agent of the Trust. The QLCC meets as needed and during the fiscal year ended March 31, 2023, did not meet.

Nominating Committee. Messrs. Campo, Ferguson and Stroyman are members of the Trust's Nominating Committee and Mr. Stroyman is the Chairman of the Nominating Committee. The principal responsibilities of the Nominating Committee are to (i) identify, select and nominate the appropriate number of candidates for election or appointment as members of the Board and (ii) recommend any appropriate changes to the Board for consideration. The Nominating Committee is solely responsible for the selection and nomination of the Trust's Independent Trustees and does not consider nominations for the office of Trustee made by Trust shareholders. During the fiscal year ended March 31, 2023, the Nominating Committee held two meetings.

Individual Trustee Qualifications

The Board has concluded that each of the Trustees should serve on the Board because of his ability to review and understand information about the Trust and the Fund provided by management, to identify and request other information he may deem relevant to the performance of the Trustees' duties, to question management and other service providers regarding material factors bearing on the management and administration of a Fund, and to exercise his business judgment in a manner that serves the best interests of a Fund's shareholders. The Board has concluded that each of the Trustees should serve as a Trustee based on his own experience, qualifications, attributes and skills as described below.

The Board has concluded that Mr. Krane should serve as Trustee because of his knowledge of, and the executive positions he holds, or has held in, the financial services industry. Specifically, Mr. Krane currently serves as Chief Executive Officer of the Adviser and Chief Executive Officer of CICC Wealth Management (USA), LLC. Mr. Krane contributes expertise and institutional knowledge relating to both the Adviser and the Trust. Prior to founding the Adviser, Mr. Krane also served as Chief Executive Officer of the China division of a multinational company, where he gained valuable experience in managing a business and critical knowledge of business and investment opportunities in China. In addition, he has served on the boards of different corporations and, in doing so, has first-hand knowledge of the fiduciary duties and responsibilities bestowed upon trustees and directors. Mr. Krane's experience as serving as Chief Executive Officer for multiple businesses in the financial services industry, his familiarity with the "Krane" complex, and his experience in serving on the boards of various companies qualify him to serve as a Trustee of the Trust.

The Board has concluded that Patrick Campo should serve as Trustee because of the experience he has gained working in the investment management industry over many years. In particular, Mr. Campo currently serves as the director of certain investment strategies managed by an investment adviser and contributes to the portfolio construction process for all products offered by that investment adviser. In addition, Mr. Campo previously served as partner and head of research for another investment adviser. The knowledge Mr. Campo has gained over these years working in the investment management industry and his day-to-day work in managing investment advisory firms qualify him to serve as Trustee of the Trust.

The Board has concluded that Mr. Ferguson should serve as Trustee because of the experience he has gained working in the financial services and legal industries over the years. In particular, Mr. Ferguson has extensive experience in managing global investment adviser firms, including the management, creation and success of hedge funds. Prior to that, Mr. Ferguson served as a corporate securities and tax attorney assisting and counseling clients with the organization and creation of both domestic and offshore funds. In addition, Mr. Ferguson has served as an officer for two registered investment companies and, in doing so, has gained experience and knowledge regarding the mutual fund industry. Mr. Ferguson's experience in the financial services, fund and legal industries and his day-to-day work in managing investment advisory firms, qualify him to serve as a Trustee of the Trust.

The Board has concluded that Mr. Stroyman should serve as Trustee because of the experience he has gained working in the financial services and real estate industries. Working as an investment banker early in his career, Mr. Stroyman developed a strong base of knowledge regarding corporate finance, structuring, public and private securities, and company valuations. Through his work in the real estate industry and relationships with large investment management firms, Mr. Stroyman has gained an understanding of sophisticated financial products. He has advised institutional clients including pension funds, endowments and other qualified investors in asset management, risk assessment, and repositioning and disposition of underperforming assets. The knowledge Mr. Stroyman has gained over the years working in the financial services and real estate industries and his value and understanding of fiduciary duties and responsibilities qualify him to serve as Trustee of the Trust.

As of March 31, 2023, none of the Independent Trustees or members of their immediate family, beneficially owned or owned of record securities representing interests in Krane, any sub-adviser or distributor of the Trust, or any person controlling, controlled by or under common control with such persons. For this purpose, "immediate family member" includes an Independent Trustee's spouse, children residing in the same household and dependents of the Independent Trustee.

Fund Shares Owned by Board Members

As of December 31, 2022, the Trustees beneficially owned the following amounts of Fund shares and shares of other series of the Trust:

Trustee	Funds	Aggregate Dollar Range of Beneficial Ownership of Funds
Patrick Campo	None	None
John Ferguson	KraneShares Electric Vehicles and Future Mobility Index ETF	\$10,001-\$50,000
	KraneShares MSCI All China Health Care Index ETF	\$10,001-\$50,000
	KraneShares CSI China Internet ETF	\$50,001-\$100,000
	Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	\$50,001-\$100,000
Jonathan Krane	KraneShares Bosera MSCI China A 50 Connect Index ETF	\$10,001-\$50,000
	KraneShares CSI China Internet ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares MSCI Emerging Markets Ex China Index ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares MSCI All China Index ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares Emerging Markets Healthcare Index ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares Electric Vehicles and Future Mobility Index ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares Asia Pacific High Income Bond ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares Emerging Markets Consumer Technology Index ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares CICC China Leaders 100 Index ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares Global Carbon Strategy ETF	\$10,001-\$50,000
	KraneShares SSE Star Market 50 Index ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares China Internet and Covered Call Strategy ETF	\$10,001-\$50,000
	Matthew Stroyman	KraneShares CSI China Internet ETF
KraneShares California Carbon Allowance Strategy ETF		\$1-\$10,000

“Beneficial ownership” is determined in accordance with Rule 16a-1(a)(2) under the 1934 Act.

Board Compensation

Trustees who are “interested persons” of Krane are not compensated by the Trust for their service as a Trustee. For the fiscal year ended March 31, 2023: (a) Mr. Campo received aggregate compensation from the Trust in the amount of \$90,000; (b) Mr. Ferguson received aggregate compensation from the Trust in the amount of \$100,000; and (c) Mr. Stroyman received aggregate compensation from the Trust in the amount of \$100,000. None of the Trustees accrued or received any retirement or pension benefits.

For the fiscal year ending March 31, 2024, it is expected that the Trustees will receive compensation from the Trust in the amount of \$90,000 per year and the Chairmen of the Audit Committee and Nominating Committee will each receive an additional \$10,000. The Fund bears a proportionate share of Trustee compensation and expenses based on its relative net assets.

INVESTMENT ADVISER

Krane Funds Advisors, LLC (“Krane” or “Adviser”) serves as investment adviser to each Fund pursuant to an Investment Advisory Agreement between the Trust and Krane (the “Investment Advisory Agreement”). Krane is a Delaware limited liability company registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”). Krane’s offices are located at 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York, 10017.

Under the Investment Advisory Agreement, Krane is responsible for reviewing, supervising and administering each Fund’s investment program and the general management and administration of the Trust. Krane may engage a subadviser to assist it in managing a Fund’s investments, but will be responsible for overseeing any subadvisers. Krane arranges for transfer agency, custody, fund administration and accounting, and other non-distribution related services necessary for each Fund to operate. Krane manages each Fund’s business affairs, provides office facilities and equipment and certain clerical, bookkeeping and administrative services, and permits its officers and employees to serve as officers or Trustees of the Trust. Under the Investment Advisory Agreement, Krane bears all of its own costs associated with providing advisory services to the Fund. As part of the Investment Advisory Agreement, Krane has contractually agreed to pay all expenses of each Fund, except (i) interest and taxes (including, but not limited to, income, excise, transaction, transfer and withholding taxes); (ii) expenses of a Fund incurred with respect to the acquisition and disposition of portfolio securities and the execution of portfolio transactions, including brokerage commissions and short sale dividend or interest expense; (iii) expenses incurred in connection with any distribution plan adopted by the Trust in compliance with Rule 12b-1 under the 1940 Act, including distribution fees; (iv) Acquired Fund Fees and Expenses; (v) litigation expenses; (vi) the compensation payable to the Adviser under the investment advisory agreement; (vii) compensation and expenses of the Independent Trustees (including any Trustees’ counsel fees); and (viii) any expenses determined to be extraordinary expenses by the Board. Nevertheless, there exists a risk that a Trust service provider will seek recourse against the Trust if it is not timely paid by Krane for the fees and expenses for which it is responsible, which could materially adversely affect a Fund.

Under the Investment Advisory Agreement, each Fund pays Krane the fee shown in the table below, which is calculated daily and paid monthly, at an annual rate based on a percentage of the average daily net assets of the Fund (“Gross Management Fee”).

Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	0.99%
Quadratic Deflation ETF	0.99%

Prior to August 1, 2021, Krane contractually agreed to waive its management fee by 0.05% of the Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF’s average daily net assets.

For the prior fiscal year or period during which the Fund was operational, Krane received the following compensation under the Investment Advisory Agreement:

	Fiscal Year/Period Ended 3/31/23	Fiscal Year/Period Ended 3/31/22	Fiscal Year/Period Ended 3/31/21
	Management Fees	Management Fees	Management Fees
Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	\$12,801,441	\$28,654,381	\$7,060,140
Quadratic Deflation ETF	\$618,854	\$412,655	N/A

Because the Quadratic Deflation ETF had not commenced operations prior to the end of the fiscal years ended March 31, 2021, Krane did not receive any advisory fees from the Fund during that fiscal year.

The Investment Advisory Agreement with respect to each Fund will continue in effect for two years from its initial effective date, and thereafter is subject to annual approval by (i) the Board of Trustees of the Trust or (ii) the vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities (as defined in the 1940 Act) of the Fund, provided that in either event such continuance also is approved by a vote of a majority of the Trustees of the Trust who are not interested persons (as defined in the 1940 Act) of the Fund. If the shareholders of a Fund fail to approve the Investment Advisory Agreement, Krane may continue to serve in the manner and to the extent permitted by the 1940 Act and rules and regulations thereunder.

The Investment Advisory Agreement with respect to a Fund is terminable without any penalty, by vote of the Board of Trustees of the Trust or by vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities (as defined in the 1940 Act) of a Fund, or by Krane, in each case on not less than sixty (60) days' prior written notice to the other party; provided that a shorter notice period shall be permitted for a Fund in the event its shares are no longer listed on a national securities exchange or in such other circumstances where a Fund waives such notice period. The Investment Advisory Agreement will terminate automatically and immediately in the event of its "assignment" (as defined in the 1940 Act).

China International Capital Corporation (USA) Holdings Inc., a wholly-owned, indirect subsidiary of China International Capital Corporation Limited owns a majority stake in Krane. As of March 31, 2023, Central Huijin Investment Limited, a mainland Chinese-domiciled entity, and HKSCC Nominees Limited, held approximately 40.11% and 39.42%, respectively, of the shares of China International Capital Corporation Limited. Central Huijin Investment Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of China Investment Corporation, which is a mainland Chinese sovereign wealth fund. KFA One Holdings, LLC, located at 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017, holds the remaining equity interests in Krane and Jonathan Krane, through his equity interests in KFA One Holdings, LLC, beneficially owns more than 10% of the equity interests in Krane.

SUB-ADVISER

The Trust, on behalf of the Fund, and the Adviser has retained Quadratic Capital Management LLC (“Quadratic” or “Sub-Adviser”), 39 Lewis Street, 4th Floor, Greenwich, Connecticut 06830, to serve as investment sub-adviser for the Fund. Quadratic was established in 2013 and is controlled by its Managing Partner and CIO, Nancy Davis. Quadratic provides discretionary investment management services to separately managed accounts, in addition to the Fund, and, has previously provided such services to limited partnerships, offshore investment companies, and other collective investment vehicles that were offered to investors on a private placement basis.

Krane has entered into a Sub-Advisory Agreement with Quadratic pursuant to which Krane will pay Quadratic seventy-six percent (76%) of the sum of: (i) the total Gross Management Fee due to Krane from the Fund under the terms of the Investment Advisory Agreement minus (ii) any applicable fee waivers from time to time entered into between the Fund and Krane. Under the Sub-Advisory Agreement, the fee will be calculated daily and paid monthly.

The Quadratic Sub-Advisory Agreement will automatically terminate if assigned, and may be terminated without penalty at any time: (1) by Krane upon sixty (60) days’ written notice to Quadratic; (2) by a vote of a majority of the Trustees or by a vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities of the Fund upon (60) days’ written notice to Quadratic; (3) by Quadratic upon sixty (60) days’ written notice to the Board and Krane; or immediately upon written notice by Krane or Quadratic if (A) the license, approval, authorization or consent held by Krane or Quadratic which is required for the performance of its obligations under the Sub-Advisory Agreement and which has been granted or given by any relevant regulatory authority, is terminated or suspended; (B) Krane or Quadratic commits a material breach of the Sub-Advisory Agreement that is uncured within thirty (30) days of notice; (C) any step is taken with a view to the winding up, bankruptcy or administration of Krane or Quadratic; (D) any adverse finding is made in respect of, or official sanction imposed on, Krane or Quadratic by any relevant regulatory authority which would be likely to affect its ability to perform its obligations under the Sub-Advisory Agreement; or (E) a relevant regulatory authority has held, or is likely to hold, Krane or Quadratic to be in breach of any regulatory or other duties in relation to the Sub-Advisory Agreement. After an initial period of two years, the Quadratic Sub-Advisory Agreement will continue in effect provided that annually such continuance is specifically approved by a vote of the Trustees, including the affirmative votes of a majority of the Trustees who are not parties to the Quadratic Sub-Advisory Agreement or “interested persons” (as defined in the 1940 Act) of any such party, cast in person at a meeting called for the purpose of considering such approval, or by the vote of shareholders.

For the fiscal period ended March 31, 2023, Krane paid Quadratic \$10,426,102 in sub-advisory fees with respect to the Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF. For the fiscal year ended March 31, 2022, Krane paid Quadratic \$22,012,716 in sub-advisory fees with respect to the Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF. For the fiscal year ended March 31, 2021, Krane paid Quadratic \$5,365,706 in sub-advisory fees with respect to the Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF.

For the fiscal period ended March 31, 2023, Krane paid Quadratic \$557,135 in sub-advisory fees with respect to the Quadratic Deflation ETF. For the fiscal period ended March 31, 2022, Krane paid Quadratic \$196,889 in sub-advisory fees with respect to the Quadratic Deflation ETF.

PORTFOLIO MANAGER

Nancy Davis, Managing Partner and CIO of Quadratic, has been primarily responsible for the day-to-day management of each Fund's portfolio since each Fund's inception. She is responsible for various functions related to portfolio management, including, but not limited to, developing and implementing the Funds' investment process and investment strategy, researching and reviewing investment strategy, and overseeing members of her portfolio management team that have more limited responsibilities. The following information provides additional information the portfolio manager.

Portfolio Manager Fund Ownership. The Funds are required to show the dollar range of each portfolio manager's "beneficial ownership" of shares of a Fund as of the end of the most recently completed fiscal year. Dollar amount ranges disclosed are established by the SEC.

Quadratic's Portfolio Manager		
Name	Funds Covered By this SAI	Dollar Range of Fund Ownership (dollars)
Nancy Davis	Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	\$100,001-\$500,000
	Quadratic Deflation ETF	None

Other Accounts. The portfolio manager is responsible for the day-to-day management of certain other accounts, as follows:

Quadratic's Portfolio Manager						
Name	Registered Investment Companies*		Other Pooled Investment Vehicles*		Other Accounts*	
	Number of Accounts	Total Assets (\$ millions)	Number of Accounts	Total Assets (\$ millions)	Number of Accounts	Total Assets (\$ millions)
Nancy Davis *	2	\$874.7	0	\$0	0	\$0

* The information provided is as of March 31, 2023. None of the accounts paid advisory fees based on the performance of the accounts.

Portfolio Manager Compensation

The Funds' portfolio manager receives from the Sub-Adviser a base salary, a discretionary bonus not tied to the performance of the Funds, and a portion of any distribution of company profits.

Description of Material Conflicts of Interest

The investment activities of the Sub-Adviser and its affiliates in the management of, or their interest in, their own accounts and other accounts they manage, may present conflicts of interest that could disadvantage a Fund and its shareholders. The Sub-Adviser and its affiliates provide investment management services to other funds and discretionary managed accounts that may follow investment programs similar to that of a Fund. The Sub-Adviser and its affiliates may engage in the ordinary course of business in activities in which their interests or the interests of their clients may conflict with those of a Fund. An affiliate may have business relationships with, and purchase, distribute, or sell services or products from or to, distributors, consultants or others who recommend a Fund or who engage in transactions with or for a Fund, and may receive compensation for such services. Each Fund may also make brokerage and other payments to affiliates in connection with a Fund's portfolio investment transactions.

The Sub-Adviser or its affiliates may engage in proprietary trading and advise accounts and funds that have investment objectives similar to those of a Fund and/or that engage in and compete for transactions in the same types of securities, currencies, and other instruments as a Fund, including securities issued by other open-end and closed-end investment companies (which may include investment companies that are affiliated with a Fund and the Sub-Adviser, to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act). The trading activities of the Sub-Adviser and its affiliates are carried out without reference to positions held directly or indirectly by a Fund and may result in the Sub-Adviser and its affiliate having positions in certain securities that are senior or junior to, or having interests different from or adverse to, the securities that are owned by a Fund.

No Sub-Adviser affiliate is under any obligation to share any investment opportunity, idea, or strategy with a Fund. As a result, a Sub-Adviser affiliate may compete with a Fund for appropriate investment opportunities. The results of a Fund's investment activities, therefore, may differ from those of a Sub-Adviser affiliate and of other accounts managed by a Sub-Adviser affiliate, and it is possible that a Fund could sustain losses during periods in which one or more Sub-Adviser affiliates and other accounts achieve profits on their trading for proprietary or other accounts. The opposite result is also possible.

In addition, a Fund may, from time to time, enter into transactions in which the Sub-Adviser's or its affiliate's other clients have an adverse interest. Furthermore, transactions undertaken by Sub-Adviser affiliate-advised clients may adversely impact a Fund. Transactions by one or more a Sub-Adviser affiliate-advised clients or by the Sub-Adviser may have the effect of diluting or otherwise disadvantaging the values, prices, or investment strategies of a Fund.

The activities of the Sub-Adviser or its affiliates may give rise to other conflicts of interest that could disadvantage the Fund and its shareholders. The Sub-Adviser has adopted policies and procedures designed to address these potential conflicts of interest.

CODES OF ETHICS

The Trust, Krane and Quadratic have each adopted a Code of Ethics pursuant to Rule 17j-1 under the 1940 Act. The Codes of Ethics apply to the personal investing activities of trustees, directors, officers and certain employees ("access persons"). Rule 17j-1 and the Codes of Ethics are designed to prevent unlawful practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities by access persons. Under the Codes of Ethics, access persons are permitted to engage in personal securities transactions (including investments in securities that may be purchased and held by a Fund), but are required to report their personal securities transactions for monitoring purposes. In addition, certain access persons are required to obtain approval before investing in private placements. Each Code of Ethics is on file with the SEC and is available to the public.

PROXY VOTING POLICY

The Trust has adopted the proxy voting policies of Krane, a summary of which is set forth in the appendix to this SAI. The Trust is required to disclose annually a Fund's complete proxy voting record on Form N-PX covering the period from July 1 of one year through June 30 of the next and to file Form N-PX with the SEC no later than August 31 of each year. The Form N-PX is available, or will be available, at no charge upon request by calling 1.855.857.2638. A Fund's Form N-PX is also available or will be available, on the SEC's website at www.sec.gov.

ADMINISTRATOR

SEI Investments Global Funds Services (the "Administrator") serves as administrator for the Funds. SEI Investments Management Corporation ("SIMC"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of SEI Investments Company ("SEI Investments"), is the owner of all beneficial interest in the Administrator. The principal address of the Administrator is One Freedom Valley Drive, Oaks, Pennsylvania 19456. Under an Amended and Restated Administration Agreement with the Trust dated July 9, 2014, as amended (the "Administration Agreement"), the Administrator provides necessary administrative and accounting services for the maintenance and operations of the Trust and the Funds. In addition, the Administrator makes available the office space, equipment, personnel and facilities required to provide such services.

For its services under the Administration Agreement, the Administrator is entitled to a fee, based on assets under management, subject to a minimum fee. The Administrator may be reimbursed by the Funds for its out-of-pocket expenses. The Investment Advisory Agreement provides that Krane will pay certain operating expenses of the Trust, including the fees due to the Administrator under the Administration Agreement.

CUSTODIAN AND TRANSFER AGENT

Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. ("BBH") serves as custodian and transfer agent for the Trust. The principal address of BBH is 50 Post Office Square, Boston, Massachusetts 02110. Under the Custodian and Transfer Agent Agreement with the Trust dated December 12, 2012, BBH, in its capacity as custodian, maintains in separate accounts cash, securities and other assets of the Funds, keeps all necessary accounts and records, and provides other services. BBH is required, upon the order of the Trust, to deliver securities held by it, in its capacity as custodian, and to make payments for securities purchased by the Trust for a Fund.

BBH further acts as a transfer agent for the Trust's authorized and issued shares of beneficial interest, and as dividend disbursing agent of the Trust, under the Custodian and Transfer Agent Agreement. The Investment Advisory Agreement provides that Krane will pay certain operating expenses of the Trust, including the fees due to BBH under the Custodian and Transfer Agent Agreement.

DISTRIBUTOR AND DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENTS

SEI Investments Distribution Co., a wholly-owned subsidiary of SEI Investments, and an affiliate of the Administrator, serves as Distributor for the Trust. The principal address of the Distributor is One Freedom Valley Drive, Oaks, Pennsylvania 19456. The Distributor has entered into an Amended and Restated Distribution Agreement with the Trust dated July 9, 2014, (the "Distribution Agreement") pursuant to which it distributes shares of the Funds. The Distribution Agreement will continue for two years from its effective date and is renewable annually. Shares are continuously offered for sale by the Funds through the Distributor only in Creation Units, as described in the Prospectus and below in the "Creation and Redemption of Creation Units" section. Shares in less than Creation Units are not distributed by the Distributor. The Distributor is a broker-dealer registered under the 1934 Act and a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"). The Distributor is not affiliated with Krane, the sub-adviser, or any national securities exchange.

The Distribution Agreement provides that it may be terminated at any time, without the payment of any penalty: (i) by a vote of a majority of the independent Trustees; (ii) by a vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities (as defined in the 1940 Act) of a Fund; or (iii) on at least thirty (30) days' prior written notice to the other party. The Distribution Agreement will terminate automatically in the event of its assignment (as defined in the 1940 Act).

The Distributor also may enter into agreements with securities dealers ("Soliciting Dealers") who will solicit purchases of Creation Units of shares. Such Soliciting Dealers also may be Authorized Participants (as defined below) or DTC Participants (as defined below).

Distribution Plan. Each Fund has adopted a Distribution Plan applicable to the Fund's shares. Under the Distribution Plan, the Distributor, or designated service providers, may receive up to 0.25% of a Fund's assets attributable to shares as compensation for distribution services pursuant to Rule 12b-1 of the 1940 Act. Distribution services may include: (i) services in connection with distribution assistance, or (ii) payments to financial institutions and other financial intermediaries, such as broker-dealers, fund "supermarkets" and the Distributor's affiliates and subsidiaries, as compensation for services or reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with distribution assistance. The Distributor may, at its discretion, retain a portion of such payments to compensate itself for distribution services and distribution related expenses such as the costs of preparation, printing, mailing or otherwise disseminating sales literature, advertising, and prospectuses (other than those furnished to current shareholders of a Fund), promotional and incentive programs, and such other marketing expenses that the Distributor may incur. The plan is a compensation plan, which means that the Distributor is compensated regardless of its expenses, as opposed to a reimbursement plan which reimburses only for expenses incurred.

No distribution fees are currently charged to the Funds and there are currently no plans to impose these fees. The Plan was adopted in order to permit the implementation of each Fund's method of distribution. In the event that 12b-1 fees are charged in the future, because a Fund pays these fees out of assets on an ongoing basis, over time these fees may cost you more than other types of sales charges and will increase the cost of your investment in a Fund.

The Plan will remain in effect for a period of one year and is renewable from year to year with respect to a Fund, so long as its continuance is approved at least annually (1) by the vote of a majority of the Trustees and (2) by a vote of the majority of those Independent Trustees who have no direct or indirect financial interest in the Plan ("Rule 12b-1 Trustees"). The Plan may not be amended to increase materially the amount of fees that may be paid by a Fund under the Plan unless such amendment is approved by a 1940 Act majority vote of the outstanding shares and by a Fund's Trustees in the manner described above. The Plan is terminable with respect to a Fund at any time by a vote of a majority of the Rule 12b-1 Trustees or by a 1940 Act majority vote of the outstanding shares.

Intermediary Compensation. Krane, a sub-adviser and/or their affiliates, out of their own resources and not out of a Fund's assets (*i.e.*, without additional cost to a Fund or its shareholders), may pay certain broker dealers, banks and other financial intermediaries ("Intermediaries"), to the extent permitted by applicable law, for certain activities related to a Fund, including marketing and education support and the sale of a Fund's shares. These arrangements are sometimes referred to as "revenue sharing" arrangements. Revenue sharing arrangements are not financed by a Fund and, thus, do not result in increased Fund expenses. They are not reflected in the fees and expenses listed in the fees and expenses sections of a Fund's Prospectus and they do not change the price paid by investors for the purchase of a Fund's shares or the amount received by a shareholder as proceeds from the redemption of shares of a Fund.

Such compensation may be paid to Intermediaries that provide services to a Fund, including marketing and education support (such as through conferences, webinars and printed communications). Such compensation may also be paid to Intermediaries for inclusion of a Fund on a sales list, including a preferred or select sales list, in other sales programs. Krane periodically assesses the advisability of continuing to make these payments.

Payments to an Intermediary may be significant to the Intermediary, and amounts that Intermediaries pay to your adviser, broker or other investment professional, if any, may also be significant to such adviser, broker or investment professional. Because an Intermediary may make decisions about what investment options it will make available or recommend, and what services to provide in connection with various products, based on payments it receives or is eligible to receive, such payments create conflicts of interest between the Intermediary and its clients. For example, these financial incentives may cause the Intermediary to recommend a Fund over other investments. The same conflict of interest exists with respect to your financial adviser, broker or investment professionals if he or she receives similar payments from his or her Intermediary firm.

Intermediary information is current only as of the date of this SAI. Please contact your adviser, broker or other investment professional for more information regarding any payments his or her Intermediary firm may receive. Any payments made by Krane, a sub-adviser and/or their affiliates to an Intermediary may create an incentive for the Intermediary to encourage customers to buy shares of a Fund.

CONTROL PERSONS AND PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF SECURITIES

All shares of a Fund that have commenced operations are held of record in the name of the DTC or its nominee, Cede & Co. Although the Funds do not have information concerning the beneficial ownership of shares held in the names of DTC participants, as of June 30, 2023, the name and percentage ownership of each DTC participant* that owned of record 5% or more of the outstanding shares of a Fund were as follows:

Ticker	Fund	Participant Name and Address	Percentage of Ownership
IVOL	The Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 3000 Schwab Way Westlake, TX 76262	18.3%
		National Financial Services LLC, 1 World Financial Center - Sandy Hook New York, NY 10281	12.7%
		TD Ameritrade Clearing, Inc. 200 South 108th Avenue Omaha, NE 68154	7.2%
		Pershing LLC One Pershing Plaza Jersey City, NJ 07399	7.0%
		Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC 1585 Broadway New York, NY 10036	7.0%
		The Northern Trust Company 50 S. LaSalle Street Chicago, IL 60603	6.7%
BNDD	The Quadratic Deflation ETF	Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. 3000 Schwab Way Westlake, TX 76262	21.1%
		LPL Financial LLC 4707 Executive Drive San Diego, CA 92121	5.3%
		National Financial Services LLC 1 World Financial Center Sandy Hook New York, NY 10281	26.1%
		TD Ameritrade Clearing, Inc. 200 South 108th Avenue Omaha, NE 68154	16.3%
		Brown Brothers Harriman & Co./ETF 140 Broadway New York, NY 10005	5.7%

* DTC participants are listed according to their DTC number and may represent multiple companies under a single parent company, which have not been aggregated.

EXCHANGE LISTING AND TRADING

A discussion of exchange listing and trading matters associated with an investment in a Fund is contained in the Prospectus. The discussion below supplements, and should be read in conjunction with, such sections of the Prospectus.

The shares of the Fund are listed and traded on the Exchange identified on the cover of this SAI at prices that may differ from a Fund's NAV. There can be no assurance that the Exchange requirements necessary to maintain the listing of the shares of the Fund will continue to be met. The Exchange may, but is not required to, remove the shares of the Fund from listing if, among other matters: (i) the Exchange becomes aware that the Fund is no longer eligible to operate in reliance on Rule 6c-11 of the Investment Company Act; (ii) if the Fund no longer complies with the requirements set forth by the Exchange; (iii) following the initial 12-month period after commencement of trading of the Fund, there are fewer than fifty (50) Beneficial Owners (as that term is defined below) of the shares of the Fund; or (iv) such other event shall occur or condition exist that, in the opinion of the Exchange, makes further dealings on the Exchange inadvisable. The Exchange will remove the shares of the Fund from listing and trading upon termination of the Fund.

Trading prices of Shares on the Exchange may differ from the Fund's daily NAV. Market forces of supply and demand, economic conditions and other factors may affect the trading prices of Shares.

As in the case of other stocks traded on the Exchange, broker's commissions on purchases or sales of shares in market transactions will be based on investors' negotiated commission rates.

The Trust reserves the right to adjust the price levels of shares in the future to help maintain convenient trading ranges for investors. Any adjustments would be accomplished through stock splits or reverse stock splits, which would have no effect on the net assets of a Fund or the value of investors' individual positions in the Fund.

BOOK ENTRY ONLY SYSTEM

The information below supplements and should be read in conjunction with the section in the Prospectus entitled "Shareholder Information."

The Depository Trust Company ("DTC") acts as securities depository for a Fund's shares. Shares of a Fund are represented by securities registered in the name of the DTC or its nominee, Cede & Co., and deposited with, or on behalf of, the DTC.

The DTC, a limited-purpose trust company, was created to hold securities of its participants ("DTC Participants") and to facilitate the clearance and settlement of securities transactions among the DTC Participants in such securities through electronic book-entry changes in accounts of the DTC Participants, thereby eliminating the need for physical movement of securities' certificates. DTC Participants include securities brokers and dealers, banks, trust companies, clearing corporations and certain other organizations, some of whom (and/or their representatives) own the DTC. More specifically, the DTC is owned by a number of its DTC Participants and by the Exchange, and FINRA. Access to the DTC system is also available to others such as banks, brokers, dealers and trust companies that clear through or maintain a custodial relationship with a DTC Participant, either directly or indirectly (the "Indirect Participants").

Beneficial ownership of shares is limited to DTC Participants, Indirect Participants and persons holding interests through DTC Participants and Indirect Participants. Ownership of beneficial interests in shares (owners of such beneficial interests are referred to herein as “Beneficial Owners”) is shown on, and the transfer of ownership is effected only through, records maintained by the DTC (with respect to DTC Participants) and on the records of DTC Participants (with respect to Indirect Participants and Beneficial Owners that are not DTC Participants). Beneficial Owners will receive from or through the DTC Participant a written confirmation relating to their purchase of shares. The laws of some jurisdictions may require that certain purchasers of securities take physical delivery of such securities in definitive form. Such laws may impair the ability of certain investors to acquire beneficial interests in shares.

Conveyance of all notices, statements and other communications to Beneficial Owners is effected as follows. Pursuant to the Depositary Agreement between the Trust and the DTC, the DTC is required to make available to the Trust upon request and for a fee to be charged to the Trust a listing of the shares of a Fund held by each DTC Participant. The Trust shall inquire of each such DTC Participant as to the number of Beneficial Owners holding shares, directly or indirectly, through such DTC Participant. The Trust shall provide each such DTC Participant with copies of such notice, statement or other communication, in such form, number and at such place as such DTC Participant may reasonably request, in order that such notice, statement or communication may be transmitted by such DTC Participant, directly or indirectly, to such Beneficial Owners. In addition, the Trust shall pay to each such DTC Participant a fair and reasonable amount as reimbursement for the expenses attendant to such transmittal, all subject to applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.

Share distributions shall be made to the DTC or its nominee, Cede & Co., as the registered holder of all shares. The DTC or its nominee, upon receipt of any such distributions, shall credit immediately DTC Participants’ accounts with payments in amounts proportionate to their respective beneficial interests in shares of a Fund as shown on the records of the DTC or its nominee. Payments by DTC Participants to Indirect Participants and Beneficial Owners of shares held through such DTC Participants will be governed by standing instructions and customary practices, as is now the case with securities held for the accounts of customers in bearer form or registered in a “street name,” and will be the responsibility of such DTC Participants.

The Trust has no responsibility or liability for any aspect of the records relating to or notices to Beneficial Owners, or payments made on account of beneficial ownership interests in such shares, or for maintaining, supervising or reviewing any records relating to such beneficial ownership interests, or for any other aspect of the relationship between the DTC and DTC Participants or the relationship between such DTC Participants and the Indirect Participants and Beneficial Owners owning through such DTC Participants.

The DTC may decide to discontinue providing its service with respect to shares at any time by giving reasonable notice to the Trust and discharging its responsibilities with respect thereto under applicable law. Under such circumstances, the Trust shall take action to find a replacement for the DTC to perform its functions at a comparable cost.

BROKERAGE TRANSACTIONS

Krane or, as applicable, a Fund sub-adviser assumes general supervision over placing orders on behalf of a Fund for the purchase and sale of portfolio securities.

Although Krane or, as applicable, a Fund sub-adviser strives to obtain the best net price under prevailing circumstances surrounding each trade, the determinative factor is whether a transaction represents the best overall execution for a Fund and not whether the lowest possible transaction cost is obtained. Krane and any sub-adviser consider the full range and quality of a broker-dealer's servicing in selecting the broker to meet best execution obligations, and may not pay the lowest transaction cost available. Krane or the sub-adviser review trading to ensure best execution, operational performance, and reasonable commission rates. Order flow may go through traditional broker-dealers, but may also be executed on an Electronic Communication Network, Alternative Trading System or other execution system.

Where multiple broker-dealers are available to execute portfolio transactions, in selecting the brokers or dealers for any transaction in portfolio securities, Krane or a sub-adviser's policy is to make such selection based on factors deemed relevant, which may include the breadth of the market in the security; the price of the security; the reasonableness of the commission or mark-up or mark-down, if any; execution capability; settlement capability; back office efficiency; and the financial condition of the broker or dealer, both for the specific transaction and on a continuing basis. The overall reasonableness of brokerage commissions paid or spreads is evaluated by Krane or a sub-adviser generally based upon its knowledge of available information as to the general level of commissions paid or spreads by other institutional investors for comparable services. Brokers or dealers may also be selected because of their ability to handle special or difficult executions, such as may be involved in large block trades, less liquid securities, broad distributions, or other circumstances. Krane or a sub-adviser may also consider the provision or value of research, products or services a broker or dealer may provide, if any, as a factor in the selection of a broker or dealer or the determination of the reasonableness of commissions paid in connection with portfolio transactions. The Trust has adopted policies and procedures that prohibit the consideration of sales of a Fund's shares as a factor in the selection of a broker or a dealer to execute its portfolio transactions.

When one or more broker-dealers is believed capable of providing the best combination of price and execution, a broker-dealer need not be selected based solely on the lowest commission rate available for a particular transaction. In such cases, Krane or a sub-adviser may pay a higher commission than otherwise obtainable from other brokers in return for brokerage research services provided to Krane or a sub-adviser consistent with Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). Section 28(e) provides that Krane or a sub-adviser may cause a Fund to pay a broker-dealer a commission for effecting a transaction in excess of the amount of commission another broker or dealer would have charged as long as Krane or the sub-adviser makes a good faith determination that the amount of commission is reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services provided by the broker-dealer. To the extent Krane or a sub-adviser obtains brokerage and research services that it otherwise would acquire at its own expense, Krane or a sub-adviser may have incentive to place a greater volume of transactions or pay higher commissions than would otherwise be the case.

The types of products and services that Krane or the sub-adviser may obtain from broker-dealers through such arrangements may include research reports and other information on the economy, industries, sectors, groups of securities, individual companies, statistical information, political developments, technical market action, pricing and appraisal services, credit analysis, risk measurement analysis, performance and other analysis. Krane or a sub-adviser may use products and services provided by brokers in servicing all of its client accounts and not all such products and services may necessarily be used in connection with the account that paid commissions to the broker-dealer providing such products and services. Any advisory or other fees paid to Krane or a sub-adviser are not reduced as a result of the receipt of brokerage and research services.

In some cases, Krane or a sub-adviser may receive a product or service from a broker that has both a “research” and a “non-research” use. When this occurs, Krane or the sub-adviser will make a good faith allocation between the research and non-research uses of the product or service. The percentage of the service that is used for research purposes may be paid for with brokerage commissions, while Krane or the sub-adviser will use its own funds to pay for the percentage of the service that is used for non-research purposes. In making this good faith allocation, Krane or the sub-adviser faces a potential conflict of interest, but Krane or the sub-adviser believes that its allocation procedures are reasonably designed to appropriately allocate the anticipated use of such products and services to research and non-research uses.

Brokerage Commissions

Aggregate brokerage commissions paid by each of the following operational Funds on portfolio transactions for the fiscal periods shown are set forth in the table below:

	Fiscal Period/Year Ended March 31, 2023	Fiscal Period/Year Ended March 31, 2022	Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 2021
Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	\$0	\$0	\$0
Quadratic Deflation ETF	\$0	\$0*	N/A

* For the fiscal period starting from the Quadratic Deflation ETF’s inception, September 30, 2021, to March 31, 2022.

Because the Quadratic Deflation ETF had not commenced operations prior to the end of the fiscal year ended March 31, 2021, the Fund did not pay any brokerage commissions during that fiscal year.

Directed Brokerage

For the fiscal year/period ended March 31, 2023, the Funds paid the following in commissions on brokerage transactions directed to brokers pursuant to an agreement or understanding whereby the broker provides research or other brokerage services to Krane or the sub-adviser:

Fund	Brokerage Commissions for Research Services	Transactions Involving Brokerage Commissions for Research Services
Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	\$0	\$0
Quadratic Deflation ETF	\$0	\$0

Affiliated Brokers

Of the aggregate brokerage commissions paid by each of the following operational Funds on portfolio transactions for the fiscal periods shown, below are the commissions paid by the Funds to a broker that is an affiliated person of the Fund:

	Fiscal Period Ended March 31, 2023	Fiscal Period Ended March 31, 2022	Fiscal Period Ended March 31, 2021
Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	\$0	\$0	\$0
Quadratic Deflation ETF	\$0	\$0**	N/A

* For the fiscal period starting from the Quadratic Deflation ETF's inception, September 30, 2021, to March 31, 2022.

Because the Quadratic Deflation ETF had not commenced operations prior to the end of the fiscal year ended March 31, 2021, the Fund did not pay any brokerage commissions during that fiscal year.

Regular Broker-Dealers

Each Fund is required to identify any securities of its “regular brokers and dealers” (as such term is defined in the 1940 Act) which a Fund may hold at the close of its most recent fiscal year. “Regular brokers or dealers” of a Fund are the ten brokers or dealers that, during the most recent fiscal year: (i) received the greatest dollar amounts of brokerage commissions from a Fund’s portfolio transactions; (ii) engaged as principal in the largest dollar amounts of portfolio transactions of a Fund; or (iii) sold the largest dollar amounts of a Fund’s shares. Such information is set out in the table below:

	Ownership as of March 31, 2023
Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	None
Quadratic Deflation ETF	None

Portfolio Turnover

Portfolio turnover may vary from year to year, as well as within a year. High turnover rates are likely to result in comparatively greater brokerage expenses or dealer mark-ups and other transaction costs. The overall reasonableness of brokerage commissions is evaluated by Krane or the sub-adviser based upon their knowledge of available information as to the general level of commissions and spreads paid or incurred by the other institutional investors for comparable services.

During the prior fiscal year/period, the Funds’ portfolio turnover rates were as follows:

	Fiscal Year/Period Ended March 31, 2023	Fiscal Year/Period Ended March 31, 2022
Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	0%	0%
Quadratic Deflation ETF	0%	0%*

* For the fiscal period starting from the Quadratic Deflation ETF’s inception, September 30, 2021, to March 31, 2022.

CREATION AND REDEMPTION OF CREATION UNITS

Except as otherwise noted below, the following applies to any Fund covered by this SAI:

General

The Trust issues and redeems shares of a Fund only in Creation Units on a continuous basis through the Distributor, without a sales load but subject to the transaction fees described below, at the NAV next determined after receipt, on any Business Day (as defined below), of an order in proper form. A “Business Day”, as used herein, is any day on which the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) is open for business. As of the date of this SAI, the NYSE observes the following holidays: New Year’s Day, Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, Presidents’ Day, Good Friday, Memorial Day, Juneteenth, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day.

Currently, the number of shares that constitutes a Creation Unit is 25,000 shares. In its discretion, the Board reserves the right to increase or decrease the number of the Fund’s shares that constitute a Creation Unit. The Board reserves the right to declare a split or a consolidation in the number of shares outstanding of the Fund, and to make changes in the number of shares constituting a Creation Unit, including in the event that the per share price in the secondary market rises (or declines) to an amount that falls outside the range deemed desirable by the Board.

Creation Units may be purchased and redeemed only by or through a DTC Participant that has entered into an Authorized Participant Agreement with the Distributor (an “Authorized Participant”). Such Authorized Participant will agree, pursuant to the terms of such Authorized Participant Agreement and on behalf of itself or any investor on whose behalf it will act, to certain conditions, including those set forth below, the Authorized Participant Agreement and any handbook governing the Authorized Participants (collectively, the “AP Agreement”). Investors who are not Authorized Participants must make appropriate arrangements with an Authorized Participant to purchase or redeem Creation Units. Investors should be aware that their particular broker may not be a DTC Participant or may not have executed an Authorized Participant Agreement with the Distributor and that Creation Unit orders may have to be placed by the investor’s broker through an Authorized Participant. As a result, orders placed through an Authorized Participant may result in additional charges to such investor. A list of current Authorized Participants may be obtained from the Distributor.

Investors who are not Authorized Participants may purchase and sell shares of the Fund through an Authorized Participant or on the secondary market.

Because the portfolio securities of the Fund may trade on days that the Exchange is closed or are otherwise not Business Days for the Fund, shareholders may not be able to purchase or redeem their shares of the Fund, or purchase or sell shares of the Fund on the Exchange, on days when the NAV of the Fund could be significantly affected by events in the relevant non-U.S. markets.

The Basket of securities comprising a Fund Deposit and a Fund Redemption (each, as defined below) may be representative of the Fund’s portfolio holdings; or the Fund may utilize “Custom Baskets” provided that certain conditions are met. A Custom Basket is (i) a Basket that is composed of a non-representative selection of the Fund’s portfolio holdings, (ii) a representative Basket that is different from the initial Basket used in transactions on the same business day, or (iii) a Basket that contains bespoke cash and/or security substitutions, including for a single Authorized Participant. The Trust has adopted policies and procedures that govern the

construction and acceptance of Baskets, including heightened requirements for Custom Baskets. Such policies and procedures provide detailed parameters for the construction and acceptance of Custom Baskets, establish processes for revisions to, or deviations from, such parameters, and specify the titles and roles of the employees of the Adviser who are required to review each Custom Basket for compliance with those parameters. In connection with the construction and acceptance of Custom Baskets, the Adviser may consider various factors, including, but not limited to: (1) whether the securities, assets and other positions comprising a Basket are consistent with the Fund's investment objective, policies and disclosure; (2) whether the securities, assets and other positions can legally and readily be acquired, transferred and held by the Fund and/or Authorized Participant(s), as applicable; (3) whether the Custom Basket increases the liquidity of a Fund's portfolio, noting that a Custom Basket may not be accepted which adversely affects the liquidity position of a Fund's portfolio when other Basket options exist (4) whether and to what extent to include cash in the Basket; (5) whether the use of Custom Baskets may reduce costs, increase (tax) efficiency and improve trading in Fund shares; and (6) with respect to index-based strategies, whether the securities, assets and other positions aid the Fund to track its underlying index. The policies and procedures apply different criteria to different types of Custom Baskets in order to mitigate against potential overreaching by an Authorized Participant, although there is no guarantee that such policies and procedures will be effective.

Purchases of Creation Units

The consideration for the purchase of Creation Units of the Fund consists of an in-kind deposit of a designated portfolio of securities ("Deposit Securities") or cash for all or any portion of such securities ("Deposit Cash") (collectively, the "Deposit Basket") and the Cash Component, which is an amount equal to the difference between the aggregate NAV of a Creation Unit and the Deposit Basket. Together, the Deposit Basket and the Cash Component constitute the "Fund Deposit."

The Custodian or the Administrator makes available through the National Securities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC") on each Business Day, prior to the opening of regular trading on the Exchange, the list of names and the required number of shares of each Deposit Security and Deposit Cash in the Deposit Basket, and the estimated amount of the Cash Component to be included in the current Fund Deposit. Such Fund Deposit will normally be applicable, subject to any adjustments as described below, in order to effect purchases of Creation Units of the Fund until such time as the next-announced Fund Deposit is made available. The means by which the Deposit Basket and Cash Component are to be delivered by the Authorized Participant to the Fund are set forth in the AP Agreement, except to the extent the Distributor and the Authorized Participant otherwise agree. Fund shares will be settled through the DTC system.

The identity and number of shares of the Deposit Securities change pursuant to, among other matters, changes in the composition of the Fund's portfolio and as rebalancing adjustments and corporate action events are reflected from time to time.

The Trust also reserves the right to include or remove Deposit Securities from the Fund Deposit for one or more of the following reasons: (i) in the case of bonds, for minor differences when it is impossible to break up bonds beyond certain minimum sizes needed for transfer and settlement; (ii) for minor differences when rounding is necessary to eliminate fractional shares or lots that are not tradeable round lots; or (iii) TBA Transactions, short positions and other positions that cannot be transferred in-kind, including instruments that can be transferred in-kind only with the consent of the original counterparty.

Cash purchases of Creation Units will be effected in essentially the same manner as in-kind purchases. The Authorized Participant will pay the cash equivalent of the Deposit Securities as Deposit Cash plus or minus the same Cash Component.

Krane or the sub-adviser, as applicable, on behalf of the Fund, will convert subscriptions that are made in whole or in part in cash, including Deposit Cash, into the relevant foreign currency prior to investment at the applicable exchange rate and subject to the applicable spread. Those purchasing Creation Units of the Fund bear the risk associated with changes in the currency exchange rate between the time they place their order and the time that the Fund converts any cash received into foreign investments.

Placement of Purchase Orders

For a purchase order to be processed based on the NAV calculated on a particular Business Day, the purchase order must be received in proper form and accepted by the Trust prior to the time as of which the NAV is calculated (“Cutoff Time”). Investors who are not Authorized Participants and seek to place a purchase order for a Creation Unit through an Authorized Participant should allow sufficient time to permit proper submission of the purchase order to the Distributor by the Cutoff Time on such Business Day. Custom Orders must normally be received in proper form and accepted by the Trust at least two hours prior to Cutoff Time.

The AP Agreement sets forth the different methods whereby Authorized Participants can submit purchase orders. A purchase order is considered to be in “proper form” if a request in a form satisfactory to the Fund is (1) received by the Distributor from an Authorized Participant on behalf of itself or another person within the time period set above, and (2) all the procedures and other requirements applicable to the method used by the Authorized Participant to submit the purchase order, such as, in the case of purchase orders submitted through the Distributor’s website, the completion of all required fields, including as set forth in the AP Agreement are properly followed.

Creation Unit orders must be transmitted by an Authorized Participant by telephone or other transmission method acceptable to the Distributor. Economic or market disruptions or changes, or telephone or other communication failure, may impede transmissions between the Distributor and an Authorized Participant. Orders to create shares of the Fund that are submitted on the Business Day immediately preceding a holiday or a day (other than a weekend) when the securities markets in a foreign market in which the Fund may invest are closed may not be accepted or may be charged the maximum transaction fee. The Distributor, in its discretion, may permit the submission of orders and requests by or through an Authorized Participant via communication through the facilities of the Distributor’s proprietary website maintained for this purpose. A Purchase order, if accepted by the Trust, will be processed based on the NAV as of the next Cutoff Time.

Acceptance of Orders for, and Issuance of, Creation Units

All questions as to whether an order has been submitted in proper form and the number of shares of each security in the Deposit Securities and the validity, form, eligibility and acceptance for deposit of any securities to be delivered shall be determined by the Fund and the Fund’s determination shall be final and binding.

The Fund reserves the right to reject or revoke acceptance of a creation order, for any reason, provided that such action is not in contravention of Rule 6c-11. For example, the Fund may reject or revoke acceptance of a creation order including, but not limited to, when (i) the order is not in proper form; (ii) the investor(s), upon obtaining the shares ordered, would own 80% or more of the currently outstanding shares of the Fund; (iii) the Deposit Securities delivered do not conform to the identity and number of shares specified; (iv) the Fund Deposit is not legally required or would, in the opinion of counsel, be unlawful; or (v) circumstances outside the control of the Fund, the Distributor and Krane make it impracticable to process purchase orders. The Distributor shall notify a prospective purchaser of a Creation Unit and/or the Authorized Participant acting on behalf of such purchaser of the rejection or revocation of acceptance of such order. The Fund, the Custodian, the sub-custodian and the Distributor are under no duty, however, to give notification of any defects or irregularities in the delivery of Fund Deposits nor shall any of them incur any liability for failure to give such notification.

Except as provided in the following paragraph, a Creation Unit will not be issued until the transfer of good title to the Fund of the Deposit Securities and the payment of the Cash Component, Deposit Cash and creation transaction fees have been completed. In this regard, the Custodian will require, prior to the issuance of a Creation Unit, that the sub-custodian confirm to the Custodian that the Deposit Securities have been delivered to the account of the Fund at the sub-custodian(s). If the Fund does not receive the foregoing by the time specified herein the Creation Unit may not be delivered or the purchase order may be rejected.

The Fund may issue Creation Units to an Authorized Participant, notwithstanding the fact that all Deposit Securities have not been received, in reliance on the undertaking of the Authorized Participant to deliver the missing Deposit Securities as soon as possible, which undertaking shall be secured by such Authorized Participant's delivery and maintenance of collateral having a value of up to 115% of the value of the missing Deposit Securities. The only collateral that is acceptable is cash in U.S. dollars. Such cash collateral must be delivered no later than 2:00 p.m., Eastern Time on the contractual settlement date of the Creation Unit(s). The Fund may buy the missing Deposit Securities at any time, and the Authorized Participant will be liable for any shortfall between the cost to the Fund of purchasing such securities and the cash collateral. In addition, the cash collateral may be invested at the risk of the Authorized Participant, and any income on invested cash collateral will be paid to that Authorized Participant. Information concerning the Fund's current procedures for collateralization of missing Deposit Securities is available from the Distributor.

In certain cases, an Authorized Participant may create and redeem Creation Units on the same trade date. In these instances, the Fund reserves the right to settle these transactions on a net basis or require a representation from the Authorized Participant that the creation and redemption transactions are for separate Beneficial Owners.

Once the Fund has accepted a purchase order, upon the next determination of the NAV of the shares, the Fund may confirm the issuance of a Creation Unit, against receipt of payment, at such NAV. The Distributor will then transmit a confirmation of acceptance to the Authorized Participant that placed the order. Creation Units typically are settled on a "T+2 basis" (i.e., two Business Days after trade date), subject to certain exceptions. However, the Fund reserves the right to settle Creation Unit transactions on a basis other than T+2, including in order to accommodate non-U.S. market holiday schedules, closures and settlement cycles, and to account for different treatment among non-U.S. and U.S. markets of dividend record dates and ex-dividend dates.

Creation Transaction Fees

A standard creation transaction fee is imposed to offset transfer and other costs associated with the issuance of Creation Units. The standard creation transaction fee is charged to the Authorized Participant on the day such Authorized Participant creates a Creation Unit, and is the same, regardless of the number of Creation Units purchased by the Authorized Participant on the applicable Business Day.

The Authorized Participant may also be required to pay a variable transaction fee (up to the maximum amount shown in the table below) to cover certain brokerage, tax, foreign exchange, execution, market impact and other costs and expenses. Authorized Participants will also bear the costs of transferring the Deposit Securities, including any stamp duty or other similar fees and expenses.

The standard creation transaction fee and maximum variable transaction fee for a Creation Unit are set forth below:

FUND	STANDARD TRANSACTION FEE	MAXIMUM VARIABLE TRANSACTION FEE*
Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	\$0	2.00%
Quadratic Deflation ETF	\$0	2.00%

* As a percentage of the Creation Unit(s) purchased.

The Adviser may adjust the transactions fees from time to time based on actual experience and may waive some or all of the transaction fees from time to time.

Redemptions of Creation Units

The consideration paid by the Fund for the redemption of Creation Units consists of an in-kind basket of designated securities (“Redemption Securities”) or cash for all or any portion of such securities (“Redemption Cash”) (collectively, the “Fund Securities”) and the Cash Component, which is an amount equal to the difference between the aggregate NAV of a Creation Unit and the Fund Securities. Together, the Fund Securities and the Cash Component constitute the “Fund Redemption.”

The Custodian or the Administrator normally makes available through NSCC on each Business Day, prior to the opening of regular trading on the Exchange, the list of names and the number of shares of each Redemption Security and Redemption Cash, as applicable, and the estimated amount of the Cash Component to be included in the current Fund Redemption. Such Fund Redemption is applicable, subject to any adjustments as described below, for redemptions of Creation Units of the Fund until such time as the next-announced Fund Redemption is made available. The delivery of Fund shares will be settled through the DTC system. The means by which the Fund Securities and Cash Component are to be delivered to the Authorized Participant by the Fund are set forth in the AP Agreement, except to the extent the Distributor and the Authorized Participant otherwise agree.

The identity and number of shares of the Redemption Securities change pursuant to, among other matters, changes in the composition of the Fund's portfolio and as rebalancing adjustments and corporate action events are reflected from time to time.

Cash redemptions of Creation Units will be effected in essentially the same manner as in-kind redemptions. The Authorized Participant will receive the cash equivalent of the Fund Securities as Redemption Cash plus or minus the same Cash Component.

Krane or the sub-adviser, as applicable, on behalf of the Fund, will sell investments denominated in foreign currencies and convert such proceeds into U.S. Dollars at the applicable exchange rate and subject to the applicable spread for redemptions that are made in whole or in part for cash, including Redemption Cash. Those redeeming Creation Units of the Fund bear the risk associated with changes in the currency exchange rate between the time they place their order and the time that the Fund converts any investments into U.S. Dollars.

Placement of Redemption Orders

For a redemption order to be processed based on the NAV calculated on a particular Business Day, the order must be received in proper form and accepted by the Trust prior to the time as of which the NAV is calculated ("Cutoff Time"). Investors who are not Authorized Participants and seek to place a redemption order for a Creation Unit through an Authorized Participant should allow sufficient time to permit proper submission of the redemption order to the Distributor by the Cutoff Time on such Business Day. Custom Orders must be received in proper form and accepted by the Trust at least two hours prior to Cutoff Time.

The AP Agreement sets forth the different methods whereby Authorized Participants can submit redemption requests. A redemption request is considered to be in "proper form" if a request in a form satisfactory to the Fund is (1) received by the Distributor from an Authorized Participant on behalf of itself or another person within the time period set above, and (2) all the procedures and other requirements applicable to the method used by the Authorized Participant to submit the redemption order, such as, in the case of redemption orders submitted through the Distributor's website, the completion of all required fields, and including as set forth in the AP Agreement are properly followed.

Creation Unit orders must be transmitted by an Authorized Participant by telephone or other transmission method acceptable to the Distributor. Economic or market disruptions or changes, or telephone or other communication failure, may impede transmissions between the Distributor and an Authorized Participant. Orders to redeem shares of the Fund that are submitted on the Business Day immediately preceding a holiday or a day (other than a weekend) when the securities markets in a foreign market in which the Fund may invest are closed may be charged the maximum transaction fee. The Distributor, in its discretion, may permit the submission of orders by or through an Authorized Participant via communication through the facilities of the Distributor's proprietary website maintained for this purpose. A redemption request, if accepted by the Trust, will be processed based on the NAV as of the next Cutoff Time.

Acceptance of Orders for, and Redemption of, Creation Units

All questions as to whether an order has been submitted in proper form and the requisite number of Fund shares and transaction fees have been delivered shall be determined by the Fund, and the Fund's determination shall be final and binding.

The Fund reserves the absolute right to reject a redemption order if the order is not in proper form. In addition, the right of redemption may be suspended or the date of payment postponed with respect to the Fund (i) for any period during which the NYSE is closed (other than customary weekend and holiday closings), (ii) for any period during which trading on the NYSE is suspended or restricted, (iii) for any period during which an emergency exists as a result of which disposal of the shares of the Fund's portfolio securities or determination of its NAV is not reasonably practicable; or (iv) in such other circumstance as is permitted by the SEC. The Fund or Distributor will notify the Authorized Participant of such rejection, but the Fund, Custodian, sub-custodian and Distributor shall not be liable for any failure to give such notification.

The payment by the Fund of the Fund Securities, including Redemption Securities and Redemption Cash, and Cash Component will not be issued until the transfer of the Creation Unit(s) and the applicable redemption transaction fees has been completed. If the Transfer Agent does not receive the investor's shares through DTC's facilities and the applicable redemption transaction fees by the required time, the redemption request may be rejected.

To the extent contemplated by the AP Agreement, in the event the Authorized Participant has submitted a redemption request in proper form but is unable to transfer all or part of the Creation Unit to be redeemed to the Fund's Transfer Agent, the Transfer Agent will nonetheless accept the redemption request in reliance on the undertaking by the Authorized Participant to deliver the missing shares as soon as possible. Such undertaking may be secured by the Authorized Participant's delivery and maintenance of collateral consisting of cash having a value (marked to market daily) of up to 115% of the value of the missing shares, which the Trust may change from time to time. The current procedures for collateralization of missing shares require, among other things, that any cash collateral shall be in the form of U.S. dollars in immediately available funds and shall be held by the Custodian and marked to market daily, and that the fees of the Custodian and any sub-custodians in respect of the delivery, maintenance and redelivery of the cash collateral shall be payable by the Authorized Participant. The AP Agreement will permit the Trust, on behalf of the Fund, to purchase the missing shares at any time and will subject the Authorized Participant to liability for any shortfall between the cost to the Trust of purchasing such shares, Fund Securities or Cash Component and the value of the collateral.

A redeeming Beneficial Owner or Authorized Participant acting on behalf of such Beneficial Owner must maintain appropriate security arrangements with a qualified broker-dealer, bank or other custody providers in each jurisdiction where Redemption Securities are customarily traded and will be delivered. If neither the redeeming Beneficial Owner nor the Authorized Participant acting on behalf of such redeeming Beneficial Owner has appropriate arrangements to take delivery of Redemption Securities in the applicable non-U.S. jurisdiction and it is not possible to make other such arrangements, or if it is not possible to effect deliveries of Redemption Securities in such jurisdiction, the Trust may redeem shares in Redemption Cash, and the redeeming Beneficial Owner will be required to receive its redemption proceeds as Redemption Cash. In addition, because redemptions of shares for Redemption Securities will be subject to compliance with applicable U.S. federal and state securities laws, the Fund (whether or not it otherwise permits cash redemptions) reserves the right to redeem Creation Units for cash to the extent that the Fund cannot lawfully deliver specific Redemption Securities or cannot do so without first registering a Fund Security under such laws.

Once the Fund has accepted a redemption order, upon the next determination of the NAV of the shares, the Fund may confirm the redemption of a Creation Unit, against receipt of payment, at such NAV. The Distributor will then transmit a confirmation of acceptance to the Authorized Participant that placed the order. Deliveries of redemption proceeds by the Fund typically are settled on a “T+2” basis (i.e., two Business Days after trade date), but may be made up to seven days later, particularly in stressed market conditions. The Fund reserves the right to settle redemption transactions up to 15 days later to accommodate non-U.S. market holiday schedules (see below for further information), closures and settlement cycles, to account for different treatment among non-U.S. and U.S. markets of dividend record dates and dividend ex-dates (i.e., the last date the holder of a security can sell the security and still receive dividends payable on the security sold), and in certain other circumstances.

In certain cases, an Authorized Participant may create and redeem Creation Units on the same trade date. In these instances, the Fund reserves the right to settle these transactions on a net basis or require a representation from the Authorized Participant that the creation and redemption transactions are for separate Beneficial Owners.

Redemption Transaction Fees

A standard redemption transaction fee is imposed to offset transfer and other costs associated with the redemption of Creation Units. The standard redemption transaction fee is charged to the Authorized Participant on the day such Authorized Participant redeems a Creation Unit, and is the same regardless of the number of Creation Units redeemed by an Authorized Participant on the applicable Business Day.

The Authorized Participant may also be required to pay a variable transaction fee (up to the maximum amount shown in the table below) to cover certain brokerage, tax, foreign exchange, execution, market impact and other costs and expenses. Authorized Participants will also bear the costs of transferring the Redemption Securities, including any stamp duty or other similar fees and expenses. Investors who use the services of a broker or other financial intermediary may be charged a fee for such services.

The standard redemption transaction fee and maximum variable transaction fee for a Creation Unit are set forth below:

FUND	STANDARD TRANSACTION FEE	MAXIMUM VARIABLE TRANSACTION FEE*
Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF	\$0	2.00%
Quadratic Deflation ETF	\$0	2.00%

* As a percentage of the Creation Unit(s) redeemed.

The Adviser may adjust the transactions fees from time to time based on actual experience and may waive some or all of the transaction fees from time to time.

Taxation on Creations and Redemptions of Creation Units

An Authorized Participant generally will recognize either gain or loss upon the exchange of Deposit Securities for Creation Units. This gain or loss will generally equal the difference between (i) the sum of the market value of the Creation Units at the time of the exchange and any net amount of cash received by the Authorized Participant in the exchange and (ii) the sum of the Authorized Participant's aggregate basis in the Deposit Securities exchanged therefor and any net amount of cash paid for the Creation Units. However, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service may apply the wash sales rules to determine that any loss realized upon the exchange of Deposit Securities for Creation Units is not currently deductible. Authorized Participants should consult their own tax advisers.

Current U.S. federal tax laws dictate that capital gain or loss realized from the redemption of Creation Units will generally create long-term capital gain or loss if the Authorized Participant holds the Creation Units for more than one year, or short-term capital gain or loss if the Creation Units were held for one year or less, if the Creation Units are held as capital assets.

Postponement of Redemptions

For every occurrence of one or more intervening holidays in the applicable non-U.S. market that are not holidays observed in the U.S. equity market, the redemption settlement cycle will be extended by the number of such intervening holidays. In addition to holidays, other unforeseeable closings in a non-U.S. market due to emergencies may also prevent the Trust from delivering securities within normal settlement period. The securities delivery cycles currently practicable for transferring portfolio securities to redeeming investors, coupled with non-U.S. market holiday schedules, will require a delivery process longer than seven calendar days, in certain circumstances, but in no event longer than 15 calendar days.

The right of redemption may also be suspended or the date of payment postponed (1) for any period during which the relevant Exchange is closed (other than customary weekend and holiday closings); (2) for any period during which trading on the relevant Exchange is suspended or restricted; (3) for any period during which an emergency exists as a result of which disposal of the Shares of a Fund or determination of its NAV is not reasonably practicable; or (4) in such other circumstance as is permitted by the SEC.

TAXES

The following discussion of certain U.S. federal income tax consequences of investing in a Fund is based on the Code, U.S. Treasury regulations, and other applicable authority, all as in effect as of the date of the filing of this SAI. These authorities are subject to change by legislative or administrative action, possibly with retroactive effect. The following discussion is only a summary of some of the important U.S. federal income tax considerations generally applicable to investments in a Fund. There may be other tax considerations applicable to particular shareholders. Shareholders should consult their own tax advisers regarding their particular situation and the possible application of foreign, state, and local tax laws.

Qualification as a RIC

Each Fund has elected or intends to elect to be treated, and intends to qualify each year, as a regulated investment company (a “RIC”) under Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code. In order to qualify for the special tax treatment accorded RICs and their shareholders, a Fund must, among other things:

(a) derive at least 90% of its gross income each year from (i) dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans, gains from the sale or other disposition of stock or securities or foreign currencies, or other income (including but not limited to gains from options, futures or forward contracts) derived with respect to its business of investing in such stock, securities or currencies, and (ii) net income derived from interests in “qualified publicly traded partnerships” (as defined below);

(b) diversify its holdings so that, at the end of each quarter of its taxable year, (i) at least 50% of the market value of a Fund’s total assets consists of cash and cash items, U.S. government securities, securities of other RICs and other securities, with investments in such other securities limited with respect to any one issuer to an amount not greater than 5% of the value of a Fund’s total assets and not greater than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer, and (ii) not more than 25% of the value of a Fund’s total assets is invested in (1) the securities (other than those of the U.S. government or other RICs) of any one issuer or two or more issuers that are controlled by a Fund and that are engaged in the same, similar or related trades or businesses or (2) the securities of one or more qualified publicly traded partnerships; and

(c) distribute with respect to each taxable year at least the sum of 90% of its investment company taxable income (as that term is defined in the Code without regard to the deduction for dividends paid – generally taxable ordinary income and the excess, if any, of net short-term capital gains over net long-term capital losses) and 90% of its net tax-exempt interest income.

In general, for purposes of the 90% of gross income requirement described in (a) above, income derived from a partnership will be treated as qualifying income only to the extent such income is attributable to items of income of the partnership that would be qualifying income if realized directly by a Fund. However, 100% of the net income derived from an interest in a “qualified publicly traded partnership” (generally, a partnership (i) interests in which are traded on an established securities market or are readily tradable on a secondary market or the substantial equivalent thereof, (ii) that derives at least 90% of its income from the passive income sources specified in Code section 7704(d), and (iii) that derives less than 90% of its income from the qualifying income described in (a)(i) of the prior paragraph) will be treated as qualifying income. In addition, although in general the passive loss rules of the Code do not apply to RICs, such rules do apply to a RIC with respect to items attributable to an interest in a qualified publicly traded partnership.

The U.S. Treasury Department has authority to issue regulations that would exclude foreign currency gains from the 90% test described in (a) above if such gains are not directly related to a fund’s business of investing in stock or securities. Accordingly, regulations may be issued in the future that could treat some or all of a Fund’s non-U.S. currency gains as non-qualifying income, thereby potentially jeopardizing a Fund’s status as a RIC for all years to which the regulations are applicable.

Taxation of a Fund

If a Fund qualifies as a RIC, the Fund will not be subject to federal income tax on income and gains that are distributed in a timely manner to its shareholders in the form of dividends.

If a Fund fails to satisfy the qualifying income test in any taxable year or the diversification requirements for any quarter, the Fund may be eligible for relief provisions if the failures are due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect and if a penalty tax is paid with respect to each failure to satisfy the applicable requirements. If these relief provisions are not available to a Fund for any year in which it fails to qualify as a RIC, all of its taxable income will be subject to tax at regular corporate rates without any deduction for distributions to shareholders, and its distributions (including capital gains distributions) generally will be taxable as ordinary income dividends to its shareholders, subject to the dividends received deduction for corporate shareholders and lower tax rates on qualified dividend income for individual shareholders. In addition, the Fund could be required to recognize unrealized gains, pay substantial taxes and interest and make substantial distributions before requalifying as a RIC that is accorded special tax treatment.

Each Fund intends to distribute at least annually to its shareholders substantially all of its taxable income and its net capital gains. Taxable income that is retained by a Fund will be subject to tax at regular corporate rates. If a Fund retains any net capital gain, that gain will be subject to tax at corporate rates, but the Fund may designate the retained amount as undistributed capital gains in a notice to its shareholders who (i) will be required to include in income for federal income tax purposes, as long-term capital gain, their shares of such undistributed amount, and (ii) will be entitled to credit their proportionate shares of the tax paid by the Fund on such undistributed amount against their federal income tax liabilities, if any, and to claim refunds on a properly filed U.S. tax return to the extent the credit exceeds such liabilities. For federal income tax purposes, the tax basis of shares owned by a shareholder of the Fund will be increased by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of undistributed capital gains included in the shareholder's gross income and the tax deemed paid by the shareholder under clause (ii) of the preceding sentence.

Deferral of Late Year Losses

A Fund may elect to treat part or all of any "qualified late year loss" as if it had been incurred in the succeeding taxable year in determining the Fund's taxable income, net capital gain, net short-term capital gain, and earnings and profits. The effect of this election is to treat any such "qualified late year loss" as if it had been incurred in the succeeding taxable year in characterizing the Fund's distributions for any calendar year. A "qualified late year loss" generally includes net capital loss, net long-term capital loss, or net short-term capital loss incurred after October 31 of the current taxable year (commonly referred to as "post-October losses") and certain other late-year losses.

Capital Loss Carryovers

If a Fund has a "net capital loss" (that is, capital losses in excess of capital gains), the excess (if any) of the Fund's net short-term capital losses over its net long-term capital gains is treated as a short-term capital loss arising on the first day of the Fund's next taxable year, and the excess (if any) of the Fund's net long-term capital losses over its net short-term capital gains is treated as a long-term capital loss arising on the first day of a Fund's next taxable year. Such capital loss carryover can be used to offset capital gains of a Fund in succeeding taxable years. The carryover of capital losses may be limited under the general loss limitation rules if a Fund experiences an ownership change as defined in the Code.

Excise Tax

If a Fund fails to distribute in a calendar year an amount at least equal to the sum of 98% of its ordinary income for such year and 98.2% of its capital gain net income for the one-year period ending October 31 of such year, plus any retained amount from the prior year, the Fund will be subject to a nondeductible 4% excise tax on the undistributed amount. For these purposes, the Fund will be treated as having distributed any amount on which it has been subject to corporate income tax for the taxable year ending within the calendar year. A dividend paid to shareholders in January of a year generally is deemed to have been paid by the Fund on December 31 of the preceding year if the dividend was declared and payable to shareholders of record on a date in October, November, or December of that preceding year. Each Fund intends to declare and pay dividends and distributions in the amounts and at the times necessary to avoid the application of the 4% excise tax, although there can be no assurance that it will be able to do so.

Fund Distributions

Distributions are taxable whether shareholders receive them in cash or reinvest them in additional shares. Moreover, distributions are generally subject to federal income tax as described herein to the extent they do not exceed a Fund's realized income and gains, even though such dividends and distributions may economically represent a return of a particular shareholder's investment. Such distributions are likely to occur in respect of shares purchased at a time when a Fund's NAV reflects gains that are either unrealized, or realized but not distributed. Such realized gains may be required to be distributed even when the Fund's NAV also reflects unrealized losses.

Dividends and other distributions by a Fund are generally treated under the Code as received by the shareholders at the time the dividend or distribution is made. However, if any dividend or distribution is declared by a Fund in October, November or December of any calendar year and payable to its shareholders of record on a specified date in such a month but is actually paid during the following January, such dividend or distribution will be deemed to have been received by each shareholder on December 31 of the year in which the dividend was declared.

Distributions by a Fund of investment income are generally taxable as ordinary income. Taxes on distributions of capital gains are determined by how long a Fund owned the investments that generated those gains, rather than how long a shareholder has owned his or her Fund shares. Distributions of net capital gains from the sale of investments that a Fund owned for more than one year and that are properly designated by the Fund as capital gain dividends ("Capital Gain Dividends") will be taxable as long-term capital gains. Distributions from capital gains are generally made after applying any available capital loss carryovers. Preferential long-term capital gain rates apply to individuals at a maximum rate of 20% for individuals with taxable income exceeding certain thresholds. Such preferential rates also apply to qualified dividend income if certain holding period requirements are met. Distributions of gains from the sale of investments that a Fund owned for one year or less will be taxable as ordinary income.

Qualified dividend income is, in general, dividend income from taxable domestic corporations and certain foreign corporations (*i.e.*, foreign corporations incorporated in a possession of the United States or in certain countries with a comprehensive tax treaty with the United States, which includes China (but not Hong Kong which is treated as a separate jurisdiction), or the stock of which is readily tradable on an established securities market in the United States). In order for some portion of the dividends received by a Fund's shareholders to be qualified dividend income, the Fund must meet holding period and other requirements with respect to the dividend paying stocks in its portfolio, and the shareholder must meet holding period and other requirements with respect to the Fund's shares.

The Funds do not expect to pay significant dividends reportable as qualified dividend income.

Given each Fund's investment objective, it is not expected that Funds distributions will be eligible for the corporate dividends received deduction on Fund distributions attributable to dividends received.

For U.S. individuals with income exceeding \$200,000 (\$250,000 if married and filing jointly), a 3.8% Medicare contribution tax will apply on all or a portion of their “net investment income,” including interest, dividends, and capital gains, which generally includes taxable distributions received from a Fund. This 3.8% tax also applies to all or a portion of the undistributed net investment income of certain shareholders that are estates and trusts.

If a Fund makes distributions to a shareholder in excess of the Fund’s current and accumulated earnings and profits in any taxable year, the excess distribution will be treated as a return of capital to the extent of the shareholder’s tax basis in its shares, and thereafter as capital gain. A return of capital is not taxable, but reduces a shareholder’s tax basis in its shares, thus reducing any loss or increasing any gain on a subsequent taxable disposition by the shareholder of its shares.

The tax character of a Fund’s distributions during a taxable year is not finally determined until a Fund’s income and gains are determined at the end of the year. Gains or losses realized with respect to a Fund’s options trading over the course of the year will affect the tax character of distributions made during the year, including the extent to which such distributions consist of dividends and/or return of capital.

Each Fund plans to make monthly distributions which could result in multiple distributions that include a return of capital. Under some circumstances, due to the recharacterization of distributions at the end of the calendar year, the Fund may be deemed to have distributed long-term capital gain more frequently than is permitted under applicable federal securities laws. In such circumstances, the Fund may need to seek relief from the SEC and there could be related adverse consequences for the Fund.

Investors considering buying shares just prior to a dividend or capital gain distribution should be aware that, although the price of shares purchased at that time may reflect the amount of the forthcoming distribution, such dividend or distribution may nevertheless be taxable to them. If a Fund is the holder of record of any security on the record date for any dividends payable with respect to such security, such dividends will be included in the Fund’s gross income not as of the date received but as of the later of (a) the date such security became ex-dividend with respect to such dividends (*i.e.*, the date on which a buyer of the security would not be entitled to receive the declared, but unpaid, dividends); or (b) the date a Fund acquired such security. Accordingly, in order to satisfy its income distribution requirements, a Fund may be required to pay dividends based on anticipated earnings, and shareholders may receive dividends in an earlier year than would otherwise be the case.

Sale or Exchange of Shares

A sale or exchange of shares in a Fund may give rise to a gain or loss. In general, any gain or loss realized upon a taxable disposition of shares will be treated as long-term capital gain or loss if the shares have been held for more than 12 months. Otherwise, the gain or loss on the taxable disposition of shares will be treated as short-term capital gain or loss. However, any loss realized upon a taxable disposition of shares held for six months or less will be treated as long-term, rather than short-term, to the extent of any long-term capital gain distributions received (or deemed received) by the shareholder with respect to the shares. All or a portion of any loss realized upon a taxable disposition of shares will be disallowed if shares of the same Fund are purchased within 30 days before or after the disposition. In such a case, the basis of the newly purchased shares will be adjusted to reflect the disallowed loss.

As noted above, for U.S. individuals with income exceeding \$200,000 (\$250,000 if married and filing jointly), a 3.8% Medicare contribution tax will apply on “net investment income,” including interest, dividends, and capital gains, which generally includes taxable distributions received from a Fund and taxable gains on the disposition of shares of a Fund.

Backup Withholding

A Fund (or a financial intermediary, such as a broker, through which a shareholder holds Fund shares) generally is required to withhold and to remit to the U.S. Treasury a percentage of the taxable distributions and sale or redemption proceeds paid to any shareholder who fails to properly furnish a correct taxpayer identification number, who has under-reported dividend or interest income, or who fails to certify that he, she or it is not subject to such withholding. The backup withholding tax rate is currently 24%.

Federal Tax Treatment of Certain Fund Investments

Transactions of a Fund in options, futures contracts, hedging transactions, forward contracts, swap contracts, straddles and foreign currencies may be subject to various special and complex tax rules, including mark-to-market, constructive sale, straddle, wash sale and short sale rules. These rules could affect whether gains and losses recognized by a Fund are treated as ordinary income or capital gain, accelerate the recognition of income to a Fund and/or defer a Fund's ability to recognize losses. These rules may in turn affect the amount, timing or character of the income distributed to shareholders by a Fund.

A Fund is required, for federal income tax purposes, to mark to market and recognize as income for each taxable year its net unrealized gains and losses as of the end of such year on certain regulated futures contracts, foreign currency contracts and options that qualify as Section 1256 contracts in addition to the gains and losses actually realized with respect to such contracts during the year. Except as described below under "Certain Foreign Currency Tax Issues," gain or loss from Section 1256 contracts that are required to be marked to market annually will generally be 60% long-term and 40% short-term capital gain or loss. Application of this rule may alter the timing and character of distributions to shareholders.

Some debt obligations that are acquired by a Fund may be treated as having original issue discount ("OID"). Generally, a Fund will be required to include OID in taxable income over the term of the debt security, even though payment of the OID is not received until a later time, usually when the debt security matures. If a Fund holds such debt instruments, it may be required to pay out as distributions each year an amount that is greater than the total amount of cash interest the Fund actually received. Such distributions may be made from the cash assets of the Fund or by liquidation of portfolio securities, if necessary. A Fund may realize gains or losses from such liquidations. In the event a Fund realizes net gains from such transactions, its shareholders may receive larger distributions than they would have in the absence of such transactions.

Any market discount recognized on a bond is taxable as ordinary income. A market discount bond is a bond acquired in the secondary market at a price below redemption value or adjusted issue price if issued with original issue discount. Absent an election by a Fund to include the market discount in income as it accrues, gains on the Fund's disposition of such an obligation will be treated as ordinary income rather than capital gain to the extent of the accrued market discount.

Tax-Exempt Shareholders

Under current law, income of a RIC that would be treated as unrelated business taxable income (“UBTI”) if earned directly by a tax-exempt entity generally will not be attributed as UBTI to a tax-exempt entity that is a shareholder in the RIC. Notwithstanding this “blocking” effect, a tax-exempt shareholder could realize UBTI by virtue of its investment in a Fund if shares in the Fund constitute debt-financed property in the hands of the tax-exempt shareholder within the meaning of Code Section 514(b).

Non-U.S. Shareholders

In general, dividends other than Capital Gain Dividends paid by a Fund to a shareholder that is not a “U.S. person” within the meaning of the Code (a “foreign person”) are subject to withholding of U.S. federal income tax at a rate of 30% (or lower applicable treaty rate) even if they are funded by income or gains (such as foreign-source dividend and interest income) that, if paid to a foreign person directly, would not be subject to withholding. If a Fund were to recognize short-term capital gains or U.S.-source portfolio interest, properly reported short-term capital gain dividends and interest-related dividends paid by the Fund would not be subject to such withholding tax.

A beneficial holder of shares who is a non-U.S. person is not, in general, subject to U.S. federal income tax on gains (and is not allowed a U.S. income tax deduction for losses) realized on a sale of shares of a Fund or on Capital Gain Dividends or short-term capital gain dividends unless (i) such gain or dividend is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business carried on by such holder within the United States or (ii) in the case of an individual holder, the holder is present in the United States for a period or periods aggregating 183 days or more during the year of the sale or the receipt of the Capital Gain Dividend or short-term capital gains dividends and certain other conditions are met.

In order for a non-U.S. investor to qualify for an exemption from backup withholding, the foreign investor must comply with special certification and filing requirements. Foreign investors in a Fund should consult their tax advisers in this regard. Backup withholding is not an additional tax. Any amounts withheld may be credited against the shareholder’s U.S. federal income tax liability, provided the appropriate information is furnished to the Internal Revenue Service.

A beneficial holder of shares who is a non-U.S. person may be subject to the U.S. federal estate tax in addition to the federal income tax consequences referred to above. If a shareholder is eligible for the benefits of a tax treaty, any income or gain effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business will generally be subject to U.S. federal income tax on a net basis only if it is also attributable to a permanent establishment maintained by the shareholder in the United States.

Under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”), a 30% withholding tax will be imposed on dividends paid by a Fund to (i) foreign financial institutions including non-U.S. investment funds unless they agree to collect and disclose to the Internal Revenue Service information regarding their direct and indirect U.S. account holders and (ii) certain other foreign entities, unless they certify certain information regarding their direct and indirect U.S. owners. A non-U.S. shareholder resident or doing business in a country that has entered into an intergovernmental agreement with the U.S. to implement a similar reporting regime will be exempt from this withholding tax if the shareholder and the applicable foreign government comply with the terms of such agreement. A Shareholder subject to such withholding tax will not receive additional amounts from the Fund to compensate for such withholding. Proposed regulations (which are effective while pending) eliminate the application of FATCA’s withholding tax to capital distributions and sales of shares proceeds that was scheduled to take effect in 2019.

Creation and Redemption of Creation Units

An Authorized Participant who exchanges securities for Creation Units generally will recognize a gain or a loss. The gain or loss will be equal to the difference between the market value of the Creation Units at the time and the sum of the exchanger's aggregate basis in the securities surrendered plus the amount of cash paid for such Creation Units. A person who redeems Creation Units will generally recognize a gain or loss equal to the difference between the exchanger's basis in the Creation Units and the sum of the aggregate market value of any securities received plus the amount of any cash received for such Creation Units. The Internal Revenue Service, however, may assert that a loss realized upon an exchange of securities for Creation Units cannot be deducted currently under the rules governing "wash sales," or on the basis that there has been no significant change in economic position. Any capital gain or loss realized upon the creation of Creation Units will generally be treated as long-term capital gain or loss if the securities exchanged for such Creation Units have been held for more than one year.

Any capital gain or loss realized upon the redemption of Creation Units will generally be treated as long-term capital gain or loss if the shares comprising the Creation Units have been held for more than one year. Otherwise, such capital gains or losses will be treated as short-term capital gains or losses.

Persons purchasing or redeeming Creation Units should consult their own tax advisers with respect to the tax treatment of any creation or redemption transaction.

Section 351

The Trust on behalf of a Fund has the right to reject an order for Creation Units if the purchaser (or group of purchasers) would, upon obtaining the shares so ordered, own 80% or more of the outstanding shares of the Fund and if, pursuant to Section 351 of the Code, the Fund would have a basis in the deposit securities different from the market value of such securities on the date of deposit. The Trust also has the right to require information necessary to determine beneficial share ownership for purposes of the 80% determination.

Tax Shelter Reporting Regulations

Under U.S. Treasury regulations, if an individual shareholder recognizes a loss of \$2 million or more in any single tax year or, for a corporate shareholder, \$10 million or more in any single tax year, the shareholder must file with the Internal Revenue Service a disclosure statement on Form 8886. Direct shareholders of portfolio securities are in many cases excepted from this reporting requirement, but under current guidance, shareholders of a RIC are not excepted. Future guidance may extend the current exception from this reporting requirement to shareholders of most or all RICs. The fact that a loss is reportable under these regulations does not affect the legal determination of whether the taxpayer's treatment of the loss is proper. Shareholders should consult their tax advisers to determine the applicability of these regulations in light of their individual circumstances.

General Considerations

The U.S. federal income tax discussion set forth above is for general information only. Prospective investors should consult their tax advisers regarding the specific federal income tax consequences of purchasing, holding and disposing of shares of a Fund, as well as the effect of state, local and foreign tax law and any proposed tax law changes.

DETERMINATION OF NAV

This information supplements and should be read in conjunction with the section in the Prospectus entitled “Calculating NAV.”

The NAV per share of a Fund is computed by dividing the value of the net assets of a Fund (i.e., the value of its total assets less total liabilities and withholdings) by the total number of shares of a Fund outstanding, rounded to the nearest cent. Expenses and fees, including without limitation, the management, administration and distribution fees, are accrued daily and taken into account for purposes of determining NAV. The NAV per share for a Fund normally is calculated by the Administrator and determined as of the regularly scheduled close of normal trading on each day that the NYSE is scheduled to be open for business (normally 4:00 p.m., Eastern Time). Any assets or liabilities denominated in currencies other than the U.S. dollar are converted into U.S. dollars at the current market rates on the date of valuation as quoted by one or more sources.

Securities listed on a securities exchange (i.e. exchange-traded equity securities), market or automated quotation system for which quotations are readily available (except for securities traded on NASDAQ), including securities traded over the counter, are valued by independent pricing agents at the last reported sale price on the primary exchange or market (foreign or domestic) on which they are traded (or at the time as of which a Fund’s NAV is calculated if a security’s exchange is normally open at that time). If there is no such reported sale, such securities are valued at the most recently reported bid price. For securities traded on NASDAQ, the NASDAQ Official Closing Price will be used. If a security price cannot be obtained from an independent, third-party pricing agent, the Fund seeks to obtain bid and ask prices from two broker-dealers who make a market in the portfolio instrument and determines the average of the two.

If available, debt securities are priced based upon valuations provided by independent, third-party pricing agents. Such values generally reflect the last reported sales price if the security is actively traded. The third-party pricing agents may also value debt securities at an evaluated bid price by employing methodologies that utilize actual market transactions, broker-supplied valuations, or other methodologies designed to identify the market value for such securities. Debt obligations with remaining maturities of sixty days or less may be valued at their amortized cost, which approximates market value.

The prices for foreign securities are reported in local currency and converted to U.S. dollars using currency exchange rates. The exchange rates used for valuation are captured as of the close of the London Stock Exchange each day normally at 4:00 p.m. Greenwich Mean Time.

The value of a swap contract is equal to the obligation (or rights) under the swap contract, which will generally be equal to the net amounts to be paid or received under the contract based upon the relative values of the positions held by each party to the contract as determined by the applicable independent, third party pricing agent. Exchange-traded options are valued at the closing price in the market in which they are principally traded. If no closing price is available, exchange-traded options are valued at the mean of their most recent bid and asked price, if available, and otherwise at their closing bid price. OTC options are valued based upon prices determined by the applicable independent, third party pricing agent. A constant maturity swap (CMS) spread option is a European option on the spread of two CMS rates with different underlying tenors (e.g. CMS 10 Year - CMS 2 Year). The options are generally valued by an independent pricing agent by establishing the present value of expected future CMS cash flow, based on certain assumptions, market inputs and calculated pursuant to industry standard models maintained by the independent pricing agent.

Futures are valued at the settlement price established by the board of trade on which they are traded. Foreign currency forward contracts are valued at the current day's interpolated foreign exchange rate, as calculated using the current day's spot rate and the 30-, 60-, 90- and 180-day forward rates provided by an independent pricing agent.

On certain days, the settlement price for futures may not be available at the time the Fund calculates its NAV. On such days, the best available price (which is typically the last trade price) may be used to value futures.

Investments in open-end investment companies that do not trade on an exchange are valued at the end of day NAV per share. Investments in open-end investment companies that trade on an exchange are valued in the same manner as other exchange-traded equity securities (described below).

Securities issued by a wholly owned subsidiary of a Fund will be valued at the subsidiary's net asset value, which will be determined using the same pricing policies and procedures applicable to the Fund.

Investments for which market prices are not "readily available," or are not deemed to reflect current market values, or are debt securities where no evaluated price is available from third-party pricing agents pursuant to established methodologies, are fair valued in accordance with the Adviser's valuation policies and procedures approved by the Board. Some of the more common reasons that may necessitate that a security be valued using "fair value" pricing may include, but are not limited to: the security's trading has been halted or suspended; the security's primary trading market is temporarily closed; or the security has not been traded for an extended period of time.

In addition, a Fund may fair value its securities if an event that may materially affect the value of a Fund's securities that trade outside of the United States (a "Significant Event") has occurred between the time of the security's last close and the time that a Fund calculates its NAV. A Significant Event may relate to a single issuer or to an entire market sector, country or region. Events that may be Significant Events may include: government actions, natural disasters, armed conflict, acts of terrorism and significant market fluctuations.

If Krane becomes aware of a Significant Event that has occurred with respect to a portfolio instrument or group of portfolio instruments after the closing of the exchange or market on which the portfolio instrument or portfolio instruments principally trade, but before the time at which a Fund calculates its NAV, it will notify the Administrator and may request that an ad hoc meeting of the Fair Value Pricing Committee be called.

With respect to trade-halted securities, the Adviser typically will fair value a trade-halted security by adjusting the security's last market close price by the security's sector performance, as measured by a predetermined index, unless Krane's Fair Value Pricing Committee determines otherwise. Certain foreign securities exchanges have mechanisms in place that confine one day's price movement in an individual security to a pre-determined price range based on that day's opening price ("Collared Securities"). Fair value determinations for Collared Securities will generally be capped based on any applicable pre-determined "limit down" or "limit up" prices established by the relevant foreign securities exchange. As an example, China A-Shares can only be plus or minus ten percent in one day of trading in the relevant mainland China equity market. As a result, the fair value price determination on a given day will generally be capped plus or minus ten percent.

Fair value pricing involves subjective judgments and it is possible that a fair value determination for a security is materially different than the value that could actually be realized upon the sale of the security or that another fund that uses market quotations or its own fair value procedures to price the same securities. In addition, fair value pricing could result in a difference between the prices used to calculate a Fund's NAV and the prices used by the Underlying Index, if applicable. This may adversely affect a Fund's ability to track its Underlying Index, if applicable.

Trading in securities on many foreign exchanges is normally completed before the close of business on each Business Day. In addition, securities trading in a particular country or countries may not take place on each Business Day or may take place on days that are not Business Days. Changes in valuations on certain securities may occur at times or on days on which a Fund's NAV is not calculated and on which Fund shares do not trade and sales and redemptions of shares do not occur. As a result, the value of a Fund's portfolio securities and the net asset value of its shares may change on days when share purchases or sales cannot occur.

Fund shares are purchased or sold on a national securities exchange at market prices, which may be higher or lower than NAV. Transactions in Fund shares will be priced at NAV only if shares are purchased or redeemed directly from a Fund in Creation Units. No secondary sales will be made to brokers or dealers at a concession by the Distributor or by a Fund. Purchases and sales of shares in the secondary market, which will not involve a Fund, will be subject to customary brokerage commissions and charges.

DIVIDENDS AND DISTRIBUTIONS

Each Fund pays out to its shareholders any net investment income and net realized capital gains. Ordinarily, a Fund typically distributes any net investment income monthly and makes any capital gain distributions once a year (usually in December). A Fund may make distributions on a more frequent basis. A Fund may occasionally be required to make supplemental distributions at some other time during the year. Distributions in cash may be reinvested automatically in additional whole shares only if the broker through whom you purchased shares makes such option available. Your broker is responsible for distributing the income and capital gain distributions to you.

The Trust reserves the right to declare special distributions if, in its reasonable discretion, such action is necessary or advisable.

OTHER INFORMATION

Portfolio Holdings

The Board has approved portfolio holdings disclosure policies and procedures that govern the timing and circumstances of disclosure to shareholders and third parties of a Fund's portfolio holdings and the use of material non-public information about a Fund's holdings. These policies and procedures, as described below, are designed to ensure that disclosure of portfolio holdings is in the best interests of Fund shareholders, and address conflicts of interest between the interests of Fund shareholders and those of Krane, a sub-adviser, the Distributor, or any affiliated person of a Fund, Krane, a sub-adviser or the Distributor. The policies and procedures apply to all officers, employees, and agents of a Fund, including Krane and a sub-adviser.

Each Fund discloses on its website at the start of each Business Day the identities and quantities of the securities and other assets held by a Fund that will form the basis of a Fund's calculation of its NAV on that Business Day. The portfolio holdings so disclosed will be based on information as of the close of business on the prior Business Day. This information is generally used in connection with the creation and redemption process and is disseminated on a daily basis through the facilities of the Exchange, the National Securities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC") and/or other fee-based subscription services to NSCC members and/or subscribers to those other fee-based subscription services, including Authorized Participants, and to entities that publish and/or analyze such information in connection with the process of purchasing or redeeming Creation Units or trading shares of a Fund in the secondary market.

Daily access to non-public information concerning a Fund's portfolio holdings also is permitted (i) to certain personnel of those service providers that are involved in portfolio management and providing administrative, operational, risk management, or other support to portfolio management, including affiliated broker-dealers and/or Authorized Participants, and (ii) to other personnel of Krane and other service providers, such as a sub-adviser, the administrator, the custodian and the fund accountant, who deal directly with, or assist in, functions related to investment management, administration, custody and fund accounting, as may be necessary to conduct business in the ordinary course in a manner consistent with agreements with a Fund and/or the terms of a Fund's current registration statement.

From time to time, non-public information concerning Fund portfolio holdings also may be provided to other entities that provide services to a Fund, including, among others, rating or ranking organizations, in the ordinary course of business, no earlier than one business day following the date of the information. Portfolio holdings information made available in connection with the creation and redemption process may be provided to other entities that provide services to a Fund in the ordinary course of business after it has been disseminated to the NSCC.

A Fund's chief compliance officer, or a compliance manager designated by the chief compliance officer, also may grant exceptions to permit additional disclosure of Fund portfolio holdings information at differing times and with different lag times (the period from the date of the information to the date the information is made available), if any, in instances where a Fund has legitimate business purposes for doing so, it is in the best interests of shareholders, and the recipients are subject to a duty of confidentiality, including a duty not to trade on the nonpublic information and are required to execute an agreement to that effect. The Board will be informed of any such disclosures at its next regularly scheduled meeting or as soon as is reasonably practicable thereafter. In no event will a Fund, Krane, a sub-adviser, or any other party receive any direct or indirect compensation in connection with the disclosure of information about a Fund's portfolio holdings.

The Board exercises continuing oversight of the disclosure of a Fund's portfolio holdings by (1) overseeing the implementation and enforcement of the Trust's the portfolio holdings policies and procedures by a Fund's chief compliance officer and a Fund, (2) considering reports and recommendations by the chief compliance officer concerning any material compliance matters (as defined in Rule 38a-1 under the 1940 Act and Rule 206(4)-7 under the Advisers Act) that may arise in connection with any portfolio holdings policies and procedures, and (3) considering whether to approve or ratify any amendment to any of the portfolio holdings policies and procedures. The Board and a Fund reserve the right to amend the policies and procedures in their sole discretion at any time and from time to time without prior notice to shareholders. For purposes of the policies and procedures, the term "portfolio holdings" means investment positions held by a Fund that are not publicly disclosed.

In addition to the permitted disclosures described above, a Fund must disclose its complete holdings quarterly in SEC filings. These reports are available, free of charge, on the EDGAR database on the SEC's web site at www.sec.gov.

No person is authorized to disclose a Fund's portfolio holdings or other investment positions except in accordance with the Trust's policies and procedures.

Voting Rights

Each share of a Fund is entitled to one vote with respect to matters upon which a shareholder vote is required consistent with the requirements of the 1940 Act and the rules promulgated thereunder. Shareholders receive one vote for every full Fund share owned. Each fund will vote separately on matters relating solely to that fund. All shares of a Fund are freely transferable.

As a Delaware statutory trust, the Trust is not required to hold annual shareholder meetings unless otherwise required by the 1940 Act. However, for the purpose of considering removal of a Trustee as provided in Section 16(c) of the 1940 Act, a special meeting may be called by shareholders owning at least 10% of the outstanding shares of the Trust. Shareholder inquiries can be made by contacting the Trust at the number and website address provided under “Shareholder Inquiries” below.

Shareholder Inquiries

Shareholders may visit the Funds’ web sites at www.ivoletf.com or www.bnndetf.com or call 1-833-IVOL ETF and 1-888-BNDD-007 or call to obtain information about account statements, procedures, and other related information.

COUNSEL

K&L Gates LLP, 1601 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, serves as counsel to the Trust.

INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

KPMG LLP, 1601 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103, the Trust’s independent registered public accounting firm, provides audit and tax services with respect to the Funds.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

The audited financial statements of Quadratic Interest Rate Volatility and Inflation Hedge ETF for the fiscal years or periods ended March 31, 2023, March 31, 2022, March 31, 2021 and March 31, 2020, including the notes thereto and the report of KPMG LLP, the Fund’s independent registered public accounting firm, are incorporated by reference into this SAI.

The audited financial statements of Quadratic Deflation ETF for the fiscal year or period ended March 31, 2023 and March 31, 2022, including the notes thereto and the report of KPMG LLP, the Fund’s independent registered public accounting firm, are incorporated by reference into this SAI.

APPENDIX A – PROXY VOTING POLICY

Form N-1A requires an investment company to describe the policies and procedures that it uses to determine how to vote proxies relating to portfolio securities. In connection with this requirement, the Trust's Board has delegated voting of the Fund's proxies to Krane Funds Advisors, LLC ("Adviser" or "KFA"), subject to the Board's oversight. The Board has directed that proxies be voted consistent with the Fund and its shareholders' best interests and in compliance with all applicable proxy voting rules and regulations. Below is a summary of the proxy voting policies and procedures adopted by the Adviser:

PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES SUMMARY

Background

Investment advisers are fiduciaries that owe a duty of care and loyalty to each of their clients with respect to services undertaken on the client's behalf, including monitoring corporate events and exercising proxy authority. In the context of voting, the specific obligations that flow from the investment adviser's fiduciary duty depend upon the scope of voting authority assumed by the adviser. To satisfy its fiduciary duty in making any voting determination, an investment adviser must make the determination in the best interest of the client and must not place its own interests ahead of the interest of the client.

Policies and Procedures

Proxy Voting Requirements

Rule 206(4)-6 under the Advisers Act requires each registered investment adviser that exercises proxy voting authority with respect to client securities to:

- Adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the adviser votes client securities in the best interest of clients, including sufficient ongoing oversight of any third party retained to assist with voting responsibilities;
- Disclose to clients how they may obtain information from the adviser about how the adviser voted proxies for their securities; and
- Describe the adviser's proxy voting policies and procedures to clients and furnish them with a copy of such policies and procedures on request.

Paragraph (c)(2) of Rule 204-2 under the Advisers Act imposes additional recordkeeping requirements on investment advisers that execute proxy voting authority, as described under "Recordkeeping" below and in the *Maintenance of Books and Records* section of this Manual.¹

¹ Each Adviser notes that the fiduciary duties described in Section 404(a)(1)(A) and (B) of ERISA require that, in voting proxies, the responsible fiduciary consider those factors that may affect the value of a plan's investment and not subordinate the interests of the plan's participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated objectives. As such, to the extent that the one or both of the Advisers becomes an ERISA fiduciary, they will consider whether a plan's vote is expected to have an effect on the value of the plan's investment that warrants the additional cost of voting before making any proxy vote.

Policy

Each Adviser complies with Rule 206(4)-6 under the Advisers Act and all other applicable laws and regulations to the extent the Adviser votes proxies on behalf of Clients. KFA votes proxies for the securities in the KraneShares Trust, on behalf of each series of the Trust (the “Funds”) for which it has been granted investment authority. KFA has retained Broadridge Investor Communication Solutions, Inc. (“Broadridge”) to track the Funds’ proxy votes, the subsequent action taken by the Funds upon receipt of the vote, and where applicable, the issuer’s management and shareholder recommendations (system name: ProxyEdge). KFA will provide ongoing oversight of Broadridge with respect to the ProxyEdge system which is used to assist in KFA’s proxy voting duties.

Where KFA has responsibility for voting proxies, KFA will take reasonable steps under the circumstances so that proxies are received and voted in the best interest of its Clients, including the Funds, which generally means voting proxies in accordance with this policy. KFA may abstain from voting to the extent that KFA determines that such abstention is in the Client’s best interest (based on a quantitative/qualitative materiality assessment). KFA generally does not vote proxies on behalf of separate account clients (if any). Separate account clients either vote their own proxies or designate an independent third party to vote proxies at the client’s discretion.

Proxy Advisory Firm - General Guidelines and Oversight

Where KFA has proxy voting authority, KFA generally votes in accordance with pre-determined proxy voting guidelines prepared by Glass Lewis & Co. (“GL Guidelines”), where Glass Lewis serves as an independent, unaffiliated third-party proxy advisory service firm.² KFA believes that utilizing an independent third party’s framework and analysis to support KFA’s assessments of proxy proposals assists KFA in making sure that all proxy voting decisions are made in the best interests of KFA’s Clients and Funds. However, KFA may diverge from the GL Guidelines to the extent that KFA believes it is in the best interest of a Fund or Client account to vote differently. In determining whether to vote in accordance with the GL Guidelines, KFA will take into account all information received with respect to the particular proxy vote, including any information provided by the issuer. KFA will provide ongoing oversight of any proxy advisory firm engaged to ensure the proxy advisory firm has the capacity and competency to adequately analyze proxy issues, including but not limited to reviewing (1) the adequacy and quality of the proxy advisory firm’s staffing and personnel; (2) the robustness of its policies and procedures regarding its ability to (i) ensure that its proxy voting recommendations are based on current and accurate information and (ii) identify and address any conflicts of interest and any other considerations that the investment adviser believes would be appropriate in considering the nature and quality of the services provided by the proxy advisory firm.

Conflicts of Interests

KFA has adopted these policies and procedures that are designed to identify conflicts (or potential conflicts that could arise between its own interests and those of its Clients, including the Funds. For example, conflicts of interest may arise when:

- proxy votes where the issuer is an affiliate, or the subject of the proxy measure involved a material economic or business interest of an affiliate;

² As of the dated of these policies and procedures, KFA relies on the 2023 Environmental, Social & Governance (ESG) Thematic Voting Policy (“GL ESG Policy Guidelines”). To the extent the GL ESG Policy Guidelines do not provide a specific approach to a ballot, or an ESG rule does not trigger for a particular ballot, the default vote will come from the In-House Glass Lewis Guidelines.

- proxy votes regarding non-routine matters are solicited by an issuer that has an institutional separate account relationship with KFA;³
- a proponent of a proxy proposal has a business relationship with KFA; or
- KFA has business relationships with participants in proxy contests, corporate directors or director candidates.

The Compliance Team and KFA's Investment Team are responsible for monitoring and resolving possible material conflicts of interest with respect to proxy voting. KFA will identify any conflicts that exist between its interests and those of a Client by reviewing KFA's relationship with the issuer of each security to determine if KFA or any of its employees has any financial, business, or personal relationship with the issuer. Any person with knowledge of a personal conflict of interest relating to a particular matter shall disclose that conflict to the Investment Team or the Compliance Team and may be required to recuse him or herself from the proxy voting process.

If it is determined that a conflict of interest or potential conflict of interest is material, the CCO will work with appropriate personnel to agree upon a method to resolve such conflict before voting proxies affected by the conflict. It is KFA's expectation that voting in accordance with the GL Guidelines will, in most cases, adequately address any possible conflicts of interest.

KFA will maintain a record of the resolution of any conflict of interest with respect to proxy voting.

Special Issues with Voting Foreign Proxies

Although KFA has arrangements with BBH (custodian) and Broadridge to vote foreign proxies, voting proxies with respect to shares of foreign stocks may involve significantly greater effort and corresponding cost due to the variety of regulatory schemes and corporate practices in foreign countries with respect to proxy voting. Logistical problems in voting foreign proxies include the following:

- Each country has its own rules and practices regarding shareholder notification, voting restrictions, registration conditions and "share blocking" (as described in the following bullet point).

³ For this purpose, KFA generally will consider as "non-routine" any matter listed in New York Stock Exchange Rule 452.11, relating to when a member adviser may not vote a proxy without instructions from its customer (for example, contested matters are deemed non-routine).

- To vote shares in some countries, the shares may be “blocked” by the custodian or depository (or bearer shares deposited with a specified financial institution) for a specified number of days (usually five or fewer but sometimes longer) before or after the shareholder meeting. When blocked, shares typically may not be traded until the day after the blocking period. KFA may refrain from voting shares of foreign stocks subject to blocking restrictions where, in KFA’s judgment, the benefit from voting the shares is outweighed by the interest of maintaining liquidity in the shares. This decision generally is made on a case-by-case basis based on relevant factors, including the length of the blocking period, the significance of the holding, and whether the stock is considered a long-term holding.
- Often it is difficult to ascertain the date of a shareholder meeting because certain countries, such as France, do not require companies to publish announcements in any official stock exchange publication.
- Timeframes between shareholder notification, distribution of proxy materials, book closure and the actual meeting date may be too short to allow timely action.
- Language barriers will generally mean that an English translation of proxy information must be obtained or commissioned before the relevant shareholder meeting, if possible.
- Some companies and/or jurisdictions require that, in order to be eligible to vote, the shares of the beneficial holders be registered in the company’s share registry.
- Lack of a “proxy voting service” by custodians in certain countries, which in certain cases may require KFA to have a power of attorney in place with the local custodian for voting.
- Lack of proxy statement information (where KFA is limited to what is available on Proxy Ballot and Issuer’s website).
- Proxy votes for the issuer are suppressed or restricted due to operational constraints, including sanctions.
- Meetings are informational only and/or have to be attended in person.

Because the cost of voting on a particular proxy proposal, including lengthy operational processing, could exceed the expected benefit to a Fund or Client account, KFA may, after weighing the costs and benefits of voting on proxy proposals relating to foreign securities, make the decision not to vote a proxy proposal. At times, KFA may abstain from voting proxies of companies for the reasons stated above.

Affiliated Entities

For the avoidance of doubt, when required by contract or requested in writing, it is KFA’s policy to generally abstain from voting proxies as they relate to affiliated entities of subadvisors who co-manage the portfolios of the Funds.

Voting Contrary to Guidelines

To the extent a proxy is voted contrary to the GL Guidelines for the reasons stated above (i.e. conflicts of interest, foreign proxies with special issues, affiliated entities), or otherwise (for example, proxy is a “case by case” under which the third-party proxy advisory service firm does not provide a recommendation or due to a sanction or operational restriction), such override must be made in the Client account’s or Fund’s best interest. In such cases, the reason for such decision must be agreed on by both the Compliance Team and the Investment Team and recorded. To the extent the contrary vote is determined during monthly reviews, Krane Compliance will communicate that to the Investment Team, if not previously identified.

Proxy Voting Reporting

Information regarding how KFA voted proxies on behalf of the Funds is available on the SEC’s website at <http://sec.gov>. Information regarding how KFA voted proxies on behalf of Client accounts is available upon request.

KFA must provide the Funds’ Board with a report that describes any significant issues that arose during the year as they relate to voting proxies, including any votes that were made inconsistent with this policy. Additionally, on at least an annual basis, any changes to this policy with respect to the Funds must be reported to the Board, which shall review and, in its discretion, approve the use of such amended policy.

KFA’s CCO will meet with the Stewardship Committee periodically, but no less frequently than annually, to review compliance with this policy.

Class Actions

KFA does not commit to participate in all class actions that may arise with regard to Client account or Fund portfolio securities. Upon receipt of class action information, the Compliance Team and/or Investment Team will evaluate the costs versus the benefits of participation in the suit for each pertinent Client. Unless it is determined that it would be in the best interest of the Client or Fund, KFA will not participate in the class action on behalf of the Client or Fund. The Compliance Team or Investment Team will either return to the sender any documents inadvertently received by KFA regarding the class action, or forward the documents to the pertinent Client(s). If a determination is made that the benefits of participating in a class action outweigh the cost of participation, KFA will distribute any compensation received pro rata to the investors in the Funds(s) and/or to the Client based on the current percentage holdings in the Fund or Client account, or as otherwise appropriately arranged and disclosed to Clients.

Class Action Notices should be forwarded to the CCO upon receipt.

Recordkeeping

To the extent that KFA exercises proxy voting authority with respect to its Clients, it shall make and retain the following:

- a copy of this policy;
- a copy of each proxy statement that KFA receives regarding Client securities;
- a record of each vote cast by KFA on behalf of a Client;
- a copy of any document created by KFA that was material to making a decision how to vote proxies on behalf of a Client or that memorializes the basis for that decision; and
- a copy of each written Client request for information on how KFA voted proxies on behalf of the Client, and a copy of any written response by KFA to any written or oral Client request for information on how KFA voted proxies on behalf of the requesting Client.

KFA shall retain these records in an easily accessible place for five years from the end of the fiscal year during which the last entry was made on such record, the first two years in KFA's principal office. The CCO will confirm that KFA complies with all applicable recordkeeping requirements associated with proxy voting.

United States



2023 Policy Guidelines

www.glasslewis.com






Table of Contents

About Glass Lewis	6
Guidelines Introduction	7
Summary of Changes for 2023	7
A Board of Directors that Serves Shareholder Interest	12
Election of Directors	12
Independence	12
Committee Independence	15
Independent Chair	16
Performance	17
Board Responsiveness	18
The Role of a Committee Chair	19
Audit Committees and Performance	20
Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee	20
Compensation Committee Performance	23
Nominating and Governance Committee Performance	25
Board-level Risk Management Oversight	28
Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues	29
Cyber Risk Oversight	30
Board Accountability for Environmental and Social Performance	30
Director Commitments	31
Other Considerations	32
Controlled Companies	33
Significant Shareholders	35
Governance Following an IPO, Spin-off, or Direct Listing	35
Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company	36
Dual-Listed or Foreign-Incorporated Companies	37
OTC-listed Companies	37
Mutual Fund Boards	38




Declassified Boards	39
Board Composition and Refreshment	40
Board Diversity	41
Board Gender Diversity	41
Board Underrepresented Community Diversity	41
State Laws on Diversity	42
Disclosure of Director Diversity and Skills	42
Stock Exchange Diversity Disclosure Requirements	43
Proxy Access	43
Majority Vote for Election of Directors	43
The Plurality Vote Standard	44
Advantages of a Majority Vote Standard	44
Conflicting and Excluded Proposals	44
Transparency and Integrity in Financial Reporting	47
Auditor Ratification	47
Voting Recommendations on Auditor Ratification	48
Pension Accounting Issues	49
The Link Between Compensation and Performance	50
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay)	50
Say-on-Pay Voting Recommendations	51
Company Responsiveness	52
Pay for Performance	53
Short-Term Incentives	54
Long-Term Incentives	55
Grants of Front-Loaded Awards	56
Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria	57
One-Time Awards	58
Contractual Payments and Arrangements	59
Sign-on Awards and Severance Benefits	59
Change in Control	60
Excise Tax Gross-ups	60






Amended Employment Agreements	60
Recoupment Provisions (Clawbacks)	60
Hedging of Stock	61
Pledging of Stock	61
Compensation Consultant Independence	62
CEO Pay Ratio	62
Frequency of Say-on-Pay	63
Vote on Golden Parachute Arrangements	63
Equity-Based Compensation Plan Proposals	63
Option Exchanges and Repricing	65
Option Backdating, Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging	65
Director Compensation Plans	67
Employee Stock Purchase Plans	67
Executive Compensation Tax Deductibility — Amendment to IRC 162(M)	67
Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise	69
Anti-Takeover Measures	69
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)	69
NOL Poison Pills	69
Fair Price Provisions	70
Quorum Requirements	71
Director and Officer Indemnification	71
Officer Exculpation	71
Reincorporation	72
Exclusive Forum and Fee-Shifting Bylaw Provisions	73
Authorized Shares	73
Advance Notice Requirements	74
Virtual Shareholder Meetings	75
Voting Structure	76
Multi-Class Share Structures	76
Cumulative Voting	76





Supermajority Vote Requirements	77
Transaction of Other Business	77
Anti-Greenmail Proposals	78
Mutual Funds: Investment Policies and Advisory Agreements	78
Real Estate Investment Trusts	78
Preferred Stock Issuances at REITs	79
Business Development Companies	79
Authorization to Sell Shares at a Price Below Net Asset Value	79
Auditor Ratification and Below-NAV Issuances	80
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies	80
Extension of Business Combination Deadline	80
SPAC Board Independence	81
Director Commitments of SPAC Executives	81
Shareholder Proposals	81
Overall Approach to Environmental, Social & Governance Issues	82
Connect with Glass Lewis	84



About Glass Lewis

Glass Lewis is the world's choice for governance solutions. We enable institutional investors and publicly listed companies to make sustainable decisions based on research and data. We cover 30,000+ meetings each year, across approximately 100 global markets. Our team has been providing in-depth analysis of companies since 2003, relying solely on publicly available information to inform its policies, research, and voting recommendations.

Our customers include the majority of the world's largest pension plans, mutual funds, and asset managers, collectively managing over \$40 trillion in assets. We have teams located across the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific giving us global reach with a local perspective on the important governance issues.

Investors around the world depend on Glass Lewis' [Viewpoint](#) platform to manage their proxy voting, policy implementation, recordkeeping, and reporting. Our industry leading [Proxy Paper](#) product provides comprehensive environmental, social, and governance research and voting recommendations weeks ahead of voting deadlines. Public companies can also use our innovative [Report Feedback Statement](#) to deliver their opinion on our proxy research directly to the voting decision makers at every investor client in time for voting decisions to be made or changed.


The research team engages extensively with public companies, investors, regulators, and other industry stakeholders to gain relevant context into the realities surrounding companies, sectors, and the market in general. This enables us to provide the most comprehensive and pragmatic insights to our customers.

Join the Conversation

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Guidelines Introduction

Summary of Changes for 2023

Glass Lewis evaluates these guidelines on an ongoing basis and formally updates them on an annual basis. This year we've made noteworthy revisions in the following areas, which are summarized below but discussed in greater detail in the relevant section of this document:

Update: 15 December 2022. We have clarified on pages 8 and 42 that we will generally recommend against a nominating and governance committee chair at companies in the Russell 1000 index if the company has not provided any disclosure of director diversity and skills in any of our tracked categories, rather than any disclosure in each category.

Board Diversity

Gender Diversity

We are transitioning from a fixed numerical approach to a percentage-based approach for board gender diversity, as announced in 2022.

Beginning with shareholder meetings held after January 1, 2023, we will generally recommend against the chair of the nominating committee of a board that is not at least 30 percent gender diverse at companies within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside the Russell 3000 index, our existing policy requiring a minimum of one gender diverse director will remain in place.

Additionally, when making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company's disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline to appoint additional gender diverse directors (generally by the next annual meeting).


Underrepresented Community Diversity

We have expanded our policy on measures of diversity beyond gender. Beginning in 2023, we will generally recommend against the chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than one director from an underrepresented community on the board at companies within the Russell 1000 index.

We define "underrepresented community" as an individual who self-identifies as Black, African American, North African, Middle Eastern, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaskan Native, or who self-identifies as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender. For the purposes of this evaluation, we will rely solely on self-identified demographic information as disclosed in company proxy statements.

Additionally, when making these voting recommendations we will carefully review a company's disclosure of its diversity considerations, and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline to appoint additional directors from an underrepresented community (generally by the next annual meeting).





State Laws on Diversity

We have revised our discussion regarding state laws on diversity following recent changes to the status of certain state laws. Over the past several years, some U.S. states have encouraged board diversity through legislation. Most notably, companies headquartered in California were subject to mandatory board composition requirements during early 2022.

Subsequently, California's Senate Bill 826 and Assembly Bill 979 regarding board gender and "underrepresented community" diversity, respectively, were both deemed to violate the equal protection clause of the California state constitution. These laws are currently in the appeals process.

Accordingly, where we previously recommended in accordance with mandatory board composition requirements set forth in California's SB 826 and AB 979, we will refrain from providing recommendations pursuant to these state board composition requirements until further notice while we continue to monitor the appeals process. However, we will continue to monitor compliance with these requirements.

Disclosure of Director Diversity and Skills

We have revised our discussion on disclosure of director diversity and skills in company proxy statements. At companies in the Russell 1000 index that have not provided any disclosure in any of our tracked categories, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee.


Additionally, beginning in 2023, when companies in the Russell 1000 index have not provided any disclosure of individual or aggregate racial/ethnic minority demographic information, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee.

Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues

We have updated our guidelines with respect to board-level oversight of environmental and social (E&S) issues. For shareholder meetings held after January 1, 2023, we will generally recommend voting against the governance committee chair of a company in the Russell 1000 index that fails to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board's role in overseeing environmental and social issues. While we believe that it is important that these issues are overseen at the board level and that shareholders are afforded meaningful disclosure of these oversight responsibilities, we believe that companies should determine the best structure for this oversight. In our view, this oversight can be effectively conducted by specific directors, the entire board, a separate committee, or combined with the responsibilities of a key committee. Furthermore, beginning in 2023 we will expand our tracking of board-level oversight of environmental and social issues to all companies within the Russell 3000 index.

When evaluating a board's role in overseeing environmental and social issues, we will examine a company's proxy statement and governing documents (such as committee charters) to determine if directors maintain a meaningful level of oversight and accountability for a company's material environmental and social risks.





Director Commitments

We have revised our discussion of director commitments. We have clarified that we will generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves as an executive officer (other than executive chair) of any public company while serving on more than one external public company board, a director who serves as an executive chair of any public company while serving on more than two external public company boards, and any other director who serves on more than five public company boards.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have included a new discussion on our approach to cyber risk oversight. Given current regulatory focus on and the potential adverse outcomes from cyber-related issues, it is our view that cyber risk is material for all companies. We, therefore, believe that it is critical that companies evaluate and mitigate these risks to the greatest extent possible. With that view, we encourage all issuers to provide clear disclosure concerning the role of the board in overseeing issues related to cybersecurity. We also believe that disclosure concerning how companies are ensuring directors are fully versed on this rapidly evolving and dynamic issue can help shareholders understand the seriousness with which companies take this issue.

We will generally not make recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight or disclosure concerning cyber-related issues. However, we will closely evaluate a company's disclosure in this regard in instances where cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders and may recommend against appropriate directors should we find such disclosure or oversight to be insufficient.

Board Accountability for Climate-related Issues


We have included a new discussion on director accountability for climate-related issues. In particular, we believe that clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding climate risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen, should be provided by those companies whose own GHG emissions represent a financially material risk, such as those companies identified by groups including Climate Action 100+.

Accordingly, for companies with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations, we believe they should provide thorough climate-related disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures ("TCFD"). We also believe the boards of these companies should have explicit and clearly defined oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. As such, in instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

Officer Exculpation

We have included a new section regarding officer exculpation. In August 2022, the Delaware General Assembly amended Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") to authorize corporations to adopt a provision in their certificate of incorporation to eliminate or limit monetary liability of certain corporate officers for breach of fiduciary duty of care. The amendment authorizes corporations to provide for exculpation of the following officers: (i) the corporation's president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, chief legal officer, controller, treasurer or chief accounting officer, (ii) "named executive officers" identified in the corporation's SEC filings, and (iii) individuals who have agreed to be identified as officers of the corporation.





Corporate exculpation provisions under the DGCL apply only to claims for breach of the duty of care, and not to breaches of the duty of loyalty. Exculpation provisions also do not apply to acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve intentional misconduct, knowing violations of the law, or transactions involving the receipt of any improper personal benefits. Furthermore, officers may not be exculpated from claims brought against them by, or in the right of, the corporation (i.e., derivative actions).

Under Section 102(b)(7), a corporation must affirmatively elect to include an exculpation provision in its certificate of incorporation. We will closely evaluate proposals to adopt officer exculpation provisions on a case- by-case basis. We will generally recommend voting against such proposals eliminating monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care for certain corporate officers, unless compelling rationale for the adoption is provided by the board, and the provisions are reasonable.

Long-Term Incentives

We revised our threshold for the minimum percentage of the long-term incentive grant that should be performance-based from 33% to 50%, in line with market trends. Beginning in 2023, Glass Lewis will raise concerns in our analysis with executive pay programs that provide less than half of an executive's long-term incentive awards that are subject to performance-based vesting conditions. As with past year, we may refrain from a negative recommendation in the absence of other significant issues with the program's design or operation, but a negative trajectory in the allocation amount may lead to an unfavorable recommendation.

Clarifying Amendments

The following clarifications of our existing policies are included this year:


Board Responsiveness

We have clarified our discussion of board responsiveness. Specifically, we have clarified that when 20% or more of shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness. When a majority or more of shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and provide a more robust response to fully address shareholder concerns. Furthermore, we have clarified our approach at controlled companies and companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, where we will carefully examine the level of disapproval attributable to unaffiliated shareholders and will generally evaluate vote results on a "one share, one vote" basis.

Compensation Committee Performance

We have clarified our approach when certain outsized awards (so called "mega-grants") have been granted and the awards present concerns such as excessive quantum, lack of sufficient performance conditions, and/or are excessively dilutive, among others. We will generally recommend against the chair of the compensation committee when such outsized awards have been granted and include any of the aforementioned concerns.





Company Responsiveness (for Say-on-Pay Analysis)

With regard to our discussion of company responsiveness, we have clarified that we will also scrutinize high levels of disapproval from disinterested shareholders when assessing the support levels for previous years' say-on-pay votes. When evaluating a company's response to low support levels, we also expanded our discussion of what we consider robust disclosure, including discussion of rationale for not implementing change to pay decisions that drove low support and intentions going forward.

One-Time Awards

We have expanded our discussion regarding what we consider reasonable disclosure in terms of one-time awards. Specifically, we have included that we expect discussion surrounding the determination of quantum and structure for such awards.

Grants of Front-Loaded Awards


Adding to our discussion relating to front-loaded awards, we have included language touching on the topic of the rise in the use of "mega-grants". Furthermore, we expanded on our concerns regarding the increased restraint placed upon the board to respond to unforeseen factors when front-loaded awards are used. Finally, we provided clarification surrounding situations where front-loaded awards are intended to cover only the time-based or performance-based portion of an executive's long-term incentive awards.

Pay for Performance

We included mention of the new pay versus performance disclosure requirements announced by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in August of 2022. In our revised discussion of our Pay-for-Performance methodology, we have made clear that the methodology is not impacted by new rules. There is no change to the methodology for the 2023 Proxy Season. However, we note that the disclosure requirements from the new rule may be reviewed in our evaluation of executive pay programs on a qualitative basis.

Short- and Long-Term Incentives

We have added new discussion to codify our views on certain exercise of compensation committee discretion on incentive payouts. Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of the compensation committee's judicious and responsible exercise of discretion over incentive pay outcomes to account for significant events that would otherwise be excluded from performance results of selected metrics of incentive programs. We believe that companies should provide thorough discussion of how such events were considered in the committee's decisions to exercise discretion or refrain from applying discretion over incentive pay outcomes.



Recoupment Provisions

We have revised our discussion on clawback policies to reflect new regulatory developments for exchange-listed companies. On October 26, 2022, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved final rules regarding clawback policies based on which the national exchanges are to create new listing requirements. During period between the announcement of the final rules and the effective date of listing requirements, Glass Lewis will continue to raise concerns for companies that maintain clawback policies that only meet the requirements set forth by Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, disclosure from such companies of early effort to meet the standards of the final rules may help to mitigate concerns.

A Board of Directors that Serves Shareholder Interest

Election of Directors


The purpose of Glass Lewis' proxy research and advice is to facilitate shareholder voting in favor of governance structures that will drive performance, create shareholder value and maintain a proper tone at the top. Glass Lewis looks for talented boards with a record of protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. We believe that a board can best protect and enhance the interests of shareholders if it is sufficiently independent, has a record of positive performance, and consists of individuals with diverse backgrounds and a breadth and depth of relevant experience.

Independence

The independence of directors, or lack thereof, is ultimately demonstrated through the decisions they make. In assessing the independence of directors, we will take into consideration, when appropriate, whether a director has a track record indicative of making objective decisions. Likewise, when assessing the independence of directors we will also examine when a director's track record on multiple boards indicates a lack of objective decision-making. Ultimately, we believe the determination of whether a director is independent or not must take into consideration both compliance with the applicable independence listing requirements as well as judgments made by the director.

We look at each director nominee to examine the director's relationships with the company, the company's executives, and other directors. We do this to evaluate whether personal, familial, or financial relationships (not including director compensation) may impact the director's decisions. We believe that such relationships make it difficult for a director to put shareholders' interests above the director's or the related party's interests. We also believe that a director who owns more than 20% of a company can exert disproportionate influence on the board, and therefore believe such a director's independence may be hampered, in particular when serving on the audit committee.





Thus, we put directors into three categories based on an examination of the type of relationship they have with the company:

Independent Director — An independent director has no material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, its executives, or other board members, except for board service and standard fees paid for that service. Relationships that existed within three to five years¹ before the inquiry are usually considered “current” for purposes of this test. For material financial relationships with the company, we apply a three-year look back, and for former employment relationships with the company, we apply a five-year look back.

Affiliated Director — An affiliated director has, (or within the past three years, had) a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company or its executives, but is not an employee of the company.² This includes directors whose employers have a material financial relationship with the company.³ In addition, we view a director who either owns or controls 20% or more of the company’s voting stock, or is an employee or affiliate of an entity that controls such amount, as an affiliate.⁴

We view 20% shareholders as affiliates because they typically have access to and involvement with the management of a company that is fundamentally different from that of ordinary shareholders. More importantly, 20% holders may have interests that diverge from those of ordinary holders, for reasons such as the liquidity (or lack thereof) of their holdings, personal tax issues, etc.

Glass Lewis applies a three-year look back period to all directors who have an affiliation with the company other than former employment, for which we apply a five-year look back.

Definition of “**Material**”: A material relationship is one in which the dollar value exceeds:


- \$50,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for directors who are paid for a service they have agreed to perform for the company, outside of their service as a director, including professional or other services. This threshold also applies to directors who are the majority or principal owner of a firm that receives such payments; or
- \$120,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for those directors employed by a professional services firm such as a law firm, investment bank, or consulting firm and the company pays the firm, not the

¹ NASDAQ originally proposed a five-year look-back period but both it and the NYSE ultimately settled on a three-year look-back prior to finalizing their rules. A five-year standard for former employment relationships is more appropriate, in our view, because we believe that the unwinding of conflicting relationships between former management and board members is more likely to be complete and final after five years. However, Glass Lewis does not apply the five-year look-back period to directors who have previously served as executives of the company on an interim basis for less than one year.

² If a company does not consider a non-employee director to be independent, Glass Lewis will classify that director as an affiliate.

³ We allow a five-year grace period for former executives of the company or merged companies who have consulting agreements with the surviving company. (We do not automatically recommend voting against directors in such cases for the first five years.) If the consulting agreement persists after this five-year grace period, we apply the materiality thresholds outlined in the definition of “material.”

⁴ This includes a director who serves on a board as a representative (as part of his or her basic responsibilities) of an investment firm with greater than 20% ownership. However, while we will generally consider him/her to be affiliated, we will not recommend voting against unless (i) the investment firm has disproportionate board representation or (ii) the director serves on the audit committee.



individual, for services.⁵ This dollar limit would also apply to charitable contributions to schools where a board member is a professor; or charities where a director serves on the board or is an executive;⁶ and any aircraft and real estate dealings between the company and the director's firm; or

- 1% of either company's consolidated gross revenue for other business relationships (e.g., where the director is an executive officer of a company that provides services or products to or receives services or products from the company).⁷

Definition of "Familial" — Familial relationships include a person's spouse, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces, nephews, in-laws, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person's home. A director is an affiliate if: i) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and receives more than \$120,000⁸ in annual compensation; or, ii) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and the company does not disclose this individual's compensation.

Definition of "Company" — A company includes any parent or subsidiary in a group with the company or any entity that merged with, was acquired by, or acquired the company.

Inside Director — An inside director simultaneously serves as a director and as an employee of the company. This category may include a board chair who acts as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company. In our view, an inside director who derives a greater amount of income as a result of affiliated transactions with the company rather than through compensation paid by the company (i.e., salary, bonus, etc. as a company employee) faces a conflict between making decisions that are in the best interests of the company versus those in the director's own best interests. Therefore, we will recommend voting against such a director.


Additionally, we believe a director who is currently serving in an interim management position should be considered an insider, while a director who previously served in an interim management position for less than one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered independent. Moreover, a director who previously served in an interim management position for over one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered an affiliate for five years following the date of the director's resignation or departure from the interim management position.

⁵ We may deem such a transaction to be immaterial where the amount represents less than 1% of the firm's annual revenues and the board provides a compelling rationale as to why the director's independence is not affected by the relationship.

⁶ We will generally take into consideration the size and nature of such charitable entities in relation to the company's size and industry along with any other relevant factors such as the director's role at the charity. However, unlike for other types of related party transactions, Glass Lewis generally does not apply a look-back period to affiliated relationships involving charitable contributions; if the relationship between the director and the school or charity ceases, or if the company discontinues its donations to the entity, we will consider the director to be independent.

⁷ This includes cases where a director is employed by, or closely affiliated with, a private equity firm that profits from an acquisition made by the company. Unless disclosure suggests otherwise, we presume the director is affiliated.

⁸ Pursuant to SEC rule Item 404 of Regulation S-K under the Securities Exchange Act, compensation exceeding \$120,000 is the minimum threshold deemed material for disclosure of transactions involving family members of directors.



Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Board Independence

Glass Lewis believes a board will be most effective in protecting shareholders' interests if it is at least two-thirds independent. We note that each of the Business Roundtable, the Conference Board, and the Council of Institutional Investors advocates that two-thirds of the board be independent. Where more than one-third of the members are affiliated or inside directors, we typically⁸ recommend voting against some of the inside and/or affiliated directors in order to satisfy the two-thirds threshold.

In the case of a less than two-thirds independent board, Glass Lewis strongly supports the existence of a presiding or lead director with authority to set the meeting agendas and to lead sessions outside the insider chair's presence.

In addition, we scrutinize avowedly "independent" chairs and lead directors. We believe that they should be unquestionably independent or the company should not tout them as such.

Committee Independence


We believe that only independent directors should serve on a company's audit, compensation, nominating, and governance committees.⁹ We typically recommend that shareholders vote against any affiliated or inside director seeking appointment to an audit, compensation, nominating, or governance committee, or who has served in that capacity in the past year.

Pursuant to Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require that boards apply enhanced standards of independence when making an affirmative determination of the independence of compensation committee members. Specifically, when making this determination, in addition to the factors considered when assessing general director independence, the board's considerations must include: (i) the source of compensation of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the listed company to the director (the "Fees Factor"); and (ii) whether the director is affiliated with the listing company, its subsidiaries, or affiliates of its subsidiaries (the "Affiliation Factor").

Glass Lewis believes it is important for boards to consider these enhanced independence factors when assessing compensation committee members. However, as discussed above in the section titled Independence, we apply our own standards when assessing the independence of directors, and these standards also take into account consulting and advisory fees paid to the director, as well as the director's affiliations with the company and its subsidiaries and affiliates. We may recommend voting against compensation committee members who are not independent based on our standards.

⁸ With a staggered board, if the affiliates or insiders that we believe should not be on the board are not up for election, we will express our concern regarding those directors, but we will not recommend voting against the other affiliates or insiders who are up for election just to achieve two-thirds independence. However, we will consider recommending voting against the directors subject to our concern at their next election if the issue giving rise to the concern is not resolved.

⁹ We will recommend voting against an audit committee member who owns 20% or more of the company's stock, and we believe that there should be a maximum of one director (or no directors if the committee is composed of less than three directors) who owns 20% or more of the company's stock on the compensation, nominating, and governance committees.



Independent Chair

Glass Lewis believes that separating the roles of CEO (or, more rarely, another executive position) and chair creates a better governance structure than a combined CEO/chair position. An executive manages the business according to a course the board charts. Executives should report to the board regarding their performance in achieving goals set by the board. This is needlessly complicated when a CEO chairs the board, since a CEO/chair presumably will have a significant influence over the board.

While many companies have an independent lead or presiding director who performs many of the same functions of an independent chair (e.g., setting the board meeting agenda), we do not believe this alternate form of independent board leadership provides as robust protection for shareholders as an independent chair.

It can become difficult for a board to fulfill its role of overseer and policy setter when a CEO/chair controls the agenda and the boardroom discussion. Such control can allow a CEO to have an entrenched position, leading to longer-than-optimal terms, fewer checks on management, less scrutiny of the business operation, and limitations on independent, shareholder-focused goal-setting by the board.

A CEO should set the strategic course for the company, with the board's approval, and the board should enable the CEO to carry out the CEO's vision for accomplishing the board's objectives. Failure to achieve the board's objectives should lead the board to replace that CEO with someone in whom the board has confidence.

Likewise, an independent chair can better oversee executives and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. Such oversight and concern for shareholders allows for a more proactive and effective board of directors that is better able to look out for the interests of shareholders.


Further, it is the board's responsibility to select a chief executive who can best serve a company and its shareholders and to replace this person when his or her duties have not been appropriately fulfilled. Such a replacement becomes more difficult and happens less frequently when the chief executive is also in the position of overseeing the board.

Glass Lewis believes that the installation of an independent chair is almost always a positive step from a corporate governance perspective and promotes the best interests of shareholders. Further, the presence of an independent chair fosters the creation of a thoughtful and dynamic board, not dominated by the views of senior management. Encouragingly, many companies appear to be moving in this direction — one study indicates that only 10 percent of incoming CEOs in 2014 were awarded the chair title, versus 48 percent in 2002.¹⁰ Another study finds that 53 percent of S&P 500 boards now separate the CEO and chair roles, up from 37 percent in 2009, although the same study found that only 34 percent of S&P 500 boards have truly independent chairs.¹¹

We do not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who chair the board. However, we typically recommend that our clients support separating the roles of chair and CEO whenever that question is posed in a proxy (typically in the form of a shareholder proposal), as we believe that it is in the long-term best interests of the company and its shareholders.

¹⁰ Ken Favaro, Per-Ola Karlsson and Gary L. Nelson. "The \$112 Billion CEO Succession Problem." (*Strategy+Business*, Issue 79, Summer 2015).

¹¹ Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 6.



Further, where the company has neither an independent chair nor independent lead director, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee.

Performance

The most crucial test of a board's commitment to the company and its shareholders lies in the actions of the board and its members. We look at the performance of these individuals as directors and executives of the company and of other companies where they have served.

We find that a director's past conduct is often indicative of future conduct and performance. We often find directors with a history of overpaying executives or of serving on boards where avoidable disasters have occurred serving on the boards of companies with similar problems. Glass Lewis has a proprietary database of directors serving at over 8,000 of the most widely held U.S. companies. We use this database to track the performance of directors across companies.

Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Performance

We typically recommend that shareholders vote against directors who have served on boards or as executives of companies with records of poor performance, inadequate risk oversight, excessive compensation, audit- or accounting-related issues, and/or other indicators of mismanagement or actions against the interests of shareholders. We will reevaluate such directors based on, among other factors, the length of time passed since the incident giving rise to the concern, shareholder support for the director, the severity of the issue, the director's role (e.g., committee membership), director tenure at the subject company, whether ethical lapses accompanied the oversight lapse, and evidence of strong oversight at other companies.


Likewise, we examine the backgrounds of those who serve on key board committees to ensure that they have the required skills and diverse backgrounds to make informed judgments about the subject matter for which the committee is responsible.

We believe shareholders should avoid electing directors who have a record of not fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders at any company where they have held a board or executive position. We typically recommend voting against:

1. A director who fails to attend a minimum of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings, calculated in the aggregate.¹²
2. A director who belatedly filed a significant form(s) 4 or 5, or who has a pattern of late filings if the late filing was the director's fault (we look at these late filing situations on a case-by-case basis).
3. A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious and material restatement has occurred after the CEO had previously certified the pre-restatement financial statements.

¹² However, where a director has served for less than one full year, we will typically not recommend voting against for failure to attend 75% of meetings. Rather, we will note the poor attendance with a recommendation to track this issue going forward. We will also refrain from recommending to vote against directors when the proxy discloses that the director missed the meetings due to serious illness or other extenuating circumstances.





4. A director who has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies (the same situation must also apply at the company being analyzed).

Furthermore, with consideration given to the company's overall corporate governance, pay-for-performance alignment and board responsiveness to shareholders, we may recommend voting against directors who served throughout a period in which the company performed significantly worse than peers and the directors have not taken reasonable steps to address the poor performance.

Board Responsiveness

Glass Lewis believes that boards should be responsive to shareholders when a significant percentage of shareholders vote contrary to the recommendation of management, depending on the issue.

When 20% or more of shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders on the issue and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness. These include instances when 20% or more of shareholders:

- (i) withhold votes from (or vote against) a director nominee;
- (ii) vote against a management-sponsored proposal; or
- (iii) vote for a shareholder proposal.


In our view, a 20% threshold is significant enough to warrant a close examination of the underlying issues and an evaluation of whether the board responded appropriately following the vote, particularly in the case of a compensation or director election proposal. While the 20% threshold alone will not automatically generate a negative vote recommendation from Glass Lewis on a future proposal (e.g., to recommend against a director nominee, against a say-on-pay proposal, etc.), it may be a contributing factor to our recommendation to vote against management's recommendation in the event we determine that the board did not respond appropriately.

When a majority of shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders on the issue and provide a more robust response to fully address shareholder concerns. These include instances when a majority or more of shareholders:

- (i) withhold votes from (or vote against) a director nominee;
- (ii) vote against a management-sponsored proposal; or
- (iii) vote for a shareholder proposal.

In the case of shareholder proposals, we believe clear action is warranted when such proposals receive support from a majority of votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes). In our view, this may include fully implementing the request of the shareholder proposal and/or engaging with shareholders on the issue and providing sufficient disclosures to address shareholder concerns.

At controlled companies and companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. In the case of companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will generally examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed



to unaffiliated shareholders on a “one share, one vote” basis. At controlled and multi-class companies, when at least 20% or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness, and when a majority or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and provide a more robust response to address shareholder concerns.

As a general framework, our evaluation of board responsiveness involves a review of publicly available disclosures (e.g., the proxy statement, annual report, 8-Ks, company website, etc.) released following the date of the company’s last annual meeting up through the publication date of our most current Proxy Paper. Depending on the specific issue, our focus typically includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- At the board level, any changes in directorships, committee memberships, disclosure of related party transactions, meeting attendance, or other responsibilities;
- Any revisions made to the company’s articles of incorporation, bylaws or other governance documents;
- Any press or news releases indicating changes in, or the adoption of, new company policies, business practices or special reports; and
- Any modifications made to the design and structure of the company’s compensation program, as well as an assessment of the company’s engagement with shareholders on compensation issues as discussed in the Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A), particularly following a material vote against a company’s say-on-pay.
- Proxy statement disclosure discussing the board’s efforts to engage with shareholders and the actions taken to address shareholder concerns.

Our Proxy Paper analysis will include a case-by-case assessment of the specific elements of board responsiveness that we examined along with an explanation of how that assessment impacts our current voting recommendations.


The Role of a Committee Chair

Glass Lewis believes that a designated committee chair maintains primary responsibility for the actions of his or her respective committee. As such, many of our committee-specific voting recommendations are against the applicable committee chair rather than the entire committee (depending on the seriousness of the issue). In cases where the committee chair is not up for election due to a staggered board, and where we have identified multiple concerns, we will generally recommend voting against other members of the committee who are up for election, on a case-by-case basis.

In cases where we would ordinarily recommend voting against a committee chair but the chair is not specified, we apply the following general rules, which apply throughout our guidelines:

- If there is no committee chair, we recommend voting against the longest-serving committee member or, if the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, the longest-serving board member serving on the committee (i.e., in either case, the “senior director”); and
- If there is no committee chair, but multiple senior directors serving on the committee, we recommend voting against both (or all) such senior directors.





In our view, companies should provide clear disclosure of which director is charged with overseeing each committee. In cases where that simple framework is ignored and a reasonable analysis cannot determine which committee member is the designated leader, we believe shareholder action against the longest serving committee member(s) is warranted. Again, this only applies if we would ordinarily recommend voting against the committee chair but there is either no such position or no designated director in such role.

Audit Committees and Performance

Audit committees play an integral role in overseeing the financial reporting process because stable capital markets depend on reliable, transparent, and objective financial information to support an efficient and effective capital market process. Audit committees play a vital role in providing this disclosure to shareholders.

When assessing an audit committee's performance, we are aware that an audit committee does not prepare financial statements, is not responsible for making the key judgments and assumptions that affect the financial statements, and does not audit the numbers or the disclosures provided to investors. Rather, an audit committee member monitors and oversees the process and procedures that management and auditors perform. The 1999 Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees stated it best:

A proper and well-functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main groups responsible for financial reporting — the full board including the audit committee, financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside auditors — form a 'three legged stool' that supports responsible financial disclosure and active participatory oversight. However, in the view of the Committee, the audit committee must be 'first among equals' in this process, since the audit committee is an extension of the full board and hence the ultimate monitor of the process.


Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee

For an audit committee to function effectively on investors' behalf, it must include members with sufficient knowledge to diligently carry out their responsibilities. In its audit and accounting recommendations, the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise said "members of the audit committee must be independent and have both knowledge and experience in auditing financial matters."¹³

We are skeptical of audit committees where there are members that lack expertise as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or corporate controller, or similar experience. While we will not necessarily recommend voting against members of an audit committee when such expertise is lacking, we are more likely to recommend voting against committee members when a problem such as a restatement occurs and such expertise is lacking.

Glass Lewis generally assesses audit committees against the decisions they make with respect to their oversight and monitoring role. The quality and integrity of the financial statements and earnings reports, the completeness of disclosures necessary for investors to make informed decisions, and the effectiveness of the internal controls should provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements are materially free from errors. The independence of the external auditors and the results of their work all provide useful information by which to assess the audit committee.

¹³ Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise. The Conference Board. 2003.



When assessing the decisions and actions of the audit committee, we typically defer to its judgment and generally recommend voting in favor of its members. However, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:

1. All members of the audit committee when options were backdated, there is a lack of adequate controls in place, there was a resulting restatement, and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation with respect to the option grants.
2. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee does not have a financial expert or the committee's financial expert does not have a demonstrable financial background sufficient to understand the financial issues unique to public companies.
3. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee did not meet at least four times during the year.
4. The audit committee chair, if the committee has less than three members.
5. Any audit committee member who sits on more than three public company audit committees, unless the audit committee member is a retired CPA, CFO, controller or has similar experience, in which case the limit shall be four committees, taking time and availability into consideration including a review of the audit committee member's attendance at all board and committee meetings.¹⁴
6. All members of an audit committee who are up for election and who served on the committee at the time of the audit, if audit and audit-related fees total one-third or less of the total fees billed by the auditor.
7. The audit committee chair when tax and/or other fees are greater than audit and audit-related fees paid to the auditor for more than one year in a row (in which case we also recommend against ratification of the auditor).
8. The audit committee chair when fees paid to the auditor are not disclosed.
9. All members of an audit committee where non-audit fees include fees for tax services (including, but not limited to, such things as tax avoidance or shelter schemes) for senior executives of the company. Such services are prohibited by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).
10. All members of an audit committee that reappointed an auditor that we no longer consider to be independent for reasons unrelated to fee proportions.
11. All members of an audit committee when audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.
12. The audit committee chair if the committee failed to put auditor ratification on the ballot for shareholder approval. However, if the non-audit fees or tax fees exceed audit plus audit-related fees in either the current or the prior year, then Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the entire audit committee.

¹⁴ Glass Lewis may exempt certain audit committee members from the above threshold if, upon further analysis of relevant factors such as the director's experience, the size, industry-mix and location of the companies involved and the director's attendance at all the companies, we can reasonably determine that the audit committee member is likely not hindered by multiple audit committee commitments.




13. All members of an audit committee where the auditor has resigned and reported that a section 10A¹⁵ letter has been issued.
14. All members of an audit committee at a time when material accounting fraud occurred at the company.¹⁶
15. All members of an audit committee at a time when annual and/or multiple quarterly financial statements had to be restated, and any of the following factors apply:¹⁷
 - a. The restatement involves fraud or manipulation by insiders;
 - b. The restatement is accompanied by an SEC inquiry or investigation;
 - c. The restatement involves revenue recognition;
 - d. The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to costs of goods sold, operating expense, or operating cash flows; or
 - e. The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to net income, 10% adjustment to assets or shareholders equity, or cash flows from financing or investing activities.
16. All members of an audit committee if the company repeatedly fails to file its financial reports in a timely fashion. For example, the company has filed two or more quarterly or annual financial statements late within the last five quarters.
17. All members of an audit committee when it has been disclosed that a law enforcement agency has charged the company and/or its employees with a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
18. All members of an audit committee when the company has aggressive accounting policies and/or poor disclosure or lack of sufficient transparency in its financial statements.
19. All members of the audit committee when there is a disagreement with the auditor and the auditor resigns or is dismissed (e.g., the company receives an adverse opinion on its financial statements from the auditor).
20. All members of the audit committee if the contract with the auditor specifically limits the auditor's liability to the company for damages.¹⁸
21. All members of the audit committee who served since the date of the company's last annual meeting, and when, since the last annual meeting, the company has reported a material weakness that has not yet been corrected, or, when the company has an ongoing material weakness from a prior year that has not yet been corrected.

¹⁵ Auditors are required to report all potential illegal acts to management and the audit committee unless they are clearly inconsequential in nature. If the audit committee or the board fails to take appropriate action on an act that has been determined to be a violation of the law, the independent auditor is required to send a section 10A letter to the SEC. Such letters are rare and therefore we believe should be taken seriously.

¹⁶ Research indicates that revenue fraud now accounts for over 60% of SEC fraud cases, and that companies that engage in fraud experience significant negative abnormal stock price declines—facing bankruptcy, delisting, and material asset sales at much higher rates than do non-fraud firms (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. “Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007.” May 2010).

¹⁷ The SEC issued guidance in March 2021 related to classification of warrants as liabilities at special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs). We will generally refrain from recommending against audit committee members when the restatement in question is solely as a result of the aforementioned SEC guidance.

¹⁸ The Council of Institutional Investors. “Corporate Governance Policies,” p. 4, April 5, 2006; and “Letter from Council of Institutional Investors to the AICPA,” November 8, 2006.



We also take a dim view of audit committee reports that are boilerplate, and which provide little or no information or transparency to investors. When a problem such as a material weakness, restatement or late filings occurs, we take into consideration, in forming our judgment with respect to the audit committee, the transparency of the audit committee report.

Compensation Committee Performance

Compensation committees have a critical role in determining the compensation of executives. This includes deciding the basis on which compensation is determined, as well as the amounts and types of compensation to be paid. This process begins with the hiring and initial establishment of employment agreements, including the terms for such items as pay, pensions and severance arrangements. It is important in establishing compensation arrangements that compensation be consistent with, and based on the long-term economic performance of, the business's long-term shareholders returns.

Compensation committees are also responsible for the oversight of the transparency of compensation. This oversight includes disclosure of compensation arrangements, the matrix used in assessing pay for performance, and the use of compensation consultants. In order to ensure the independence of the board's compensation consultant, we believe the compensation committee should only engage a compensation consultant that is not also providing any services to the company or management apart from their contract with the compensation committee. It is important to investors that they have clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements in order to make informed decisions with respect to the oversight and decisions of the compensation committee.

Finally, compensation committees are responsible for oversight of internal controls over the executive compensation process. This includes controls over gathering information used to determine compensation, establishment of equity award plans, and granting of equity awards. For example, the use of a compensation consultant who maintains a business relationship with company management may cause the committee to make decisions based on information that is compromised by the consultant's conflict of interests. Lax controls can also contribute to improper awards of compensation such as through granting of backdated or spring-loaded options, or granting of bonuses when triggers for bonus payments have not been met.

Central to understanding the actions of compensation committee is a careful review of the CD&A report included in each company's proxy. We review the CD&A in our evaluation of the overall compensation practices of a company, as overseen by the compensation committee. The CD&A is also integral to the evaluation of compensation proposals at companies, such as advisory votes on executive compensation, which allow shareholders to vote on the compensation paid to a company's top executives.

When assessing the performance of compensation committees, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:

1. All members of a compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to address shareholder concerns following majority shareholder rejection of the say-on-pay proposal in the previous year. Where the proposal was approved but there was a significant shareholder vote (i.e., greater than 20% of votes cast) against the say-on-pay proposal in the prior year, if the board did not respond sufficiently to the vote including actively engaging shareholders on this issue, we will also consider recommending voting against the chair of the compensation committee or all members of the compensation committee, depending on the severity and history of the compensation problems and the level of shareholder opposition.






2. All members of the compensation committee who are up for election and served when the company failed to align pay with performance if shareholders are not provided with an advisory vote on executive compensation at the annual meeting.¹⁹
3. Any member of the compensation committee who has served on the compensation committee of at least two other public companies that have consistently failed to align pay with performance and whose oversight of compensation at the company in question is suspect.
4. All members of the compensation committee (during the relevant time period) if the company entered into excessive employment agreements and/or severance agreements.
5. All members of the compensation committee when performance goals were changed (i.e., lowered) when employees failed or were unlikely to meet original goals, or performance-based compensation was paid despite goals not being attained.
6. All members of the compensation committee if excessive employee perquisites and benefits were allowed.
7. The compensation committee chair if the compensation committee did not meet during the year.
8. All members of the compensation committee when the company repriced options or completed a “self tender offer” without shareholder approval within the past two years.
9. All members of the compensation committee when vesting of in-the-money options is accelerated.
10. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were backdated. Glass Lewis will recommend voting against an executive director who played a role in and participated in option backdating.
11. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were spring-loaded or otherwise timed around the release of material information.
12. All members of the compensation committee when a new employment contract is given to an executive that does not include a clawback provision and the company had a material restatement, especially if the restatement was due to fraud.
13. The chair of the compensation committee where the CD&A provides insufficient or unclear information about performance metrics and goals, where the CD&A indicates that pay is not tied to performance, or where the compensation committee or management has excessive discretion to alter performance terms or increase amounts of awards in contravention of previously defined targets.
14. All members of the compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to implement a shareholder proposal regarding a compensation-related issue, where the proposal received the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting shares at a shareholder meeting, and when a reasonable

¹⁹ If a company provides shareholders with a say-on-pay proposal, we will initially only recommend voting against the company’s say-on-pay proposal and will not recommend voting against the members of the compensation committee unless there is a pattern of failing to align pay and performance and/or the company exhibits egregious compensation practices. For cases in which the disconnect between pay and performance is marginal and the company has outperformed its peers, we will consider not recommending against compensation committee members.





analysis suggests that the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) should have taken steps to implement the request.²⁰

15. All members of the compensation committee when the board has materially decreased proxy statement disclosure regarding executive compensation policies and procedures in a manner which substantially impacts shareholders' ability to make an informed assessment of the company's executive pay practices.
16. All members of the compensation committee when new excise tax gross-up provisions are adopted in employment agreements with executives, particularly in cases where the company previously committed not to provide any such entitlements in the future.
17. All members of the compensation committee when the board adopts a frequency for future advisory votes on executive compensation that differs from the frequency approved by shareholders.
18. The chair of the compensation committee when "mega-grants" have been granted and the awards present concerns such as excessive quantum, lack of sufficient performance conditions, and/or are excessively dilutive, among others.

Nominating and Governance Committee Performance

The nominating and governance committee is responsible for the governance by the board of the company and its executives. In performing this role, the committee is responsible and accountable for selection of objective and competent board members. It is also responsible for providing leadership on governance policies adopted by the company, such as decisions to implement shareholder proposals that have received a majority vote. At most companies, a single committee is charged with these oversight functions; at others, the governance and nominating responsibilities are apportioned among two separate committees.


Consistent with Glass Lewis' philosophy that boards should have diverse backgrounds and members with a breadth and depth of relevant experience, we believe that nominating and governance committees should consider diversity when making director nominations within the context of each specific company and its industry. In our view, shareholders are best served when boards make an effort to ensure a constituency that is not only reasonably diverse on the basis of age, race, gender and ethnicity, but also on the basis of geographic knowledge, industry experience, board tenure and culture.

Regarding the committee responsible for governance, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:

1. All members of the governance committee²¹ during whose tenure a shareholder proposal relating to important shareholder rights received support from a majority of the votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes) and the board has not begun to implement or enact the proposal's subject

²⁰ In all other instances (i.e., a non-compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented) we recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the governance committee.

²¹ If the board does not have a committee responsible for governance oversight and the board did not implement a shareholder proposal that received the requisite support, we will recommend voting against the entire board. If the shareholder proposal at issue requested that the board adopt a declassified structure, we will recommend voting against all director nominees up for election.



matter.²² Examples of such shareholder proposals include those seeking a declassified board structure, a majority vote standard for director elections, or a right to call a special meeting. In determining whether a board has sufficiently implemented such a proposal, we will examine the quality of the right enacted or proffered by the board for any conditions that may unreasonably interfere with the shareholders' ability to exercise the right (e.g., overly restrictive procedural requirements for calling a special meeting).

2. All members of the governance committee when a shareholder resolution is excluded from the meeting agenda but the SEC has declined to state a view on whether such resolution should be excluded, or when the SEC has verbally permitted a company to exclude a shareholder proposal but there is no written record provided by the SEC about such determination and the company has not provided any disclosure concerning this no-action relief.
3. The governance committee chair when the chair is not independent and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.²³
4. The governance committee chair at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less).
5. In the absence of a nominating committee, the governance committee chair when there are fewer than five, or the whole governance committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.
6. The governance committee chair when the committee fails to meet at all during the year.
7. The governance committee chair, when for two consecutive years the company provides what we consider to be "inadequate" related party transaction disclosure (i.e., the nature of such transactions and/or the monetary amounts involved are unclear or excessively vague, thereby preventing a shareholder from being able to reasonably interpret the independence status of multiple directors above and beyond what the company maintains is compliant with SEC or applicable stock exchange listing requirements).
8. The governance committee chair, when during the past year the board adopted a forum selection clause (i.e., an exclusive forum provision)²⁴ designating either a state's courts for intra-corporate disputes, and/or federal courts for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933 without shareholder

²² Where a compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the members of the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) bear the responsibility for failing to implement the request, we recommend that shareholders only vote against members of the compensation committee.

²³ We believe that one independent individual should be appointed to serve as the lead or presiding director. When such a position is rotated among directors from meeting to meeting, we will recommend voting against the governance committee chair as we believe the lack of fixed lead or presiding director means that, effectively, the board does not have an independent board leader.

²⁴ A forum selection clause is a bylaw provision stipulating that a certain state or federal jurisdiction is the exclusive forum for specified legal matters. Such a clause effectively limits a shareholder's legal remedy regarding appropriate choice of venue and related relief.



approval,²⁵ or if the board is currently seeking shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal.


9. All members of the governance committee during whose tenure the board adopted, without shareholder approval, provisions in its charter or bylaws that, through rules on director compensation, may inhibit the ability of shareholders to nominate directors.
10. The governance committee chair when the board takes actions to limit shareholders' ability to vote on matters material to shareholder rights (e.g., through the practice of excluding a shareholder proposal by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal).
11. The governance committee chair when directors' records for board and committee meeting attendance are not disclosed, or when it is indicated that a director attended less than 75% of board and committee meetings but disclosure is sufficiently vague that it is not possible to determine which specific director's attendance was lacking.
12. The governance committee chair when a detailed record of proxy voting results from the prior annual meeting has not been disclosed.
13. The governance committee chair when a company does not clearly disclose the identity of a shareholder proponent (or lead proponent when there are multiple filers) in their proxy statement. For a detailed explanation of this policy, please refer to our comprehensive *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives*, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.

In addition, we may recommend that shareholders vote against the chair of the governance committee, or the entire committee, where the board has amended the company's governing documents to reduce or remove important shareholder rights, or to otherwise impede the ability of shareholders to exercise such right, and has done so without seeking shareholder approval. Examples of board actions that may cause such a recommendation include: the elimination of the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or to act by written consent; an increase to the ownership threshold required for shareholders to call a special meeting; an increase to vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments; the adoption of provisions that limit the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse — such as bylaws that require arbitration of shareholder claims or that require shareholder plaintiffs to pay the company's legal expenses in the absence of a court victory (i.e., "fee-shifting" or "loser pays" bylaws); the adoption of a classified board structure; and the elimination of the ability of shareholders to remove a director without cause.

Regarding the nominating committee, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:

1. All members of the nominating committee, when the committee nominated or renominated an individual who had a significant conflict of interest or whose past actions demonstrated a lack of integrity or inability to represent shareholder interests.
2. The nominating committee chair, if the nominating committee did not meet during the year.
3. In the absence of a governance committee, the nominating committee chair when the chair is not independent, and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.

²⁵ Glass Lewis will evaluate the circumstances surrounding the adoption of any forum selection clause as well as the general provisions contained therein. Where it can be reasonably determined that a forum selection clause is narrowly crafted to suit the particular circumstances facing the company and/or a reasonable sunset provision is included, we may make an exception to this policy.



4. The nominating committee chair, when there are fewer than five, or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.
5. The nominating committee chair, when a director received a greater than 50% against vote the prior year and not only was the director not removed, but the issues that raised shareholder concern were not corrected.²⁶
6. The chair of the nominating committee of a board that is not at least 30 percent gender diverse,²⁷ or all members of the nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at companies within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside of the Russell 3000 index, we will recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee if there are no gender diverse directors.
7. The chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than one director from an underrepresented community on the board, at companies within the Russell 1000 index.
8. The nominating committee chair when, alongside other governance or board performance concerns, the average tenure of non-executive directors is 10 years or more and no new independent directors have joined the board in the past five years. We will not be making voting recommendations solely on this basis; rather, insufficient board refreshment may be a contributing factor in our recommendations when additional board-related concerns have been identified.

In addition, we may consider recommending shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating committee where the board's failure to ensure the board has directors with relevant experience, either through periodic director assessment or board refreshment, has contributed to a company's poor performance. Where these issues warrant an against vote in the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the board chair, unless the chair also serves as the CEO, in which case we will recommend voting against the longest-serving director.

Board-level Risk Management Oversight


Glass Lewis evaluates the risk management function of a public company board on a strictly case-by-case basis. Sound risk management, while necessary at all companies, is particularly important at financial firms which inherently maintain significant exposure to financial risk. We believe such financial firms should have a chief risk officer reporting directly to the board and a dedicated risk committee or a committee of the board charged with risk oversight. Moreover, many non-financial firms maintain strategies which involve a high level of exposure to financial risk. Similarly, since many non-financial firms have complex hedging or trading strategies, those firms should also have a chief risk officer and a risk committee.

Our views on risk oversight are consistent with those expressed by various regulatory bodies. In its December 2009 Final Rule release on Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, the SEC noted that risk oversight is a key competence of the board and that additional disclosures would improve investor and shareholder understanding of the role of the board in the organization's risk management practices. The final rules, which became effective on February 28, 2010, now explicitly require companies and mutual funds to describe (while allowing for some degree of flexibility) the board's role in the oversight of risk.

²⁶ Considering that shareholder disapproval clearly relates to the director who received a greater than 50% against vote rather than the nominating chair, we review the severity of the issue(s) that initially raised shareholder concern as well as company responsiveness to such matters, and will only recommend voting against the nominating chair if a reasonable analysis suggests that it would be most appropriate. In rare cases, we will consider recommending against the nominating chair when a director receives a substantial (i.e., 20% or more) vote against based on the same analysis.

²⁷ Women and directors that identify with a gender other than male or female.





When analyzing the risk management practices of public companies, we take note of any significant losses or writedowns on financial assets and/or structured transactions. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and where we find that the company's board-level risk committee's poor oversight contributed to the loss, we will recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise),²⁸ we will consider recommending to vote against the board chair on that basis. However, we generally would not recommend voting against a combined chair/CEO, except in egregious cases.

Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues

Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of ensuring the sustainability of companies' operations. We believe that insufficient oversight of material environmental and social issues can present direct legal, financial, regulatory and reputational risks that could serve to harm shareholder interests. Therefore, we believe that these issues should be carefully monitored and managed by companies, and that all companies should have an appropriate oversight structure in place to ensure that they are mitigating attendant risks and capitalizing on related opportunities to the best extent possible.

To that end, Glass Lewis believes that companies should ensure that boards maintain clear oversight of material risks to their operations, including those that are environmental and social in nature. These risks could include, but are not limited to, matters related to climate change, human capital management, diversity, stakeholder relations, and health, safety & environment.


For companies in the Russell 3000 index and in instances where we identify material oversight concerns, Glass Lewis will review a company's overall governance practices and identify which directors or board-level committees have been charged with oversight of environmental and/or social issues. Furthermore, given the importance of the board's role in overseeing environmental and social risks, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against the governance committee chair of a company in the Russell 1000 index that fails to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board's role in overseeing these issues.

While we believe that it is important that these issues are overseen at the board level and that shareholders are afforded meaningful disclosure of these oversight responsibilities, we believe that companies should determine the best structure for this oversight. In our view, this oversight can be effectively conducted by specific directors, the entire board, a separate committee, or combined with the responsibilities of a key committee.

When evaluating the board's role in overseeing environmental and/or social issues, we will examine a company's proxy statement and governing documents (such as committee charters) to determine if directors maintain a meaningful level of oversight of and accountability for a company's material environmental and social impacts.

²⁸ A committee responsible for risk management could be a dedicated risk committee, the audit committee, or the finance committee, depending on a given company's board structure and method of disclosure. At some companies, the entire board is charged with risk management.





Cyber Risk Oversight

Companies and consumers are exposed to a growing risk of cyber-attacks. These attacks can result in customer or employee data breaches, harm to a company's reputation, significant fines or penalties, and interruption to a company's operations. Further, in some instances, cyber breaches can result in national security concerns, such as those impacting companies operating as utilities, defense contractors, and energy companies.

In response to these issues, regulators have increasingly been focused on ensuring companies are providing appropriate and timely disclosures and protections to stakeholders that could have been adversely impacted by a breach in a company's cyber infrastructure.

Given the regulatory focus on, and the potential adverse outcomes from, cyber-related issues, it is our view that cyber risk is material for all companies. We therefore believe that it is critical that companies evaluate and mitigate these risks to the greatest extent possible. With that view, we encourage all issuers to provide clear disclosure concerning the role of the board in overseeing issues related to cybersecurity.

We also believe that disclosure concerning how companies are ensuring directors are fully versed on this rapidly evolving and dynamic issue can help shareholders understand the seriousness with which companies take this issue.


We will generally not make voting recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight or disclosure concerning cyber-related issues. However, we will closely evaluate a company's disclosure in this regard in instances where cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders and may recommend against appropriate directors should we find such disclosure or oversight to be insufficient.

Board Accountability for Environmental and Social Performance

Glass Lewis carefully monitors companies' performance with respect to environmental and social issues, including those related to climate and human capital management. In situations where we believe that a company has not properly managed or mitigated material environmental or social risks to the detriment of shareholder value, or when such mismanagement has threatened shareholder value, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the board who are responsible for oversight of environmental and social risks. In the absence of explicit board oversight of environmental and social issues, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against members of the audit committee. In making these determinations, Glass Lewis will carefully review the situation, its effect on shareholder value, as well as any corrective action or other response made by the company.

For more information on how Glass Lewis evaluates environmental and social issues, please see Glass Lewis' Overall Approach to ESG as well as our comprehensive *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives* available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.





Board Accountability for Climate-related Issues

Given the exceptionally broad impacts of a changing climate on companies, the economy, and society in general, we view climate risk as a material risk for all companies. We therefore believe that boards should be considering and evaluating their operational resilience under lower-carbon scenarios. While all companies maintain exposure to climate-related risks, we believe that additional consideration should be given to, and that disclosure should be provided by those companies whose GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

We believe that companies with this increased risk exposure, such as those companies identified by groups including Climate Action 100+, should provide clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding these risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen. We believe such information is crucial to allow investors to understand the company's management of this issue, as well as the impact of a lower carbon future on the company's operations.

Accordingly, for such companies with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations, we believe thorough climate-related disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures ("TCFD") should be provided to shareholders. We also believe the boards of these companies should have explicit and clearly defined oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. As such, in instances where we find either (or both) of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against the chair of the committee (or board) charged with oversight of climate-related issues, or if no committee has been charged with such oversight, the chair of the governance committee. Further, we may extend our recommendation on this basis to additional members of the responsible committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company's size and industry and its overall governance profile.


Director Commitments

We believe that directors should have the necessary time to fulfill their duties to shareholders. In our view, an overcommitted director can pose a material risk to a company's shareholders, particularly during periods of crisis. In addition, recent research indicates that the time commitment associated with being a director has been on a significant upward trend in the past decade.²⁹ As a result, we generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves as an executive officer (other than executive chair) of any public company³⁰ while serving on more than one external public company board, a director who serves as an executive chair of any public company while serving on more than two external public company boards, and any other director who serves on more than five public company boards.

²⁹ For example, the 2015-2016 NACD Public Company Governance Survey states that, on average, directors spent a total of 248.2 hours annual on board-related matters during the past year, which it describes as a "historically high level" that is significantly above the average hours recorded in 2006. Additionally, the 2020 Spencer Stuart Board Index indicates that, while 39% of S&P 500 CEOs serve on one additional public board, just 2% of S&P 500 CEOs serve on two additional public boards and only one CEO serves on three.

³⁰ When the executive officer in question serves only as an executive at a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) we will generally apply the higher threshold of five public company directorships.





Because we believe that executives will primarily devote their attention to executive duties, we generally will not recommend that shareholders vote against overcommitted directors at the companies where they serve as an executive.

When determining whether a director's service on an excessive number of boards may limit the ability of the director to devote sufficient time to board duties, we may consider relevant factors such as the size and location of the other companies where the director serves on the board, the director's board roles at the companies in question, whether the director serves on the board of any large privately-held companies, the director's tenure on the boards in question, and the director's attendance record at all companies. In the case of directors who serve in executive roles other than CEO (e.g., executive chair), we will evaluate the specific duties and responsibilities of that role in determining whether an exception is warranted.

We may also refrain from recommending against certain directors if the company provides sufficient rationale for their continued board service. The rationale should allow shareholders to evaluate the scope of the directors' other commitments, as well as their contributions to the board including specialized knowledge of the company's industry, strategy or key markets, the diversity of skills, perspective and background they provide, and other relevant factors. We will also generally refrain from recommending to vote against a director who serves on an excessive number of boards within a consolidated group of companies in related industries, or a director that represents a firm whose sole purpose is to manage a portfolio of investments which include the company.

Other Considerations

In addition to the three key characteristics — independence, performance, experience — that we use to evaluate board members, we consider conflict-of-interest issues as well as the size of the board of directors when making voting recommendations.

Conflicts of Interest

We believe board members should be wholly free of identifiable and substantial conflicts of interest, regardless of the overall level of independent directors on the board. Accordingly, we recommend that shareholders vote against the following types of directors:

1. A CFO who is on the board: In our view, the CFO holds a unique position relative to financial reporting and disclosure to shareholders. Due to the critical importance of financial disclosure and reporting, we believe the CFO should report to the board and not be a member of it.
2. A director who provides — or a director who has an immediate family member who provides — material consulting or other material professional services to the company. These services may include legal, consulting,³¹ or financial services. We question the need for the company to have consulting relationships with its directors. We view such relationships as creating conflicts for directors, since they may be forced to weigh their own interests against shareholder interests when making board decisions. In addition, a company's decisions regarding where to turn for the best professional services may be compromised when doing business with the professional services firm of one of the company's directors.

³¹ We will generally refrain from recommending against a director who provides consulting services for the company if the director is excluded from membership on the board's key committees and we have not identified significant governance concerns with the board.



3. A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, engaging in airplane, real estate, or similar deals, including perquisite-type grants from the company, amounting to more than \$50,000. Directors who receive these sorts of payments from the company will have to make unnecessarily complicated decisions that may pit their interests against shareholder interests.
4. Interlocking directorships: CEOs or other top executives who serve on each other's boards create an interlock that poses conflicts that should be avoided to ensure the promotion of shareholder interests above all else.³²
5. All board members who served at a time when a poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.³³ In the event a board is classified and shareholders are therefore unable to vote against all directors, we will recommend voting against the remaining directors the next year they are up for a shareholder vote. If a poison pill with a term of one year or less was adopted without shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of the governance committee. If the board has, without seeking shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, extended the term of a poison pill by one year or less in two consecutive years, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the entire board.

Size of the Board of Directors

While we do not believe there is a universally applicable optimal board size, we do believe boards should have at least five directors to ensure sufficient diversity in decision-making and to enable the formation of key board committees with independent directors. Conversely, we believe that boards with more than 20 members will typically suffer under the weight of “too many cooks in the kitchen” and have difficulty reaching consensus and making timely decisions. Sometimes the presence of too many voices can make it difficult to draw on the wisdom and experience in the room by virtue of the need to limit the discussion so that each voice may be heard.

To that end, we typically recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee (or the governance committee, in the absence of a nominating committee) at a board with fewer than five directors or more than 20 directors.


Controlled Companies

We believe controlled companies warrant certain exceptions to our independence standards. The board's function is to protect shareholder interests; however, when an individual, entity (or group of shareholders party to a formal agreement) owns more than 50% of the voting shares, the interests of the majority of shareholders are the interests of that entity or individual. Consequently, Glass Lewis does not apply our usual two-thirds board independence rule and therefore we will not recommend voting against boards whose composition reflects the makeup of the shareholder population.

³² We do not apply a look-back period for this situation. The interlock policy applies to both public and private companies. We will also evaluate multiple board interlocks among non-insiders (i.e., multiple directors serving on the same boards at other companies), for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

³³ Refer to the “Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise” section for further discussion of our policies regarding anti-takeover measures, including poison pills.





Independence Exceptions

The independence exceptions that we make for controlled companies are as follows:

1. We do not require that controlled companies have boards that are at least two-thirds independent. So long as the insiders and/or affiliates are connected with the controlling entity, we accept the presence of non-independent board members.
2. The compensation committee and nominating and governance committees do not need to consist solely of independent directors.
 - a. We believe that standing nominating and corporate governance committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although having a committee charged with the duties of searching for, selecting, and nominating independent directors can be beneficial, the unique composition of a controlled company's shareholder base makes such committees weak and irrelevant.
 - b. Likewise, we believe that independent compensation committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although independent directors are the best choice for approving and monitoring senior executives' pay, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests. As such, we believe that having affiliated directors on a controlled company's compensation committee is acceptable. However, given that a controlled company has certain obligations to minority shareholders we feel that an insider should not serve on the compensation committee. Therefore, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against any insider (the CEO or otherwise) serving on the compensation committee.
3. Controlled companies do not need an independent chair or an independent lead or presiding director. Although an independent director in a position of authority on the board — such as chair or presiding director — can best carry out the board's duties, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests.

Size of the Board of Directors

We have no board size requirements for controlled companies.


Audit Committee Independence

Despite a controlled company's status, unlike for the other key committees, we nevertheless believe that audit committees should consist solely of independent directors. Regardless of a company's controlled status, the interests of all shareholders must be protected by ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the company's financial statements. Allowing affiliated directors to oversee the preparation of financial reports could create an insurmountable conflict of interest.

Board Responsiveness at Multi-Class Companies

At controlled companies and companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. In the case of companies that have multi-class share





structures with unequal voting rights, we will generally examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders on a “one share, one vote” basis. At controlled and multi-class companies, when at least 20% or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness, and when a majority or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and provide a more robust response to fully address shareholder concerns.

Significant Shareholders

Where an individual or entity holds between 20-50% of a company’s voting power, we believe it is reasonable to allow proportional representation on the board and committees (excluding the audit committee) based on the individual or entity’s percentage of ownership.

Governance Following an IPO, Spin-off, or Direct Listing


We believe companies that have recently completed an initial public offering (IPO), spin-off, or direct listing should be allowed adequate time to fully comply with marketplace listing requirements and meet basic corporate governance standards. Generally speaking, we refrain from making recommendations on the basis of governance standards (e.g., board independence, committee membership and structure, meeting attendance, etc.) during the one-year period following an IPO.

However, some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year. When evaluating companies that have recently gone public, Glass Lewis will review the terms of the applicable governing documents in order to determine whether shareholder rights are being severely restricted indefinitely. We believe boards that approve highly restrictive governing documents have demonstrated that they may subvert shareholder interests following the IPO. In conducting this evaluation, Glass Lewis will consider:

1. The adoption of anti-takeover provisions such as a poison pill or classified board
2. Supermajority vote requirements to amend governing documents
3. The presence of exclusive forum or fee-shifting provisions
4. Whether shareholders can call special meetings or act by written consent
5. The voting standard provided for the election of directors
6. The ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause
7. The presence of evergreen provisions in the company’s equity compensation arrangements
8. The presence of a multi-class share structure which does not afford common shareholders voting power that is aligned with their economic interest

In cases where Glass Lewis determines that the board has approved overly restrictive governing documents, we will generally recommend voting against members of the governance committee. If there is no governance committee, or if a portion of such committee members are not standing for election due to a classified board structure, we will expand our recommendations to additional director nominees, based on who is standing for election.





In cases where, preceding an IPO, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company's first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure). In the case of a multi-class share structure, if these provisions are put to a shareholder vote, we will examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining the vote outcome.

In our view, adopting an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest. This notion is strengthened when a board adopts a classified board with an infinite duration or a poison pill with a five- to ten-year term immediately prior to going public, thereby insulating management for a substantial amount of time.

In addition, shareholders should also be wary of companies that adopt supermajority voting requirements before their IPO. Absent explicit provisions in the articles or bylaws stipulating that certain policies will be phased out over a certain period of time, long-term shareholders could find themselves in the predicament of having to attain a supermajority vote to approve future proposals seeking to eliminate such policies.

Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company


The business combination of a private company with a publicly traded special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) facilitates the private entity becoming a publicly traded corporation. Thus, the business combination represents the private company's de-facto IPO. We believe that some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed a business combination with a SPAC within the past year.

At meetings where shareholders vote on the business combination of a SPAC with a private company, shareholders are generally voting on a new corporate charter for the post-combination company as a condition to approval of the business combination. In many cases, shareholders are faced with the dilemma of having to approve corporate charters that severely restrict shareholder rights to facilitate the business combination. Therefore, when shareholders are required to approve binding charters as a condition to approval of a business combination with a SPAC, we believe shareholders should also be provided with advisory votes on material charter amendments as a means to voice their opinions on such restrictive governance provisions.

When evaluating companies that have recently gone public via business combination with a SPAC, Glass Lewis will review the terms of the applicable governing documents to determine whether shareholder rights are being severely restricted indefinitely and whether these restrictive provisions were put forth for a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination.

In cases where, prior to the combined company becoming publicly traded, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served





at the time of the combined company becoming publicly traded if the board: (i) did not also submit these provisions to a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination; (ii) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company's first shareholder meeting following the company becoming publicly traded; or (iii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure).

Consistent with our view on IPOs, adopting an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest.

Dual-Listed or Foreign-Incorporated Companies

For companies that trade on multiple exchanges or are incorporated in foreign jurisdictions but trade only in the U.S., we will apply the governance standard most relevant in each situation. We will consider a number of factors in determining which Glass Lewis country-specific policy to apply, including but not limited to: (i) the corporate governance structure and features of the company including whether the board structure is unique to a particular market; (ii) the nature of the proposals; (iii) the location of the company's primary listing, if one can be determined; (iv) the regulatory/governance regime that the board is reporting against; and (v) the availability and completeness of the company's SEC filings.


OTC-listed Companies

Companies trading on the OTC Bulletin Board are not considered "listed companies" under SEC rules and therefore not subject to the same governance standards as listed companies. However, we believe that more stringent corporate governance standards should be applied to these companies given that their shares are still publicly traded.

When reviewing OTC companies, Glass Lewis will review the available disclosure relating to the shareholder meeting to determine whether shareholders are able to evaluate several key pieces of information, including: (i) the composition of the board's key committees, if any; (ii) the level of share ownership of company insiders or directors; (iii) the board meeting attendance record of directors; (iv) executive and non-employee director compensation; (v) related-party transactions conducted during the past year; and (vi) the board's leadership structure and determinations regarding director independence.

We are particularly concerned when company disclosure lacks any information regarding the board's key committees. We believe that committees of the board are an essential tool for clarifying how the responsibilities of the board are being delegated, and specifically for indicating which directors are accountable for ensuring: (i) the independence and quality of directors, and the transparency and integrity of the nominating process; (ii) compensation programs that are fair and appropriate; (iii) proper oversight of the company's accounting, financial reporting, and internal and external audits; and (iv) general adherence to principles of good corporate governance.

In cases where shareholders are unable to identify which board members are responsible for ensuring oversight of the above-mentioned responsibilities, we may consider recommending against certain members of the board.



Ordinarily, we believe it is the responsibility of the corporate governance committee to provide thorough disclosure of the board's governance practices. In the absence of such a committee, we believe it is appropriate to hold the board's chair or, if such individual is an executive of the company, the longest-serving non-executive board member accountable.

Mutual Fund Boards


Mutual funds, or investment companies, are structured differently from regular public companies (i.e., operating companies). Typically, members of a fund's advisor are on the board and management takes on a different role from that of regular public companies. Thus, we focus on a short list of requirements, although many of our guidelines remain the same.

The following mutual fund policies are similar to the policies for regular public companies:

1. **Size of the board of directors** — The board should be made up of between five and twenty directors.
2. **The CFO on the board** — Neither the CFO of the fund nor the CFO of the fund's registered investment advisor should serve on the board.
3. **Independence of the audit committee** — The audit committee should consist solely of independent directors.
4. **Audit committee financial expert** — At least one member of the audit committee should be designated as the audit committee financial expert.

The following differences from regular public companies apply at mutual funds:

1. **Independence of the board** — We believe that three-fourths of an investment company's board should be made up of independent directors. This is consistent with a proposed SEC rule on investment company boards. The Investment Company Act requires 40% of the board to be independent, but in 2001, the SEC amended the Exemptive Rules to require that a majority of a mutual fund board be independent. In 2005, the SEC proposed increasing the independence threshold to 75%. In 2006, a federal appeals court ordered that this rule amendment be put back out for public comment, putting it back into "proposed rule" status. Since mutual fund boards play a vital role in overseeing the relationship between the fund and its investment manager, there is greater need for independent oversight than there is for an operating company board.
2. **When the auditor is not up for ratification** — We do not recommend voting against the audit committee if the auditor is not up for ratification. Due to the different legal structure of an investment company compared to an operating company, the auditor for the investment company (i.e., mutual fund) does not conduct the same level of financial review for each investment company as for an operating company.
3. **Non-independent chair** — The SEC has proposed that the chair of the fund board be independent. We agree that the roles of a mutual fund's chair and CEO should be separate. Although we believe this would be best at all companies, we recommend voting against the chair of an investment company's nominating committee as well as the board chair if the chair and CEO of a mutual fund are the same person and the fund does not have an independent lead or presiding director. Seven former SEC commissioners support the appointment of an independent chair and we agree with them that "an independent board chair would be better able to create conditions favoring the long-term interests of



fund shareholders than would a chair who is an executive of the advisor.” (See the comment letter sent to the SEC in support of the proposed rule at <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/indchair.pdf>.)

4. **Multiple funds overseen by the same director** — Unlike service on a public company board, mutual fund boards require much less of a time commitment. Mutual fund directors typically serve on dozens of other mutual fund boards, often within the same fund complex. The Investment Company Institute’s (ICI) Overview of Fund Governance Practices, 1994-2012, indicates that the average number of funds served by an independent director in 2012 was 53. Absent evidence that a specific director is hindered from being an effective board member at a fund due to service on other funds’ boards, we refrain from maintaining a cap on the number of outside mutual fund boards that we believe a director can serve on.

Declassified Boards

Glass Lewis favors the repeal of staggered boards and the annual election of directors. We believe staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than boards that are elected annually. Furthermore, we feel the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on shareholder interests.

Empirical studies have shown: (i) staggered boards are associated with a reduction in a firm’s valuation; and (ii) in the context of hostile takeovers, staggered boards operate as a takeover defense, which entrenches management, discourages potential acquirers, and delivers a lower return to target shareholders.

In our view, there is no evidence to demonstrate that staggered boards improve shareholder returns in a takeover context. Some research has indicated that shareholders are worse off when a staggered board blocks a transaction; further, when a staggered board negotiates a friendly transaction, no statistically significant difference in premium occurs.³⁴ Additional research found that charter-based staggered boards “reduce the market value of a firm by 4% to 6% of its market capitalization” and that “staggered boards bring about and not merely reflect this reduction in market value.”³⁵ A subsequent study reaffirmed that classified boards reduce shareholder value, finding “that the ongoing process of dismantling staggered boards, encouraged by institutional investors, could well contribute to increasing shareholder wealth.”³⁶


Shareholders have increasingly come to agree with this view. In 2019, 90% of S&P 500 companies had declassified boards, up from 68% in 2009.³⁷ Management proposals to declassify boards are approved with near unanimity and shareholder proposals on the topic also receive strong shareholder support; in 2014, shareholder proposals requesting that companies declassify their boards received average support of 84% (excluding

³⁴ Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV, Guhan Subramanian, “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants,” 55 *Stanford Law Review* 885-917 (2002).

³⁵ Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, “The Costs of Entrenched Boards” (2004).

³⁶ Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang, “Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706806> (2010), p. 26.

³⁷ Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 15.



abstentions and broker non-votes), whereas in 1987, only 16.4% of votes cast favored board declassification.³⁸ Further, a growing number of companies, nearly half of all those targeted by shareholder proposals requesting that all directors stand for election annually, either recommended shareholders support the proposal or made no recommendation, a departure from the more traditional management recommendation to vote against shareholder proposals.

Given our belief that declassified boards promote director accountability, the empirical evidence suggesting staggered boards reduce a company's value and the established shareholder opposition to such a structure, Glass Lewis supports the declassification of boards and the annual election of directors.

Board Composition and Refreshment

Glass Lewis strongly supports routine director evaluation, including independent external reviews, and periodic board refreshment to foster the sharing of diverse perspectives in the boardroom and the generation of new ideas and business strategies. Further, we believe the board should evaluate the need for changes to board composition based on an analysis of skills and experience necessary for the company, as well as the results of the director evaluations, as opposed to relying solely on age or tenure limits. When necessary, shareholders can address concerns regarding proper board composition through director elections.

In our view, a director's experience can be a valuable asset to shareholders because of the complex, critical issues that boards face. This said, we recognize that in rare circumstances, a lack of refreshment can contribute to a lack of board responsiveness to poor company performance.

We will note as a potential concern instances where the average tenure of non-executive directors is 10 years or more and no new directors have joined the board in the past five years. While we will be highlighting this as a potential area of concern, we will not be making voting recommendations strictly on this basis, unless we have identified other governance or board performance concerns.


On occasion, age or term limits can be used as a means to remove a director for boards that are unwilling to police their membership and enforce turnover. Some shareholders support term limits as a way to force change in such circumstances.

While we understand that age limits can aid board succession planning, the long-term impact of age limits restricts experienced and potentially valuable board members from service through an arbitrary means. We believe that shareholders are better off monitoring the board's overall composition, including the diversity of its members, the alignment of the board's areas of expertise with a company's strategy, the board's approach to corporate governance, and its stewardship of company performance, rather than imposing inflexible rules that don't necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.

However, if a board adopts term/age limits, it should follow through and not waive such limits. In cases where the board waives its term/age limits for two or more consecutive years, Glass Lewis will generally recommend that shareholders vote against the nominating and/or governance committee chair, unless a compelling rationale is provided for why the board is proposing to waive this rule, such as consummation of a corporate transaction.

³⁸ Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy".





Board Diversity

Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of ensuring that the board is composed of directors who have a diversity of skills, thought and experience, as such diversity benefits companies by providing a broad range of perspectives and insights. Glass Lewis closely reviews the composition of the board for representation of diverse director candidates.

Board Gender Diversity

Beginning in 2023, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee of a board that is not at least 30 percent gender diverse, or all members of the nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at companies within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside the Russell 3000 index, our existing policy requiring a minimum of one gender diverse director will remain in place.

We may extend our gender diversity recommendations to additional members of the nominating committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company's size and industry, applicable laws in its state of headquarters, and its overall governance profile.

Additionally, when making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company's disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline of when the board intends to appoint additional gender diverse directors (generally by the next annual meeting).

Board Underrepresented Community Diversity

Beginning in 2023, we will generally recommend against the chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than one director from an underrepresented community on the board at companies within the Russell 1000 index.

We define "underrepresented community director" as an individual who self-identifies as Black, African American, North African, Middle Eastern, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaskan Native, or who self-identifies as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender. For the purposes of this evaluation, we will rely solely on self-identified demographic information as disclosed in company proxy statements.

We may extend our underrepresented community diversity recommendations to additional members of the nominating committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company's size and industry, applicable laws in its state of headquarters, and its overall governance profile.





Additionally, when making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company's disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline to appoint additional directors from an underrepresented community (generally by the next annual meeting).

State Laws on Diversity

Several states have begun to encourage board diversity through legislation. Some state laws imposed mandatory board composition requirements, while other states have enacted or are considering legislation that encourages companies to diversify their boards but does not mandate board composition requirements. Furthermore, several states have enacted or are considering enacting certain disclosure or reporting requirements in filings made with each respective state annually.

Glass Lewis will recommend in accordance with mandatory board composition requirements set forth in applicable state laws when they come into effect. We will generally refrain from recommending against directors when applicable state laws do not mandate board composition requirements, are non-binding, or solely impose disclosure or reporting requirements.

We note that during 2022, California's Senate Bill 826 and Assembly Bill 979 regarding board gender and "underrepresented community" diversity, respectively, were both deemed to violate the equal protection clause of the California state constitution. These laws are currently in the appeals process.


Accordingly, where we previously recommended in accordance with mandatory board composition requirements set forth in California's SB 826 and AB 979, we will refrain from providing recommendations pursuant to these state board composition requirements until further notice while we continue to monitor the appeals process. However, we will continue to monitor compliance with these requirements.

Disclosure of Director Diversity and Skills

Because company disclosure is critical when measuring the mix of diverse attributes and skills of directors, Glass Lewis assesses the quality of such disclosure in companies' proxy statements. Accordingly, we reflect how a company's proxy statement presents: (i) the board's current percentage of racial/ethnic diversity; (ii) whether the board's definition of diversity explicitly includes gender and/or race/ethnicity; (iii) whether the board has adopted a policy requiring women and minorities to be included in the initial pool of candidates when selecting new director nominees (aka "Rooney Rule"); and (iv) board skills disclosure. Such ratings will help inform our assessment of a company's overall governance and may be a contributing factor in our recommendations when additional board-related concerns have been identified.

At companies in the Russell 1000 index that have not provided any disclosure in any of the above categories, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee. Further, beginning in 2023, when companies in the Russell 1000 index have not provided any disclosure of individual or aggregate racial/ethnic minority board demographic information, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee.





Stock Exchange Diversity Disclosure Requirements

On August 6, 2021, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new listing rules regarding board diversity and disclosure for Nasdaq-listed companies. Beginning in 2022, companies listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange are required to disclose certain board diversity statistics annually in a standardized format in the proxy statement or on the company's website. Nasdaq-listed companies are required to provide this disclosure by the later of (i) August 8, 2022, or (ii) the date the company files its proxy statement for its 2022 annual meeting. Accordingly, for annual meetings held after August 8, 2022, of applicable Nasdaq-listed companies, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee when the required disclosure has not been provided.

Proxy Access

In lieu of running their own contested election, proxy access would not only allow certain shareholders to nominate directors to company boards but the shareholder nominees would be included on the company's ballot, significantly enhancing the ability of shareholders to play a meaningful role in selecting their representatives. Glass Lewis generally supports affording shareholders the right to nominate director candidates to management's proxy as a means to ensure that significant, long-term shareholders have an ability to nominate candidates to the board.

Companies generally seek shareholder approval to amend company bylaws to adopt proxy access in response to shareholder engagement or pressure, usually in the form of a shareholder proposal requesting proxy access, although some companies may adopt some elements of proxy access without prompting. Glass Lewis considers several factors when evaluating whether to support proposals for companies to adopt proxy access including the specified minimum ownership and holding requirement for shareholders to nominate one or more directors, as well as company size, performance and responsiveness to shareholders.


For a discussion of recent regulatory events in this area, along with a detailed overview of the Glass Lewis approach to shareholder proposals regarding Proxy Access, refer to Glass Lewis' *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives*, available at www.glasslewis.com.

Majority Vote for Election of Directors

Majority voting for the election of directors is fast becoming the de facto standard in corporate board elections. In our view, the majority voting proposals are an effort to make the case for shareholder impact on director elections on a company-specific basis.

While this proposal would not give shareholders the opportunity to nominate directors or lead to elections where shareholders have a choice among director candidates, if implemented, the proposal would allow shareholders to have a voice in determining whether the nominees proposed by the board should actually serve as the overseer-representatives of shareholders in the boardroom. We believe this would be a favorable outcome for shareholders.





The number of shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a majority voting standard has declined significantly during the past decade, largely as a result of widespread adoption of majority voting or director resignation policies at U.S. companies. In 2019, 89% of the S&P 500 Index had implemented a resignation policy for directors failing to receive majority shareholder support, compared to 65% in 2009.³⁹

The Plurality Vote Standard

Today, most U.S. companies still elect directors by a plurality vote standard. Under that standard, if one shareholder holding only one share votes in favor of a nominee (including that director, if the director is a shareholder), that nominee “wins” the election and assumes a seat on the board. The common concern among companies with a plurality voting standard is the possibility that one or more directors would not receive a majority of votes, resulting in “failed elections.”

Advantages of a Majority Vote Standard

If a majority vote standard were implemented, a nominee would have to receive the support of a majority of the shares voted in order to be elected. Thus, shareholders could collectively vote to reject a director they believe will not pursue their best interests. Given that so few directors (less than 100 a year) do not receive majority support from shareholders, we think that a majority vote standard is reasonable since it will neither result in many failed director elections nor reduce the willingness of qualified, shareholder-focused directors to serve in the future. Further, most directors who fail to receive a majority shareholder vote in favor of their election do not step down, underscoring the need for true majority voting.

We believe that a majority vote standard will likely lead to more attentive directors. Although shareholders only rarely fail to support directors, the occasional majority vote against a director’s election will likely deter the election of directors with a record of ignoring shareholder interests. Glass Lewis will therefore generally support proposals calling for the election of directors by a majority vote, excepting contested director elections.

In response to the high level of support majority voting has garnered, many companies have voluntarily taken steps to implement majority voting or modified approaches to majority voting. These steps range from a modified approach requiring directors that receive a majority of withheld votes to resign (i.e., a resignation policy) to actually requiring a majority vote of outstanding shares to elect directors.


We feel that the modified approach does not go far enough because requiring a director to resign is not the same as requiring a majority vote to elect a director and does not allow shareholders a definitive voice in the election process. Further, under the modified approach, the corporate governance committee could reject a resignation and, even if it accepts the resignation, the corporate governance committee decides on the director’s replacement. And since the modified approach is usually adopted as a policy by the board or a board committee, it could be altered by the same board or committee at any time.

Conflicting and Excluded Proposals

SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(9) allows companies to exclude shareholder proposals “if the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company’s own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting.” On October 22,

³⁹ Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 15.





2015, the SEC issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (SLB 14H) clarifying its rule concerning the exclusion of certain shareholder proposals when similar items are also on the ballot. SLB 14H increased the burden on companies to prove to SEC staff that a conflict exists; therefore, many companies still chose to place management proposals alongside similar shareholder proposals in many cases.

During the 2018 proxy season, a new trend in the SEC's interpretation of this rule emerged. Upon submission of shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a lower special meeting threshold, several companies petitioned the SEC for no-action relief under the premise that the shareholder proposals conflicted with management's own special meeting proposals, even though the management proposals set a higher threshold than those requested by the proponent. No-action relief was granted to these companies; however, the SEC stipulated that the companies must state in the rationale for the management proposals that a vote in favor of management's proposal was tantamount to a vote against the adoption of a lower special meeting threshold. In certain instances, shareholder proposals to lower an existing special meeting right threshold were excluded on the basis that they conflicted with management proposals seeking to ratify the existing special meeting rights. We find the exclusion of these shareholder proposals to be especially problematic as, in these instances, shareholders are not offered any enhanced shareholder right, nor would the approval (or rejection) of the ratification proposal initiate any type of meaningful change to shareholders' rights.


In instances where companies have excluded shareholder proposals, such as those instances where special meeting shareholder proposals are excluded as a result of "conflicting" management proposals, Glass Lewis will take a case-by-case approach, taking into account the following issues:

- The threshold proposed by the shareholder resolution;
- The threshold proposed or established by management and the attendant rationale for the threshold;
- Whether management's proposal is seeking to ratify an existing special meeting right or adopt a bylaw that would establish a special meeting right; and
- The company's overall governance profile, including its overall responsiveness to and engagement with shareholders.

Glass Lewis generally favors a 10-15% special meeting right. Accordingly, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting for management or shareholder proposals that fall within this range. When faced with conflicting proposals, Glass Lewis will generally recommend in favor of the lower special meeting right and will recommend voting against the proposal with the higher threshold. However, in instances where there are conflicting management and shareholder proposals and a company has not established a special meeting right, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote in favor of the shareholder proposal and that they abstain from a management-proposed bylaw amendment seeking to establish a special meeting right. We believe that an abstention is appropriate in this instance in order to ensure that shareholders are sending a clear signal regarding their preference for the appropriate threshold for a special meeting right, while not directly opposing the establishment of such a right.

In cases where the company excludes a shareholder proposal seeking a reduced special meeting right by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal, we will generally recommend voting against the chair or members of the governance committee.






In other instances of conflicting management and shareholder proposals, Glass Lewis will consider the following:

- The nature of the underlying issue;
- The benefit to shareholders of implementing the proposal;
- The materiality of the differences between the terms of the shareholder proposal and management proposal;
- The context of a company's shareholder base, corporate structure and other relevant circumstances; and
- A company's overall governance profile and, specifically, its responsiveness to shareholders as evidenced by a company's response to previous shareholder proposals and its adoption of progressive shareholder rights provisions.

In recent years, we have seen the dynamic nature of the considerations given by the SEC when determining whether companies may exclude certain shareholder proposals. We understand that not all shareholder proposals serve the long-term interests of shareholders, and value and respect the limitations placed on shareholder proponents, as certain shareholder proposals can unduly burden companies. However, Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should be able to vote on issues of material importance.

We view the shareholder proposal process as an important part of advancing shareholder rights and encouraging responsible and financially sustainable business practices. While recognizing that certain proposals cross the line between the purview of shareholders and that of the board, we generally believe that companies should not limit investors' ability to vote on shareholder proposals that advance certain rights or promote beneficial disclosure. Accordingly, Glass Lewis will make note of instances where a company has successfully petitioned the SEC to exclude shareholder proposals. If after review we believe that the exclusion of a shareholder proposal is detrimental to shareholders, we may, in certain very limited circumstances, recommend against members of the governance committee.



Transparency and Integrity in Financial Reporting

Auditor Ratification

The auditor's role as gatekeeper is crucial in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the financial information necessary for protecting shareholder value. Shareholders rely on the auditor to ask tough questions and to do a thorough analysis of a company's books to ensure that the information provided to shareholders is complete, accurate, fair, and that it is a reasonable representation of a company's financial position. The only way shareholders can make rational investment decisions is if the market is equipped with accurate information about a company's fiscal health. As stated in the October 6, 2008 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury:

"The auditor is expected to offer critical and objective judgment on the financial matters under consideration, and actual and perceived absence of conflicts is critical to that expectation. The Committee believes that auditors, investors, public companies, and other market participants must understand the independence requirements and their objectives, and that auditors must adopt a mindset of skepticism when facing situations that may compromise their independence."


As such, shareholders should demand an objective, competent and diligent auditor who performs at or above professional standards at every company in which the investors hold an interest. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should avoid situations requiring a choice between the auditor's interests and the public's interests. Almost without exception, shareholders should be able to annually review an auditor's performance and to annually ratify a board's auditor selection. Moreover, in October 2008, the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession went even further, and recommended that "to further enhance audit committee oversight and auditor accountability ... disclosure in the company proxy statement regarding shareholder ratification [should] include the name(s) of the senior auditing partner(s) staffed on the engagement."⁴⁰

On August 16, 2011, the PCAOB issued a Concept Release seeking public comment on ways that auditor independence, objectivity and professional skepticism could be enhanced, with a specific emphasis on mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB convened several public roundtable meetings during 2012 to further discuss such matters. Glass Lewis believes auditor rotation can ensure both the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the audit; we will typically recommend supporting proposals to require auditor rotation when the proposal uses a reasonable period of time (usually not less than 5-7 years), particularly at companies with a history of accounting problems.

On June 1, 2017, the PCAOB adopted new standards to enhance auditor reports by providing additional important information to investors. For companies with fiscal year end dates on or after December 15, 2017,

⁴⁰ "Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury." p. VIII:20, October 6, 2008.





reports were required to include the year in which the auditor began serving consecutively as the company's auditor. For large accelerated filers with fiscal year ends of June 30, 2019 or later, and for all other companies with fiscal year ends of December 15, 2020 or later, communication of critical audit matters (CAMs) will also be required. CAMs are matters that have been communicated to the audit committee, are related to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements, and involve especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment.

Glass Lewis believes the additional reporting requirements are beneficial for investors. The additional disclosures can provide investors with information that is critical to making an informed judgment about an auditor's independence and performance. Furthermore, we believe the additional requirements are an important step toward enhancing the relevance and usefulness of auditor reports, which too often are seen as boilerplate compliance documents that lack the relevant details to provide meaningful insight into a particular audit.


Voting Recommendations on Auditor Ratification

We generally support management's choice of auditor except when we believe the auditor's independence or audit integrity has been compromised. Where a board has not allowed shareholders to review and ratify an auditor, we typically recommend voting against the audit committee chair. When there have been material restatements of annual financial statements or material weaknesses in internal controls, we usually recommend voting against the entire audit committee.

Reasons why we may not recommend ratification of an auditor include:

1. When audit fees plus audit-related fees total less than the tax fees and/or other non-audit fees.
2. Recent material restatements of annual financial statements, including those resulting in the reporting of material weaknesses in internal controls and including late filings by the company where the auditor bears some responsibility for the restatement or late filing.⁴¹
3. When the auditor performs prohibited services such as tax-shelter work, tax services for the CEO or CFO, or contingent-fee work, such as a fee based on a percentage of economic benefit to the company.
4. When audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.
5. When the company has aggressive accounting policies.
6. When the company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in its financial statements.
7. Where the auditor limited its liability through its contract with the company or the audit contract requires the corporation to use alternative dispute resolution procedures without adequate justification.
8. We also look for other relationships or concerns with the auditor that might suggest a conflict between the auditor's interests and shareholder interests.
9. In determining whether shareholders would benefit from rotating the company's auditor, where relevant we will consider factors that may call into question an auditor's effectiveness, including auditor

⁴¹ An auditor does not audit interim financial statements. Thus, we generally do not believe that an auditor should be opposed due to a restatement of interim financial statements unless the nature of the misstatement is clear from a reading of the incorrect financial statements.




tenure, a pattern of inaccurate audits, and any ongoing litigation or significant controversies. When Glass Lewis considers ongoing litigation and significant controversies, it is mindful that such matters may involve unadjudicated allegations. Glass Lewis does not assume the truth of such allegations or that the law has been violated. Instead, Glass Lewis focuses more broadly on whether, under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the nature and number of such lawsuits or other significant controversies reflects on the risk profile of the company or suggests that appropriate risk mitigation measures may be warranted.”

Pension Accounting Issues

A pension accounting question occasionally raised in proxy proposals is what effect, if any, projected returns on employee pension assets should have on a company’s net income. This issue often arises in the executive- compensation context in a discussion of the extent to which pension accounting should be reflected in business performance for purposes of calculating payments to executives.

Glass Lewis believes that pension credits should not be included in measuring income that is used to award performance-based compensation. Because many of the assumptions used in accounting for retirement plans are subject to the company’s discretion, management would have an obvious conflict of interest if pay were tied to pension income. In our view, projected income from pensions does not truly reflect a company’s performance.





The Link Between Compensation and Performance

Glass Lewis carefully reviews the compensation awarded to senior executives, as we believe that this is an important area in which the board's priorities are revealed. Glass Lewis strongly believes executive compensation should be linked directly with the performance of the business the executive is charged with managing. We believe the most effective compensation arrangements provide for an appropriate mix of performance-based short- and long-term incentives in addition to fixed pay elements while promoting a prudent and sustainable level of risk-taking.

Glass Lewis believes that comprehensive, timely and transparent disclosure of executive pay is critical to allowing shareholders to evaluate the extent to which pay is aligned with company performance. When reviewing proxy materials, Glass Lewis examines whether the company discloses the performance metrics used to determine executive compensation. We recognize performance metrics must necessarily vary depending on the company and industry, among other factors, and may include a wide variety of financial measures as well as industry-specific performance indicators. However, we believe companies should disclose why the specific performance metrics were selected and how the actions they are designed to incentivize will lead to better corporate performance.


Moreover, it is rarely in shareholders' interests to disclose competitive data about individual salaries below the senior executive level. Such disclosure could create internal personnel discord that would be counterproductive for the company and its shareholders. While we favor full disclosure for senior executives and we view pay disclosure at the aggregate level (e.g., the number of employees being paid over a certain amount or in certain categories) as potentially useful, we do not believe shareholders need or will benefit from detailed reports about individual management employees other than the most senior executives. Additional company disclosure provided as a result of the recent final rules on pay versus performance from the SEC in August 2022 may be considered if they provide further insight into a company's executive pay program.

Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay)

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act") required companies to hold an advisory vote on executive compensation at the first shareholder meeting that occurs six months after enactment of the bill (January 21, 2011).

This practice of allowing shareholders a non-binding vote on a company's compensation report is standard practice in many non-U.S. countries, and has been a requirement for most companies in the United Kingdom since 2003 and in Australia since 2005. Although say-on-pay proposals are non-binding, a high level of "against" or "abstain" votes indicates substantial shareholder concern about a company's compensation policies and procedures.





Given the complexity of most companies' compensation programs, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach when analyzing advisory votes on executive compensation. We review each company's compensation on a case-by-case basis, recognizing that each company must be examined in the context of industry, size, maturity, performance, financial condition, its historic pay for performance practices, and any other relevant internal or external factors.

We believe that each company should design and apply specific compensation policies and practices that are appropriate to the circumstances of the company and, in particular, will attract and retain competent executives and other staff, while motivating them to grow the company's long-term shareholder value.

Where we find those specific policies and practices serve to reasonably align compensation with performance, and such practices are adequately disclosed, Glass Lewis will recommend supporting the company's approach. If, however, those specific policies and practices fail to demonstrably link compensation with performance, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against the say-on-pay proposal.

Glass Lewis reviews say-on-pay proposals on both a qualitative basis and a quantitative basis, with a focus on several main areas:

- The overall design and structure of the company's executive compensation programs including selection and challenging nature of performance metrics;
- The implementation and effectiveness of the company's executive compensation programs including pay mix and use of performance metrics in determining pay levels;
- The quality and content of the company's disclosure;
- The quantum paid to executives; and
- The link between compensation and performance as indicated by the company's current and past pay-for-performance grades.

We also review any significant changes or modifications, including post fiscal year-end changes and one-time awards, particularly where the changes touch upon issues that are material to Glass Lewis recommendations.


Say-on-Pay Voting Recommendations

In cases where we find deficiencies in a company's compensation program's design, implementation or management, we will recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. Generally such instances include evidence of a pattern of poor pay-for-performance practices (i.e., deficient or failing pay-for-performance grades), unclear or questionable disclosure regarding the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited information regarding benchmarking processes, limited rationale for bonus performance metrics and targets, etc.), questionable adjustments to certain aspects of the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited rationale for significant changes to performance targets or metrics, the payout of guaranteed bonuses or sizable retention grants, etc.), and/or other egregious compensation practices.

Although not an exhaustive list, the following issues when weighed together may cause Glass Lewis to recommend voting against a say-on-pay vote:

- Inappropriate or outsized self-selected peer groups and/or benchmarking issues such as compensation targets set well above the median without adequate justification;





- Egregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments, including golden handshakes and golden parachutes;
- Insufficient response to low shareholder support;
- Problematic contractual payments, such as guaranteed bonuses;
- Insufficiently challenging performance targets and/or high potential payout opportunities;
- Performance targets lowered without justification;
- Discretionary bonuses paid when short- or long-term incentive plan targets were not met;
- High executive pay relative to peers that is not justified by outstanding company performance; and
- The terms of the long-term incentive plans are inappropriate (please see “Long-Term Incentives”).

The aforementioned issues may also influence Glass Lewis’ assessment of the structure of a company’s compensation program. We evaluate structure on a “Good, Fair, Poor” rating scale whereby a “Good” rating represents a compensation program with little to no concerns, a “Fair” rating represents a compensation program with some concerns and a “Poor” rating represents a compensation program that deviates significantly from best practice or contains one or more egregious compensation practices.

We believe that it is important for companies to provide investors with clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements. Similar to structure, we evaluate disclosure on a “Good, Fair, Poor” rating scale whereby a “Good” rating represents a thorough discussion of all elements of compensation, a “Fair” rating represents an adequate discussion of all or most elements of compensation and a “Poor” rating represents an incomplete or absent discussion of compensation. In instances where a company has simply failed to provide sufficient disclosure of its policies, we may recommend shareholders vote against this proposal solely on this basis, regardless of the appropriateness of compensation levels.


In general, most companies will fall within the “Fair” range for both structure and disclosure, and Glass Lewis largely uses the “Good” and “Poor” ratings to highlight outliers.

Where we identify egregious compensation practices, we may also recommend voting against the compensation committee based on the practices or actions of its members during the year. Such practices may include: approving large one-off payments, the inappropriate, unjustified use of discretion, or sustained poor pay for performance practices. (Refer to the section on “Compensation Committee Performance” for more information.)

Company Responsiveness

When companies receive a significant level of shareholder opposition to a say-on-pay proposal, which occurs when there is more than 20% opposition to the proposal, we believe the board should demonstrate a commensurate level of engagement and responsiveness to the concerns behind the disapproval, with a particular focus on responding to shareholder feedback. When assessing the level of opposition to say-on-pay proposals, we may further examine the level of opposition among disinterested shareholders as an independent group. While we recognize that sweeping changes cannot be made to a compensation program without due consideration, and that often a majority of shareholders may have voted in favor of the proposal, given that the average approval rate for say-on-pay proposals is about 90%, we believe the compensation committee should provide some level of response to a significant vote against. In general, our expectations regarding the minimum appropriate levels of responsiveness will correspond with the level of shareholder opposition, as expressed both through the magnitude of opposition in a single year, and through the persistence of shareholder disapproval over time.





Responses we consider appropriate include engaging with large shareholders, especially dissenting shareholders, to identify their concerns, and, where reasonable, implementing changes and/or making commitments that directly address those concerns within the company's compensation program. In cases where particularly egregious pay decisions caused the say on pay proposal to fail, Glass Lewis will closely consider whether any changes were made directly relating to the pay decision that may address structural concerns that shareholders have. In the absence of any evidence in the disclosure that the board is actively engaging shareholders on these issues and responding accordingly, we may recommend holding compensation committee members accountable for failing to adequately respond to shareholder opposition. Regarding such recommendations, careful consideration will be given to the level of shareholder protest and the severity and history of compensation practices.


Pay for Performance

Glass Lewis believes an integral part of a well-structured compensation package is a successful link between pay and performance. Our proprietary pay-for-performance model was developed to better evaluate the link between pay and performance. Generally, compensation and performance are measured against a peer group of appropriate companies that may overlap, to a certain extent, with a company's self-disclosed peers. This quantitative analysis provides a consistent framework and historical context for our clients to determine how well companies link executive compensation to relative performance. Companies that demonstrate a weaker link are more likely to receive a negative recommendation; however, other qualitative factors such as overall incentive structure, significant forthcoming changes to the compensation program or reasonable long-term payout levels may mitigate our concerns to a certain extent.

While we assign companies a letter grade of A, B, C, D or F based on the alignment between pay and performance, the grades derived from the Glass Lewis pay-for-performance analysis do not follow the traditional U.S. school letter grade system. Rather, the grades are generally interpreted as follows:

- Grade of A:** The company's percentile rank for pay is significantly less than its percentile rank for performance
- Grade of B:** The company's percentile rank for pay is moderately less than its percentile rank for performance
- Grade of C:** The company's percentile rank for pay is approximately aligned with its percentile rank for performance
- Grade of D:** The company's percentile rank for pay is higher than its percentile rank for performance
- Grade of F:** The company's percentile rank for pay is significantly higher than its percentile rank for performance

For the avoidance of confusion, the above grades encompass the relationship between a company's percentile rank for pay and its percentile rank in performance. Separately, a specific comparison between the company's executive pay and its peers' executive pay levels is discussed in the analysis for additional insight into the grade. Likewise, a specific comparison between the company's performance and its peers' performance is reflected in the analysis for further context. Finally, Glass Lewis' pay-for-performance analysis is currently unaffected by any additional disclosure concerning pay versus performance as mandated by an August 2022 SEC rule.



We also use this analysis to inform our voting decisions on say-on-pay proposals. As such, if a company receives a “D” or “F” from our proprietary model, we are more likely to recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. However, supplemental quantitative factors like realized pay levels may be considered, and other qualitative factors such as an effective overall incentive structure, the relevance of selected performance metrics, significant forthcoming enhancements or reasonable long-term payout levels may give us cause to recommend in favor of a proposal even when we have identified a disconnect between pay and performance.

In determining the peer groups used in our A-F pay-for-performance letter grades, Glass Lewis utilizes a proprietary methodology that considers both market and industry peers, along with each company’s network of self-disclosed peers. Each component is considered on a weighted basis and is subject to size-based ranking and screening. The peer groups used are provided to Glass Lewis by Diligent Intel based on Glass Lewis’ methodology and using Diligent Intel’s data.

Selecting an appropriate peer group to analyze a company’s compensation program is a subjective determination, requiring significant judgment and on which there is not a “correct” answer. Since the peer group used is based on an independent, proprietary technique, it will often differ from the one used by the company which, in turn, will affect the resulting analyses. While Glass Lewis believes that the independent, rigorous methodology it uses provides a valuable perspective on the company’s compensation program, the company’s self-selected peer group is also presented in the Proxy Paper for comparative purposes.

Short-Term Incentives


A short-term bonus or incentive (STI) should be demonstrably tied to performance. Whenever possible, we believe a mix of corporate and individual performance measures is appropriate. We would normally expect performance measures for STIs to be based on company-wide or divisional financial measures as well as non-financial, qualitative or non-formulaic factors such as those related to safety, environmental issues, and customer satisfaction. While we recognize that companies operating in different sectors or markets may seek to utilize a wide range of metrics, we expect such measures to be appropriately tied to a company’s business drivers.

Further, the threshold, target and maximum performance goals and corresponding payout levels that can be achieved under STI plans should be disclosed. Shareholders should expect stretching performance targets for the maximum award to be achieved. Any increase in the potential target and maximum award should be clearly justified to shareholders, as should any decrease in target and maximum performance levels from the previous year.

Glass Lewis recognizes that disclosure of some measures or performance targets may include commercially confidential information. Therefore, we believe it may be reasonable to exclude such information in some cases as long as the company provides sufficient justification for non-disclosure. However, where a short-term bonus has been paid, companies should disclose the extent to which performance has been achieved against relevant targets, including disclosure of the actual target achieved.

Where management has received significant short-term incentive payments but overall performance and/or the shareholder experience over the measurement year prima facie appears to be poor or negative, we believe the company should provide a clear explanation of why these significant short-term payments were made. We also believe any significant changes to the program structure should be accompanied by rationalizing disclosure.





Further, where a company has applied upward discretion, which includes lowering goals mid-year, increasing calculated payouts or retroactively pro-rating performance periods, we expect a robust discussion of why the decision was necessary. In addition, we believe that where companies use non-GAAP or bespoke metrics, clear reconciliations between these figures and GAAP figures in audited financial statement should be provided. Adjustments to GAAP figures may be considered in Glass Lewis' assessment of the effectiveness of the incentive at tying executive pay with performance.

Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of the compensation committee's judicious and responsible exercise of discretion over incentive pay outcomes to account for significant, material events that would otherwise be excluded from performance results of selected metrics of incentive programs. For instance, major litigation settlement charges may be removed from non-GAAP results before the determination of formulaic incentive payouts, or health and safety failures may not be reflected in performance results where companies do not expressly include health and safety metrics in incentive plans; such events may nevertheless be consequential to corporate performance results, impact the shareholder experience, and, in some cases, may present material risks. Conversely, certain events may adversely impact formulaic payout results despite being outside executives' control. We believe that companies should provide thorough discussion of how such events were considered in the committee's decisions to exercise discretion or refrain from applying discretion over incentive pay outcomes. The inclusion of this disclosure may be helpful when we consider concerns around the exercise or absence of committee discretion.

We do not generally recommend against a pay program due to the use of a non-formulaic plan. If a company has chosen to rely primarily on a subjective assessment or the board's discretion in determining short-term bonuses, we believe that the proxy statement should provide a meaningful discussion of the board's rationale in determining the bonuses paid as well as a rationale for the use of a non-formulaic mechanism. Particularly where the aforementioned disclosures are substantial and satisfactory, such a structure will not provoke serious concern in our analysis on its own. However, in conjunction with other significant issues in a program's design or operation, such as a disconnect between pay and performance, the absence of a cap on payouts, or a lack of performance-based long-term awards, the use of a non-formulaic bonus may help drive a negative recommendation.


Long-Term Incentives

Glass Lewis recognizes the value of equity-based incentive programs, which are often the primary long-term incentive for executives. When used appropriately, they can provide a vehicle for linking an executive's pay to company performance, thereby aligning their interests with those of shareholders. In addition, equity-based compensation can be an effective way to attract, retain and motivate key employees.

There are certain elements that Glass Lewis believes are common to most well-structured long-term incentive (LTI) plans. These include:

- No re-testing or lowering of performance conditions;
- Performance metrics that cannot be easily manipulated by management;
- Two or more performance metrics;
- At least one relative performance metric that compares the company's performance to a relevant peer group or index;





- Performance periods of at least three years;
- Stretching metrics that incentivize executives to strive for outstanding performance while not encouraging excessive risk-taking;
- Individual award limits expressed as a percentage of base salary; and
- Equity granting practices that are clearly disclosed.

In evaluating long-term incentive grants, Glass Lewis generally believes that at least half of the grant should consist of performance-based awards, putting a material portion of executive compensation at-risk and demonstrably linked to the performance of the company. While we will consistently raise concern with programs that do not meet this criterion, we may refrain from a negative recommendation in the absence of other significant issues with the program's design or operation. However, in cases where performance-based awards are significantly rolled back or eliminated from a company's long-term incentive plan, such decisions will generally be viewed negatively outside of exceptional circumstances, and may lead to a recommendation against the proposal.

As with the short-term incentive, Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of the compensation committee's judicious and responsible exercise of discretion over incentive pay outcomes to account for significant events that would otherwise be excluded from performance results of selected metrics of incentive programs. We believe that companies should provide thorough discussion of how such events were considered in the committee's decisions to exercise discretion or refrain from applying discretion over incentive pay outcomes.

Performance measures should be carefully selected and should relate to the specific business/industry in which the company operates and, especially, to the key value drivers of the company's business. As with short-term incentive plans, the basis for any adjustments to metrics or results should be clearly explained, as should the company's judgment on the use of discretion and any significant changes to the performance program structure.


While cognizant of the inherent complexity of certain performance metrics, Glass Lewis generally believes that measuring a company's performance with multiple metrics serves to provide a more complete picture of the company's performance than a single metric. Further, reliance on just one metric may focus too much management attention on a single target and is therefore more susceptible to manipulation. When utilized for relative measurements, external benchmarks such as a sector index or peer group should be disclosed and transparent. The rationale behind the selection of a specific index or peer group should also be disclosed. Internal performance benchmarks should also be disclosed and transparent, unless a cogent case for confidentiality is made and fully explained. Similarly, actual performance and vesting levels for previous grants earned during the fiscal year should be disclosed.

We also believe shareholders should evaluate the relative success of a company's compensation programs, particularly with regard to existing equity-based incentive plans, in linking pay and performance when evaluating potential changes to LTI plans and determining the impact of additional stock awards. We will therefore review the company's pay-for-performance grade (see below for more information) and specifically the proportion of total compensation that is stock-based.

Grants of Front-Loaded Awards

Many U.S. companies have chosen to provide large grants, usually in the form of equity awards, that are intended to serve as compensation for multiple years. This practice, often called front-loading, is taken up either





in the regular course of business or as a response to specific business conditions and with a predetermined objective. The so-called “mega-grant”, an outsized award to one individual sometimes valued at over \$100 million is sometimes but not always provided as a front-loaded award. We believe shareholders should generally be wary of this approach, and we accordingly weigh these grants with particular scrutiny.

While the use of front-loaded awards is intended to lock-in executive service and incentives, the same rigidity also raises the risk of effectively tying the hands of the compensation committee. As compared with a more responsive annual granting schedule program, front-loaded awards may preclude improvements or changes to reflect evolving business strategies or to respond to other unforeseen factors. Additionally, if structured poorly, early vesting of such awards may reduce or eliminate the retentive power at great cost to shareholders. The considerable emphasis on a single grant can place intense pressures on every facet of its design, amplifying any potential perverse incentives and creating greater room for unintended consequences. In particular, provisions around changes of control or separations of service must ensure that executives do not receive excessive payouts that do not reflect shareholder experience or company performance.


We consider a company’s rationale for granting awards under this structure and also expect any front-loaded awards to include a firm commitment not to grant additional awards for a defined period, as is commonly associated with this practice. Even when such a commitment is provided, unexpected circumstances may lead the board to make additional payments or awards for retention purposes, or to incentivize management towards more realistic goals or a revised strategy. If a company breaks its commitment not to grant further awards, we may recommend against the pay program unless a convincing rationale is provided. In situations where the front-loaded award was meant to cover a certain portion of the regular long-term incentive grant for each year during the covered period, our analysis of the value of the remaining portion of the regular long-term incentives granted during the period covered by the award will account for the annualized value of the front-loaded portion, and we expect no supplemental grant be awarded during the vesting period of the front-loaded portion.

The multiyear nature of these awards generally lends itself to significantly higher compensation figures in the year of grant than might otherwise be expected. In our qualitative analysis of the grants of front-loaded awards to executives, Glass Lewis considers the quantum of the award on an annualized basis and may compare this result to the prior practice and peer data, among other benchmarks. Additionally, for awards that are granted in the form of equity, Glass Lewis may consider the total potential dilutive effect of such award on shareholders.

Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria

Glass Lewis believes that explicit environmental and/or social (E&S) criteria in executive incentive plans, when used appropriately, can serve to provide both executives and shareholders a clear line of sight into a company’s ESG strategy, ambitions, and targets. Although we are strongly supportive of companies’ incorporation of material E&S risks and opportunities in their long-term strategic planning, we believe that the inclusion of E&S metrics in compensation programs should be predicated on each company’s unique circumstances. In order to establish a meaningful link between pay and performance, companies must consider factors including their industry, size, risk profile, maturity, performance, financial condition, and any other relevant internal or external factors.





When a company is introducing E&S criteria into executive incentive plans, we believe it is important that companies provide shareholders with sufficient disclosure to allow them to understand how these criteria align with its strategy. Additionally, Glass Lewis recognizes that there may be situations where certain E&S performance criteria are reasonably viewed as prerequisites for executive performance, as opposed to behaviors and conditions that need to be incentivized. For example, we believe that shareholders should interrogate the use of metrics that award executives for ethical behavior or compliance with policies and regulations. It is our view that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that clearly lay out the rationale for selecting specific E&S metrics, the target-setting process, and corresponding payout opportunities. Further, particularly in the case of qualitative metrics, we believe that shareholders should be provided with a clear understanding of the basis on which the criteria will be assessed. Where quantitative targets have been set, we believe that shareholders are best served when these are disclosed on an ex-ante basis, or the board should outline why it believes it is unable to do so.

While we believe that companies should generally set long-term targets for their environmental and social ambitions, we are mindful that not all compensation schemes lend themselves to the inclusion of E&S metrics. We also are of the view that companies should retain flexibility in not only choosing to incorporate E&S metrics in their compensation plans, but also in the placement of these metrics. For example, some companies may resolve that including E&S criteria in the annual bonus may help to incentivize the achievement of short-term milestones and allow for more maneuverability in strategic adjustments to long-term goals. Other companies may determine that their long-term sustainability targets are best achieved by incentivizing executives through metrics included in their long-term incentive plans.


One-Time Awards

Glass Lewis believes shareholders should generally be wary of awards granted outside of the standard incentive schemes, as such awards have the potential to undermine the integrity of a company's regular incentive plans or the link between pay and performance, or both. We generally believe that if the existing incentive programs fail to provide adequate incentives to executives, companies should redesign their compensation programs rather than make additional grants.

However, we recognize that in certain circumstances, additional incentives may be appropriate. In these cases, companies should provide a thorough description of the awards, including a cogent and convincing explanation of their necessity and why existing awards do not provide sufficient motivation and a discussion of how the quantum of the award and its structure were determined. Further, such awards should be tied to future service and performance whenever possible.

Additionally, we believe companies making supplemental or one-time awards should also describe if and how the regular compensation arrangements will be affected by these additional grants. In reviewing a company's use of supplemental awards, Glass Lewis will evaluate the terms and size of the grants in the context of the company's overall incentive strategy and granting practices, as well as the current operating environment.





Contractual Payments and Arrangements

Beyond the quantum of contractual payments, Glass Lewis will also consider the design of any entitlements. Certain executive employment terms may help to drive a negative recommendation, including, but not limited to:

- Excessively broad change in control triggers;
- Inappropriate severance entitlements;
- Inadequately explained or excessive sign-on arrangements;
- Guaranteed bonuses (especially as a multiyear occurrence); and
- Failure to address any concerning practices in amended employment agreements.

In general, we are wary of terms that are excessively restrictive in favor of the executive, or that could potentially incentivize behaviors that are not in a company's best interest.

Sign-on Awards and Severance Benefits


We acknowledge that there may be certain costs associated with transitions at the executive level. In evaluating the size of severance and sign-on arrangements, we may consider the executive's regular target compensation level, or the sums paid to other executives (including the recipient's predecessor, where applicable) in evaluating the appropriateness of such an arrangement.

We believe sign-on arrangements should be clearly disclosed and accompanied by a meaningful explanation of the payments and the process by which the amounts were reached. Further, the details of and basis for any "make-whole" payments (paid as compensation for awards forfeited from a previous employer) should be provided.

With respect to severance, we believe companies should abide by predetermined payouts in most circumstances. While in limited circumstances some deviations may not be inappropriate, we believe shareholders should be provided with a meaningful explanation of any additional or increased benefits agreed upon outside of regular arrangements. However, where Glass Lewis determines that such predetermined payouts are particularly problematic or unfavorable to shareholders, we may consider the execution of such payments in a negative recommendation for the advisory vote on executive compensation.

In the U.S. market, most companies maintain severance entitlements based on a multiple of salary and, in many cases, bonus. In almost all instances we see, the relevant multiple is three or less, even in the case of a change in control. We believe the basis and total value of severance should be reasonable and should not exceed the upper limit of general market practice. We consider the inclusion of long-term incentives in cash severance calculations to be inappropriate, particularly given the commonality of accelerated vesting and the proportional weight of long-term incentives as a component of total pay. Additional considerations, however, will be accounted for when reviewing atypically structured compensation approaches.





Change in Control

Glass Lewis considers double-trigger change in control arrangements, which require both a change in control and termination or constructive termination, to be best practice. Any arrangement that is not explicitly double-trigger may be considered a single-trigger or modified single-trigger arrangement.

Further, we believe that excessively broad definitions of change in control are potentially problematic as they may lead to situations where executives receive additional compensation where no meaningful change in status or duties has occurred.

Excise Tax Gross-ups

Among other entitlements, Glass Lewis is strongly opposed to excise tax gross-ups related to IRC § 4999 and their expansion, especially where no consideration is given to the safe harbor limit. We believe that under no normal circumstance is the inclusion of excise tax gross-up provisions in new agreements or the addition of such provisions to amended agreements acceptable. In consideration of the fact that minor increases in change-in-control payments can lead to disproportionately large excise taxes, the potential negative impact of tax gross-ups far outweighs any retentive benefit.

Depending on the circumstances, the addition of new gross-ups around this excise tax may lead to negative recommendations for a company's say-on-pay proposal, the chair of the compensation committee, or the entire committee, particularly in cases where a company had committed not to provide any such entitlements in the future. For situations in which the addition of new excise tax gross-ups will be provided in connection with a specific change-in-control transaction, this policy may be applied to the say-on-pay proposal, the golden parachute proposal and recommendations related to the compensation committee for all involved corporate parties, as appropriate.


Amended Employment Agreements

Any contractual arrangements providing for problematic pay practices which are not addressed in materially amended employment agreements will potentially be viewed by Glass Lewis as a missed opportunity on the part of the company to align its policies with current best practices. Such problematic pay practices include, but are not limited to, excessive change in control entitlements, modified single-trigger change in control entitlements, excise tax gross-ups, and multi-year guaranteed awards.

Recoupment Provisions (Clawbacks)

On October 26, 2022, the SEC adopted Rule 10D-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The rule mandates national securities exchanges and associations to promulgate new listing standards requiring companies to maintain recoupment policies ("clawback provisions"). While the final rules will be effective 60 days after the date of publication in the federal register, listing standards may be effective as late as one year following such publication. Affected companies are provided with another 60 days following the listing standards' effective date to comply.





Despite the above timeline, Glass Lewis believes in the importance of such risk-mitigating provisions and their alignment with shareholder interests. Whether or not a company is affected by Rule 10D-1, during the intervening time between the final rule's announcement and the effective date of listing standards, we believe it is prudent for boards to adopt detailed variable compensation recoupment policies that, at a minimum, provide companies the ability to recover compensation from former and current named executive officers in the event of overpayment due to erroneous data that triggered an accounting restatement. For companies that will be subject to the new listing requirements and are yet to adopt clawback policies that exceed the standards set forth by Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, providing detailed disclosure in the proxy statement evidencing the board's proactive effort to ensure that the company will be in compliance may serve to mitigate concerns.

Notwithstanding the new rules, we are increasingly focusing attention on the specific terms of recoupment policies beyond whether a company maintains a clawback that simply satisfies the minimum legal requirements. We believe that clawbacks should be triggered, at a minimum, in the event of a restatement of financial results or similar revision of performance indicators upon which incentive awards were based. Such policies allow the board to review all performance-related bonuses and awards made to senior executives during a specified period and, to the extent feasible, allow the company to recoup such incentive pay where appropriate. However, some recoupment policies empower companies to recover compensation without regard to a restatement, such as those triggered by actions causing reputational harm. These may inform our overall view of the compensation program in future especially as market practice continues to evolve around expanded clawback authority.

Hedging of Stock


Glass Lewis believes that the hedging of shares by executives in the shares of the companies where they are employed severs the alignment of interests of the executive with shareholders. We believe companies should adopt strict policies to prohibit executives from hedging the economic risk associated with their share ownership in the company.

Pledging of Stock

Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should examine the facts and circumstances of each company rather than apply a one-size-fits-all policy regarding employee stock pledging. Glass Lewis believes that shareholders benefit when employees, particularly senior executives, have meaningful financial interest in the success of the company under their management, and therefore we recognize the benefits of measures designed to encourage employees to both buy shares out of their own pocket and to retain shares they have been granted; blanket policies prohibiting stock pledging may discourage executives and employees from doing either.

However, we also recognize that the pledging of shares can present a risk that, depending on a host of factors, an executive with significant pledged shares and limited other assets may have an incentive to take steps to avoid a forced sale of shares in the face of a rapid stock price decline. Therefore, to avoid substantial losses from a forced sale to meet the terms of the loan, the executive may have an incentive to boost the stock price in the short term in a manner that is unsustainable, thus hurting shareholders in the long-term. We also recognize concerns regarding pledging may not apply to less senior employees, given the latter group's significantly more limited influence over a company's stock price. Therefore, we believe that the issue of pledging shares should be reviewed in that context, as should policies that distinguish between the two groups.





Glass Lewis believes that the benefits of stock ownership by executives and employees may outweigh the risks of stock pledging, depending on many factors. As such, Glass Lewis reviews all relevant factors in evaluating proposed policies, limitations and prohibitions on pledging stock, including:

- The number of shares pledged;
- The percentage executives' pledged shares are of outstanding shares;
- The percentage executives' pledged shares are of each executive's shares and total assets;
- Whether the pledged shares were purchased by the employee or granted by the company;
- Whether there are different policies for purchased and granted shares;
- Whether the granted shares were time-based or performance-based;
- The overall governance profile of the company;
- The volatility of the company's stock (in order to determine the likelihood of a sudden stock price drop);
- The nature and cyclical, if applicable, of the company's industry;
- The participation and eligibility of executives and employees in pledging;
- The company's current policies regarding pledging and any waiver from these policies for employees and executives; and
- Disclosure of the extent of any pledging, particularly among senior executives.

Compensation Consultant Independence


As mandated by Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the SEC approved listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require compensation committees to consider six factors (<https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/33-9330.pdf>, p.31-32) in assessing compensation advisor independence. According to the SEC, "no one factor should be viewed as a determinative factor." Glass Lewis believes this six-factor assessment is an important process for every compensation committee to undertake but believes companies employing a consultant for board compensation, consulting and other corporate services should provide clear disclosure beyond just a reference to examining the six points, in order to allow shareholders to review the specific aspects of the various consultant relationships.

We believe compensation consultants are engaged to provide objective, disinterested, expert advice to the compensation committee. When the consultant or its affiliates receive substantial income from providing other services to the company, we believe the potential for a conflict of interest arises and the independence of the consultant may be jeopardized. Therefore, Glass Lewis will, when relevant, note the potential for a conflict of interest when the fees paid to the advisor or its affiliates for other services exceeds those paid for compensation consulting.

CEO Pay Ratio

As mandated by Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer and Protection Act, beginning in 2018, issuers will be required to disclose the median annual total compensation of all employees except the CEO, the total annual compensation of the CEO or equivalent position, and the ratio between the two amounts. Glass Lewis will display the pay ratio as a data point in our Proxy Papers, as available. While we recognize that the pay ratio has the potential to provide additional insight when assessing a company's pay practices, at this time it will not be a determinative factor in our voting recommendations.





Frequency of Say-on-Pay

The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to allow shareholders a non-binding vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes (i.e., every one, two or three years). Additionally, Dodd-Frank requires companies to hold such votes on the frequency of say-on-pay votes at least once every six years.

We believe companies should submit say-on-pay votes to shareholders every year. We believe that the time and financial burdens to a company with regard to an annual vote are relatively small and incremental and are outweighed by the benefits to shareholders through more frequent accountability. Implementing biannual or triennial votes on executive compensation limits shareholders' ability to hold the board accountable for its compensation practices through means other than voting against the compensation committee. Unless a company provides a compelling rationale or unique circumstances for say-on-pay votes less frequent than annually, we will generally recommend that shareholders support annual votes on compensation.

Vote on Golden Parachute Arrangements


The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to provide shareholders with a separate non-binding vote on approval of golden parachute compensation arrangements in connection with certain change-in-control transactions. However, if the golden parachute arrangements have previously been subject to a say-on-pay vote which shareholders approved, then this required vote is waived.

Glass Lewis believes the narrative and tabular disclosure of golden parachute arrangements benefits all shareholders. Glass Lewis analyzes each golden parachute arrangement on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, among other items: the nature of the change-in-control transaction, the ultimate value of the payments particularly compared to the value of the transaction, any excise tax gross-up obligations, the tenure and position of the executives in question before and after the transaction, any new or amended employment agreements entered into in connection with the transaction, and the type of triggers involved (i.e., single vs. double). In cases where new problematic features, such as excise tax gross-up obligations, are introduced in a golden parachute proposal, such features may contribute to a negative recommendation not only for the golden parachute proposal under review, but for the next say-on-pay proposal of any involved corporate parties, as well as recommendations against their compensation committee as appropriate.

Equity-Based Compensation Plan Proposals

We believe that equity compensation awards, when not abused, are useful for retaining employees and providing an incentive for them to act in a way that will improve company performance. Glass Lewis recognizes that equity-based compensation plans are critical components of a company's overall compensation program, and we analyze such plans accordingly based on both quantitative and qualitative factors.






Our quantitative analysis assesses the plan's cost and the company's pace of granting utilizing a number of different analyses, comparing the program with absolute limits we believe are key to equity value creation and with a carefully chosen peer group. In general, our model seeks to determine whether the proposed plan is either absolutely excessive or is more than one standard deviation away from the average plan for the peer group on a range of criteria, including dilution to shareholders and the projected annual cost relative to the company's financial performance. Each of the analyses (and their constituent parts) is weighted and the plan is scored in accordance with that weight.

We compare the program's expected annual expense with the business's operating metrics to help determine whether the plan is excessive in light of company performance. We also compare the plan's expected annual cost to the enterprise value of the firm rather than to market capitalization because the employees, managers and directors of the firm contribute to the creation of enterprise value but not necessarily market capitalization (the biggest difference is seen where cash represents the vast majority of market capitalization). Finally, we do not rely exclusively on relative comparisons with averages because, in addition to creeping averages serving to inflate compensation, we believe that some absolute limits are warranted.

We then consider qualitative aspects of the plan such as plan administration, the method and terms of exercise, repricing history, express or implied rights to reprice, and the presence of evergreen provisions. We also closely review the choice and use of, and difficulty in meeting, the awards' performance metrics and targets, if any. We believe significant changes to the terms of a plan should be explained for shareholders and clearly indicated. Other factors such as a company's size and operating environment may also be relevant in assessing the severity of concerns or the benefits of certain changes. Finally, we may consider a company's executive compensation practices in certain situations, as applicable.

We evaluate equity plans based on certain overarching principles:

- Companies should seek more shares only when needed;
- Requested share amounts or share reserves should be conservative in size so that companies must seek shareholder approval every three to four years (or more frequently);
- If a plan is relatively expensive, it should not grant options solely to senior executives and board members;
- Dilution of annual net share count or voting power, along with the "overhang" of incentive plans, should be limited;
- Annual cost of the plan (especially if not shown on the income statement) should be reasonable as a percentage of financial results and should be in line with the peer group;
- The expected annual cost of the plan should be proportional to the business's value;
- The intrinsic value that option grantees received in the past should be reasonable compared with the business's financial results;
- Plans should not permit re-pricing of stock options;
- Plans should not contain excessively liberal administrative or payment terms;
- Plans should not count shares in ways that understate the potential dilution, or cost, to common shareholders. This refers to "inverse" full-value award multipliers;
- Selected performance metrics should be challenging and appropriate, and should be subject to relative performance measurements; and



- Stock grants should be subject to minimum vesting and/or holding periods sufficient to ensure sustainable performance and promote retention.

Option Exchanges and Repricing

Glass Lewis is generally opposed to the repricing of employee and director options regardless of how it is accomplished. Employees should have some downside risk in their equity-based compensation program and repricing eliminates any such risk. As shareholders have substantial risk in owning stock, we believe that the equity compensation of employees and directors should be similarly situated to align their interests with those of shareholders. We believe this will facilitate appropriate risk- and opportunity-taking for the company by employees.

We are concerned that option grantees who believe they will be “rescued” from underwater options will be more inclined to take unjustifiable risks. Moreover, a predictable pattern of repricing or exchanges substantially alters a stock option’s value because options that will practically never expire deeply out of the money are worth far more than options that carry a risk of expiration.

In short, repricings and option exchange programs change the bargain between shareholders and employees after the bargain has been struck.


There is one circumstance in which a repricing or option exchange program may be acceptable: if macroeconomic or industry trends, rather than specific company issues, cause a stock’s value to decline dramatically and the repricing is necessary to motivate and retain employees. In viewing the company’s stock decline as part of a larger trend, we would expect the impact to approximately reflect the market or industry price decline in terms of timing and magnitude. In this circumstance, we think it fair to conclude that option grantees may be suffering from a risk that was not foreseeable when the original “bargain” was struck. In such a scenario, we may opt to support a repricing or option exchange program only if sufficient conditions are met. We are largely concerned with the inclusion of the following features:

- Officers and board members cannot participate in the program; and
- The exchange is value-neutral or value-creative to shareholders using very conservative assumptions.
- In our evaluation of the appropriateness of the program design, we also consider the inclusion of the following features:
- The vesting requirements on exchanged or repriced options are extended beyond one year;
- Shares reserved for options that are reacquired in an option exchange will permanently retire (i.e., will not be available for future grants) so as to prevent additional shareholder dilution in the future; and
- Management and the board make a cogent case for needing to motivate and retain existing employees, such as being in a competitive employment market.

Option Backdating, Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging

Glass Lewis views option backdating, and the related practices of spring-loading and bullet-dodging, as egregious actions that warrant holding the appropriate management and board members responsible. These practices are similar to repricing options and eliminate much of the downside risk inherent in an option grant that is designed to induce recipients to maximize shareholder return.





Backdating an option is the act of changing an option's grant date from the actual grant date to an earlier date when the market price of the underlying stock was lower, resulting in a lower exercise price for the option. In past studies, Glass Lewis identified over 270 companies that have disclosed internal or government investigations into their past stock-option grants.

Spring-loading is granting stock options while in possession of material, positive information that has not been disclosed publicly. Bullet-dodging is delaying the grants of stock options until after the release of material, negative information. This can allow option grants to be made at a lower price either before the release of positive news or following the release of negative news, assuming the stock's price will move up or down in response to the information. This raises a concern similar to that of insider trading, or the trading on material non-public information.

The exercise price for an option is determined on the day of grant, providing the recipient with the same market risk as an investor who bought shares on that date. However, where options were backdated, the executive or the board (or the compensation committee) changed the grant date retroactively. The new date may be at or near the lowest price for the year or period. This would be like allowing an investor to look back and select the lowest price of the year at which to buy shares.

A 2006 study of option grants made between 1996 and 2005 at 8,000 companies found that option backdating can be an indication of poor internal controls. The study found that option backdating was more likely to occur at companies without a majority independent board and with a long-serving CEO; both factors, the study concluded, were associated with greater CEO influence on the company's compensation and governance practices.⁴²


Where a company granted backdated options to an executive who is also a director, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against that executive/director, regardless of who decided to make the award. In addition, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against those directors who either approved or allowed the backdating. Glass Lewis feels that executives and directors who either benefited from backdated options or authorized the practice have failed to act in the best interests of shareholders.

Given the severe tax and legal liabilities to the company from backdating, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against members of the audit committee who served when options were backdated, a restatement occurs, material weaknesses in internal controls exist and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation. These committee members failed in their responsibility to ensure the integrity of the company's financial reports.

When a company has engaged in spring-loading or bullet-dodging, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against the compensation committee members where there has been a pattern of granting options at or near historic lows. Glass Lewis will also recommend voting against executives serving on the board who benefited from the spring-loading or bullet-dodging.

⁴² Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer. "LUCKY CEOs." November, 2006.





Director Compensation Plans

Glass Lewis believes that non-employee directors should receive reasonable and appropriate compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees. However, a balance is required. Fees should be competitive in order to retain and attract qualified individuals, but excessive fees represent a financial cost to the company and potentially compromise the objectivity and independence of non-employee directors. We will consider recommending support for compensation plans that include option grants or other equity-based awards that help to align the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders. However, to ensure directors are not incentivized in the same manner as executives but rather serve as a check on imprudent risk-taking in executive compensation plan design, equity grants to directors should not be performance-based. Where an equity plan exclusively or primarily covers non-employee directors as participants, we do not believe that the plan should provide for performance-based awards in any capacity.

When non-employee director equity grants are covered by the same equity plan that applies to a company's broader employee base, we will use our proprietary model and analyst review of this model to guide our voting recommendations. If such a plan broadly allows for performance-based awards to directors or explicitly provides for such grants, we may recommend against the overall plan on this basis, particularly if the company has granted performance-based awards to directors in past.


Employee Stock Purchase Plans

Glass Lewis believes that employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) can provide employees with a sense of ownership in their company and help strengthen the alignment between the interests of employees and shareholders. We evaluate ESPPs by assessing the expected discount, purchase period, expected purchase activity (if previous activity has been disclosed) and whether the plan has a "lookback" feature. Except for the most extreme cases, Glass Lewis will generally support these plans given the regulatory purchase limit of \$25,000 per employee per year, which we believe is reasonable. We also look at the number of shares requested to see if a ESPP will significantly contribute to overall shareholder dilution or if shareholders will not have a chance to approve the program for an excessive period of time. As such, we will generally recommend against ESPPs that contain "evergreen" provisions that automatically increase the number of shares available under the ESPP each year.

Executive Compensation Tax Deductibility — Amendment to IRC 162(M)

The "Tax Cut and Jobs Act" had significant implications on Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, a provision that allowed companies to deduct compensation in excess of \$1 million for the CEO and the next three most highly compensated executive officers, excluding the CFO, if the compensation is performance-based and is paid under shareholder-approved plans. Glass Lewis does not generally view amendments to equity plans and changes to compensation programs in response to the elimination of tax deductions under 162(m) as problematic. This specifically holds true if such modifications contribute to the maintenance of a sound performance-based compensation program.





As grandfathered contracts may continue to be eligible for tax deductions under the transition rule for Section 162(m), companies may therefore submit incentive plans for shareholder approval to take advantage of the tax deductibility afforded under 162(m) for certain types of compensation.


We believe the best practice for companies is to provide robust disclosure to shareholders so that they can make fully informed judgments about the reasonableness of the proposed compensation plan. To allow for meaningful shareholder review, we prefer that disclosure should include specific performance metrics, a maximum award pool, and a maximum award amount per employee. We also believe it is important to analyze the estimated grants to see if they are reasonable and in line with the company's peers.

We typically recommend voting against a 162(m) proposal where: (i) a company fails to provide at least a list of performance targets; (ii) a company fails to provide one of either a total maximum or an individual maximum; or (iii) the proposed plan or individual maximum award limit is excessive when compared with the plans of the company's peers.

The company's record of aligning pay with performance (as evaluated using our proprietary pay-for-performance model) also plays a role in our recommendation. Where a company has a record of setting reasonable pay relative to business performance, we generally recommend voting in favor of a plan even if the plan caps seem large relative to peers because we recognize the value in special pay arrangements for continued exceptional performance.

As with all other issues we review, our goal is to provide consistent but contextual advice given the specifics of the company and ongoing performance. Overall, we recognize that it is generally not in shareholders' best interests to vote against such a plan and forgo the potential tax benefit since shareholder rejection of such plans will not curtail the awards; it will only prevent the tax deduction associated with them.





Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise

Anti-Takeover Measures

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)

Glass Lewis believes that poison pill plans are not generally in shareholders' best interests. They can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. Rights plans can thus prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. Typically we recommend that shareholders vote against these plans to protect their financial interests and ensure that they have an opportunity to consider any offer for their shares, especially those at a premium.

We believe boards should be given wide latitude in directing company activities and in charting the company's course. However, on an issue such as this, where the link between the shareholders' financial interests and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is substantial, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether they support such a plan's implementation. This issue is different from other matters that are typically left to board discretion. Its potential impact on and relation to shareholders is direct and substantial. It is also an issue in which management interests may be different from those of shareholders; thus, ensuring that shareholders have a voice is the only way to safeguard their interests.


In certain circumstances, we will support a poison pill that is limited in scope to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable qualifying offer clause. We will consider supporting a poison pill plan if the qualifying offer clause includes each of the following attributes:

- The form of offer is not required to be an all-cash transaction;
- The offer is not required to remain open for more than 90 business days;
- The offeror is permitted to amend the offer, reduce the offer, or otherwise change the terms;
- There is no fairness opinion requirement; and
- There is a low to no premium requirement.

Where these requirements are met, we typically feel comfortable that shareholders will have the opportunity to voice their opinion on any legitimate offer.

NOL Poison Pills

Similarly, Glass Lewis may consider supporting a limited poison pill in the event that a company seeks shareholder approval of a rights plan for the express purpose of preserving Net Operating Losses (NOLs). While companies with NOLs can generally carry these losses forward to offset future taxable income, Section 382



of the Internal Revenue Code limits companies' ability to use NOLs in the event of a "change of ownership."⁴³ In this case, a company may adopt or amend a poison pill (NOL pill) in order to prevent an inadvertent change of ownership by multiple investors purchasing small chunks of stock at the same time, and thereby preserve the ability to carry the NOLs forward. Often such NOL pills have trigger thresholds much lower than the common 15% or 20% thresholds, with some NOL pill triggers as low as 5%.

Glass Lewis evaluates NOL pills on a strictly case-by-case basis taking into consideration, among other factors, the value of the NOLs to the company, the likelihood of a change of ownership based on the size of the holding and the nature of the larger shareholders, the trigger threshold and whether the term of the plan is limited in duration (i.e., whether it contains a reasonable "sunset" provision) or is subject to periodic board review and/ or shareholder ratification. In many cases, companies will propose the adoption of bylaw amendments specifically restricting certain share transfers, in addition to proposing the adoption of a NOL pill. In general, if we support the terms of a particular NOL pill, we will generally support the additional protective amendment in the absence of significant concerns with the specific terms of that proposal.

Furthermore, we believe that shareholders should be offered the opportunity to vote on any adoption or renewal of a NOL pill regardless of any potential tax benefit that it offers a company. As such, we will consider recommending voting against those members of the board who served at the time when an NOL pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months and where the NOL pill is not subject to shareholder ratification.

Fair Price Provisions


Fair price provisions, which are rare, require that certain minimum price and procedural requirements be observed by any party that acquires more than a specified percentage of a corporation's common stock. The provision is intended to protect minority shareholder value when an acquirer seeks to accomplish a merger or other transaction which would eliminate or change the interests of the minority shareholders. The provision is generally applied against the acquirer unless the takeover is approved by a majority of "continuing directors" and holders of a majority, in some cases a supermajority as high as 80%, of the combined voting power of all stock entitled to vote to alter, amend, or repeal the above provisions.

The effect of a fair price provision is to require approval of any merger or business combination with an "interested shareholder" by 51% of the voting stock of the company, excluding the shares held by the interested shareholder. An interested shareholder is generally considered to be a holder of 10% or more of the company's outstanding stock, but the trigger can vary.

Generally, provisions are put in place for the ostensible purpose of preventing a back-end merger where the interested shareholder would be able to pay a lower price for the remaining shares of the company than he or she paid to gain control. The effect of a fair price provision on shareholders, however, is to limit their ability to gain a premium for their shares through a partial tender offer or open market acquisition which typically raise the share price, often significantly. A fair price provision discourages such transactions because of the potential costs of seeking shareholder approval and because of the restrictions on purchase price for completing a merger or other transaction at a later time.

⁴³ Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code refers to a "change of ownership" of more than 50 percentage points by one or more 5% shareholders within a three-year period. The statute is intended to deter the "trafficking" of net operating losses.





Glass Lewis believes that fair price provisions, while sometimes protecting shareholders from abuse in a takeover situation, more often act as an impediment to takeovers, potentially limiting gains to shareholders from a variety of transactions that could significantly increase share price. In some cases, even the independent directors of the board cannot make exceptions when such exceptions may be in the best interests of shareholders. Given the existence of state law protections for minority shareholders such as Section 203 of the Delaware Corporations Code, we believe it is in the best interests of shareholders to remove fair price provisions.

Quorum Requirements

Glass Lewis believes that a company's quorum requirement should be set at a level high enough to ensure that a broad range of shareholders are represented in person or by proxy, but low enough that the company can transact necessary business. Companies in the U.S. are generally subject to quorum requirements under the laws of their specific state of incorporation. Additionally, those companies listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market are required to specify a quorum in their bylaws, provided however that such quorum may not be less than one-third of outstanding shares. Prior to 2013, the New York Stock Exchange required a quorum of 50% for listed companies, although this requirement was dropped in recognition of individual state requirements and potential confusion for issuers. Delaware, for example, required companies to provide for a quorum of no less than one-third of outstanding shares; otherwise such quorum shall default to a majority.

We generally believe a majority of outstanding shares entitled to vote is an appropriate quorum for the transaction of business at shareholder meetings. However, should a company seek shareholder approval of a lower quorum requirement we will generally support a reduced quorum of at least one-third of shares entitled to vote, either in person or by proxy. When evaluating such proposals, we also consider the specific facts and circumstances of the company, such as size and shareholder base.


Director and Officer Indemnification

While Glass Lewis strongly believes that directors and officers should be held to the highest standard when carrying out their duties to shareholders, some protection from liability is reasonable to protect them against certain suits so that these officers feel comfortable taking measured risks that may benefit shareholders. As such, we find it appropriate for a company to provide indemnification and/or enroll in liability insurance to cover its directors and officers so long as the terms of such agreements are reasonable.

Officer Exculpation

In August 2022, the Delaware General Assembly amended Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") to authorize corporations to adopt a provision in their certificate of incorporation to eliminate or limit monetary liability of certain corporate officers for breach of fiduciary duty of care. Previously, the DGCL allowed only exculpation of corporate directors from breach of fiduciary duty of care claims if the corporation's certificate of incorporation includes an exculpation provision.





The amendment authorizes corporations to provide for exculpation of the following officers: (i) the corporation's president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, chief legal officer, controller, treasurer or chief accounting officer, (ii) "named executive officers" identified in the corporation's SEC filings, and (iii) individuals who have agreed to be identified as officers of the corporation.

Corporate exculpation provisions under the DGCL only apply to claims for breach of the duty of care, and not to breaches of the duty of loyalty. Exculpation provisions also do not apply to acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve intentional misconduct, knowing violations of the law, or transactions involving the receipt of any improper personal benefits. Furthermore, officers may not be exculpated from claims brought against them by, or in the right of, the corporation (i.e., derivative actions).

Under Section 102(b)(7), a corporation must affirmatively elect to include an exculpation provision in its certificate of incorporation. We will closely evaluate proposals to adopt officer exculpation provisions on a case-by-case basis. We will generally recommend voting against such proposals eliminating monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care for certain corporate officers, unless compelling rationale for the adoption is provided by the board, and the provisions are reasonable.


Reincorporation

In general, Glass Lewis believes that the board is in the best position to determine the appropriate jurisdiction of incorporation for the company. When examining a management proposal to reincorporate to a different state or country, we review the relevant financial benefits, generally related to improved corporate tax treatment, as well as changes in corporate governance provisions, especially those relating to shareholder rights, resulting from the change in domicile. Where the financial benefits are de minimis and there is a decrease in shareholder rights, we will recommend voting against the transaction.

However, costly, shareholder-initiated reincorporations are typically not the best route to achieve the furtherance of shareholder rights. We believe shareholders are generally better served by proposing specific shareholder resolutions addressing pertinent issues which may be implemented at a lower cost, and perhaps even with board approval. However, when shareholders propose a shift into a jurisdiction with enhanced shareholder rights, Glass Lewis examines the significant ways would the company benefit from shifting jurisdictions including the following:

- Is the board sufficiently independent?
- Does the company have anti-takeover protections such as a poison pill or classified board in place?
- Has the board been previously unresponsive to shareholders (such as failing to implement a shareholder proposal that received majority shareholder support)?
- Do shareholders have the right to call special meetings of shareholders?
- Are there other material governance issues of concern at the company?
- Has the company's performance matched or exceeded its peers in the past one and three years?
- How has the company ranked in Glass Lewis' pay-for-performance analysis during the last three years?
- Does the company have an independent chair?





We note, however, that we will only support shareholder proposals to change a company's place of incorporation in exceptional circumstances.

Exclusive Forum and Fee-Shifting Bylaw Provisions

Glass Lewis recognizes that companies may be subject to frivolous and opportunistic lawsuits, particularly in conjunction with a merger or acquisition, that are expensive and distracting. In response, companies have sought ways to prevent or limit the risk of such suits by adopting bylaws regarding where the suits must be brought or shifting the burden of the legal expenses to the plaintiff, if unsuccessful at trial.

Glass Lewis believes that charter or bylaw provisions limiting a shareholder's choice of legal venue are not in the best interests of shareholders. Such clauses may effectively discourage the use of shareholder claims by increasing their associated costs and making them more difficult to pursue. As such, shareholders should be wary about approving any limitation on their legal recourse including limiting themselves to a single jurisdiction (e.g., Delaware or federal courts for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933) without compelling evidence that it will benefit shareholders.

For this reason, we recommend that shareholders vote against any bylaw or charter amendment seeking to adopt an exclusive forum provision unless the company: (i) provides a compelling argument on why the provision would directly benefit shareholders; (ii) provides evidence of abuse of legal process in other, non- favored jurisdictions; (iii) narrowly tailors such provision to the risks involved; and (iv) maintains a strong record of good corporate governance practices.

Moreover, in the event a board seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal, we will weigh the importance of the other bundled provisions when determining the vote recommendation on the proposal. We will nonetheless recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee for bundling disparate proposals into a single proposal (refer to our discussion of nominating and governance committee performance in Section I of the guidelines).

Similarly, some companies have adopted bylaws requiring plaintiffs who sue the company and fail to receive a judgment in their favor pay the legal expenses of the company. These bylaws, also known as "fee-shifting" or "loser pays" bylaws, will likely have a chilling effect on even meritorious shareholder lawsuits as shareholders would face an strong financial disincentive not to sue a company. Glass Lewis therefore strongly opposes the adoption of such fee-shifting bylaws and, if adopted without shareholder approval, will recommend voting against the governance committee. While we note that in June of 2015 the State of Delaware banned the adoption of fee-shifting bylaws, such provisions could still be adopted by companies incorporated in other states.

Authorized Shares

Glass Lewis believes that adequate capital stock is important to a company's operation. When analyzing a request for additional shares, we typically review four common reasons why a company might need additional capital stock:





1. **Stock Split** — We typically consider three metrics when evaluating whether we think a stock split is likely or necessary: The historical stock pre-split price, if any; the current price relative to the company's most common trading price over the past 52 weeks; and some absolute limits on stock price that, in our view, either always make a stock split appropriate if desired by management or would almost never be a reasonable price at which to split a stock.
2. **Shareholder Defenses** — Additional authorized shares could be used to bolster takeover defenses such as a poison pill. Proxy filings often discuss the usefulness of additional shares in defending against or discouraging a hostile takeover as a reason for a requested increase. Glass Lewis is typically against such defenses and will oppose actions intended to bolster such defenses.
3. **Financing for Acquisitions** — We look at whether the company has a history of using stock for acquisitions and attempt to determine what levels of stock have typically been required to accomplish such transactions. Likewise, we look to see whether this is discussed as a reason for additional shares in the proxy.
4. **Financing for Operations** — We review the company's cash position and its ability to secure financing through borrowing or other means. We look at the company's history of capitalization and whether the company has had to use stock in the recent past as a means of raising capital.

Issuing additional shares generally dilutes existing holders in most circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. Accordingly, where we find that the company has not detailed a plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, we typically recommend against the authorization of additional shares. Similar concerns may also lead us to recommend against a proposal to conduct a reverse stock split if the board does not state that it will reduce the number of authorized common shares in a ratio proportionate to the split.


With regard to authorizations and/or increases in preferred shares, Glass Lewis is generally against such authorizations, which allow the board to determine the preferences, limitations and rights of the preferred shares (known as "blank-check preferred stock"). We believe that granting such broad discretion should be of concern to common shareholders, since blank-check preferred stock could be used as an anti-takeover device or in some other fashion that adversely affects the voting power or financial interests of common shareholders. Therefore, we will generally recommend voting against such requests, unless the company discloses a commitment to not use such shares as an anti-takeover defense or in a shareholder rights plan, or discloses a commitment to submit any shareholder rights plan to a shareholder vote prior to its adoption.

While we think that having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical, we prefer that, for significant transactions, management come to shareholders to justify their use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of a large pool of unallocated shares available for any purpose.

Advance Notice Requirements

We typically recommend that shareholders vote against proposals that would require advance notice of shareholder proposals or of director nominees.





These proposals typically attempt to require a certain amount of notice before shareholders are allowed to place proposals on the ballot. Notice requirements typically range between three to six months prior to the annual meeting. Advance notice requirements typically make it impossible for a shareholder who misses the deadline to present a shareholder proposal or a director nominee that might be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.

We believe shareholders should be able to review and vote on all proposals and director nominees. Shareholders can always vote against proposals that appear with little prior notice. Shareholders, as owners of a business, are capable of identifying issues on which they have sufficient information and ignoring issues on which they have insufficient information. Setting arbitrary notice restrictions limits the opportunity for shareholders to raise issues that may come up after the window closes.

Virtual Shareholder Meetings


A growing contingent of companies have elected to hold shareholder meetings by virtual means only. Glass Lewis believes that virtual meeting technology can be a useful complement to a traditional, in-person shareholder meeting by expanding participation of shareholders who are unable to attend a shareholder meeting in person (i.e. a “hybrid meeting”). However, we also believe that virtual-only meetings have the potential to curb the ability of a company’s shareholders to meaningfully communicate with the company’s management.

Prominent shareholder rights advocates, including the Council of Institutional Investors, have expressed concerns that such virtual-only meetings do not approximate an in-person experience and may serve to reduce the board’s accountability to shareholders. When analyzing the governance profile of companies that choose to hold virtual-only meetings, we look for robust disclosure in a company’s proxy statement which assures shareholders that they will be afforded the same rights and opportunities to participate as they would at an in-person meeting.

Examples of effective disclosure include: (i) addressing the ability of shareholders to ask questions during the meeting, including time guidelines for shareholder questions, rules around what types of questions are allowed, and rules for how questions and comments will be recognized and disclosed to meeting participants; (ii) procedures, if any, for posting appropriate questions received during the meeting and the company’s answers, on the investor page of their website as soon as is practical after the meeting; (iii) addressing technical and logistical issues related to accessing the virtual meeting platform; and (iv) procedures for accessing technical support to assist in the event of any difficulties accessing the virtual meeting.

We will generally recommend voting against members of the governance committee where the board is planning to hold a virtual-only shareholder meeting and the company does not provide such disclosure.





Voting Structure

Multi-Class Share Structures

Glass Lewis believes multi-class voting structures are typically not in the best interests of common shareholders. Allowing one vote per share generally operates as a safeguard for common shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares are able to weigh in on issues set forth by the board.

Furthermore, we believe that the economic stake of each shareholder should match their voting power and that no small group of shareholders, family or otherwise, should have voting rights different from those of other shareholders. On matters of governance and shareholder rights, we believe shareholders should have the power to speak and the opportunity to effect change. That power should not be concentrated in the hands of a few for reasons other than economic stake.

We generally consider a multi-class share structure to reflect negatively on a company's overall corporate governance. Because we believe that companies should have share capital structures that protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders as well as any controlling entity, we typically recommend that shareholders vote in favor of recapitalization proposals to eliminate dual-class share structures. Similarly, we will generally recommend against proposals to adopt a new class of common stock. We will generally recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less).


In the case of a board that adopts a multi-class share structure in connection with an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting the multi-class structure to a shareholder vote at the company's first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class structure (generally seven years or less). If the multi-class share structure is put to a shareholder vote, we will examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining the vote outcome.

At companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. In the case of companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will generally examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders on a "one share, one vote" basis. At controlled and multi-class companies, when at least 20% or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness, and when a majority or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and provide a more robust response to fully address shareholder concerns.

Cumulative Voting

Cumulative voting increases the ability of minority shareholders to elect a director by allowing shareholders to cast as many shares of the stock they own multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. As companies





generally have multiple nominees up for election, cumulative voting allows shareholders to cast all of their votes for a single nominee, or a smaller number of nominees than up for election, thereby raising the likelihood of electing one or more of their preferred nominees to the board. It can be important when a board is controlled by insiders or affiliates and where the company's ownership structure includes one or more shareholders who control a majority-voting block of company stock.

Glass Lewis believes that cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a candidate of their choosing to the board. This allows the creation of boards that are responsive to the interests of all shareholders rather than just a small group of large holders.

We review cumulative voting proposals on a case-by-case basis, factoring in the independence of the board and the status of the company's governance structure. But we typically find these proposals on ballots at companies where independence is lacking and where the appropriate checks and balances favoring shareholders are not in place. In those instances we typically recommend in favor of cumulative voting.

Where a company has adopted a true majority vote standard (i.e., where a director must receive a majority of votes cast to be elected, as opposed to a modified policy indicated by a resignation policy only), Glass Lewis will recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals due to the incompatibility of the two election methods. For companies that have not adopted a true majority voting standard but have adopted some form of majority voting, Glass Lewis will also generally recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals if the company has not adopted anti-takeover protections and has been responsive to shareholders.


Where a company has not adopted a majority voting standard and is facing both a shareholder proposal to adopt majority voting and a shareholder proposal to adopt cumulative voting, Glass Lewis will support only the majority voting proposal. When a company has both majority voting and cumulative voting in place, there is a higher likelihood of one or more directors not being elected as a result of not receiving a majority vote. This is because shareholders exercising the right to cumulate their votes could unintentionally cause the failed election of one or more directors for whom shareholders do not cumulate votes.

Supermajority Vote Requirements

Glass Lewis believes that supermajority vote requirements impede shareholder action on ballot items critical to shareholder interests. An example is in the takeover context, where supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit the voice of shareholders in making decisions on such crucial matters as selling the business. This in turn degrades share value and can limit the possibility of buyout premiums to shareholders. Moreover, we believe that a supermajority vote requirement can enable a small group of shareholders to overrule the will of the majority shareholders. We believe that a simple majority is appropriate to approve all matters presented to shareholders.

Transaction of Other Business

We typically recommend that shareholders not give their proxy to management to vote on any other business items that may properly come before an annual or special meeting. In our opinion, granting unfettered discretion is unwise.



Anti-Greenmail Proposals

Glass Lewis will support proposals to adopt a provision preventing the payment of greenmail, which would serve to prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a certain shareholder. Since a large or majority shareholder could attempt to compel a board into purchasing its shares at a large premium, the anti-greenmail provision would generally require that a majority of shareholders other than the majority shareholder approve the buyback.

Mutual Funds: Investment Policies and Advisory Agreements

Glass Lewis believes that decisions about a fund's structure and/or a fund's relationship with its investment advisor or sub-advisors are generally best left to management and the members of the board, absent a showing of egregious or illegal conduct that might threaten shareholder value. As such, we focus our analyses of such proposals on the following main areas:

- The terms of any amended advisory or sub-advisory agreement;
- Any changes in the fee structure paid to the investment advisor; and
- Any material changes to the fund's investment objective or strategy.


We generally support amendments to a fund's investment advisory agreement absent a material change that is not in the best interests of shareholders. A significant increase in the fees paid to an investment advisor would be reason for us to consider recommending voting against a proposed amendment to an investment advisory agreement or fund reorganization. However, in certain cases, we are more inclined to support an increase in advisory fees if such increases result from being performance-based rather than asset-based. Furthermore, we generally support sub-advisory agreements between a fund's advisor and sub-advisor, primarily because the fees received by the sub-advisor are paid by the advisor, and not by the fund.

In matters pertaining to a fund's investment objective or strategy, we believe shareholders are best served when a fund's objective or strategy closely resembles the investment discipline shareholders understood and selected when they initially bought into the fund. As such, we generally recommend voting against amendments to a fund's investment objective or strategy when the proposed changes would leave shareholders with stakes in a fund that is noticeably different than when originally purchased, and which could therefore potentially negatively impact some investors' diversification strategies.

Real Estate Investment Trusts

The complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) provide for a unique shareholder evaluation. In simple terms, a REIT must have a minimum of 100 shareholders (the 100 Shareholder Test) and no more than 50% of the value of its shares can be held by five or fewer individuals (the "5/50 Test"). At least 75% of a REITs' assets must be in real estate, it must derive 75% of its gross income from rents or mortgage interest, and it must pay out 90% of its taxable earnings as dividends. In addition, as a publicly traded security listed on a stock exchange, a REIT must comply with the same general listing requirements as a publicly traded equity.





In order to comply with such requirements, REITs typically include percentage ownership limitations in their organizational documents, usually in the range of 5% to 10% of the REITs outstanding shares. Given the complexities of REITs as an asset class, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach in our evaluation of REIT proposals, especially regarding changes in authorized share capital, including preferred stock.

Preferred Stock Issuances at REITs

Glass Lewis is generally against the authorization of “blank-check preferred stock.” However, given the requirement that a REIT must distribute 90% of its net income annually, it is inhibited from retaining capital to make investments in its business. As such, we recognize that equity financing likely plays a key role in a REIT’s growth and creation of shareholder value. Moreover, shareholder concern regarding the use of preferred stock as an anti-takeover mechanism may be allayed by the fact that most REITs maintain ownership limitations in their certificates of incorporation. For these reasons, along with the fact that REITs typically do not engage in private placements of preferred stock (which result in the rights of common shareholders being adversely impacted), we may support requests to authorize shares of blank-check preferred stock at REITs.


Business Development Companies

Business Development Companies (BDCs) were created by the U.S. Congress in 1980; they are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and are taxed as regulated investment companies (RICs) under the Internal Revenue Code. BDCs typically operate as publicly traded private equity firms that invest in early stage to mature private companies as well as small public companies. BDCs realize operating income when their investments are sold off, and therefore maintain complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements that are similar to those of REITs—the most evident of which is that BDCs must distribute at least 90% of their taxable earnings as dividends.

Authorization to Sell Shares at a Price Below Net Asset Value

Considering that BDCs are required to distribute nearly all their earnings to shareholders, they sometimes need to offer additional shares of common stock in the public markets to finance operations and acquisitions. However, shareholder approval is required in order for a BDC to sell shares of common stock at a price below Net Asset Value (NAV). Glass Lewis evaluates these proposals using a case-by-case approach, but will recommend supporting such requests if the following conditions are met:

- The authorization to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date of one year or less from the date that shareholders approve the underlying proposal (i.e. the meeting date);
- The proposed discount below NAV is minimal (ideally no greater than 20%);
- The board specifies that the issuance will have a minimal or modest dilutive effect (ideally no greater than 25% of the company’s then-outstanding common stock prior to the issuance); and
- A majority of the company’s independent directors who do not have a financial interest in the issuance approve the sale.



In short, we believe BDCs should demonstrate a responsible approach to issuing shares below NAV, by proactively addressing shareholder concerns regarding the potential dilution of the requested share issuance, and explaining if and how the company's past below-NAV share issuances have benefitted the company.

Auditor Ratification and Below-NAV Issuances

When a BDC submits a below-NAV issuance for shareholder approval, we will refrain from recommending against the audit committee chair for not including auditor ratification on the same ballot. Because of the unique way these proposals interact, votes may be tabulated in a manner that is not in shareholders' interests. In cases where these proposals appear on the same ballot, auditor ratification is generally the only "routine proposal," the presence of which triggers a scenario where broker non-votes may be counted toward shareholder quorum, with unintended consequences.

Under the 1940 Act, below-NAV issuance proposals require relatively high shareholder approval. Specifically, these proposals must be approved by the lesser of: (i) 67% of votes cast if a majority of shares are represented at the meeting; or (ii) a majority of outstanding shares. Meanwhile, any broker non-votes counted toward quorum will automatically be registered as "against" votes for purposes of this proposal. The unintended result can be a case where the issuance proposal is not approved, despite sufficient voting shares being cast in favor. Because broker non-votes result from a lack of voting instruction by the shareholder, we do not believe shareholders' ability to weigh in on the selection of auditor outweighs the consequences of failing to approve an issuance proposal due to such technicality.


Special Purpose Acquisition Companies

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), also known as "blank check companies," are publicly traded entities with no commercial operations and are formed specifically to pool funds in order to complete a merger or acquisition within a set time frame. In general, the acquisition target of a SPAC is either not yet identified or otherwise not explicitly disclosed to the public even when the founders of the SPAC may have at least one target in mind. Consequently, IPO investors often do not know what company they will ultimately be investing in.

SPACs are therefore very different from typical operating companies. Shareholders do not have the same expectations associated with an ordinary publicly traded company and executive officers of a SPAC typically do not continue in employment roles with an acquired company.

Extension of Business Combination Deadline

Governing documents of SPACs typically provide for the return of IPO proceeds to common shareholders if no qualifying business combination is consummated before a certain date. Because the time frames for the consummation of such transactions are relatively short, SPACs will sometimes hold special shareholder meetings at which shareholders are asked to extend the business combination deadline. In such cases, an acquisition target will typically have been identified, but additional time is required to allow management of the SPAC to finalize the terms of the deal.



Glass Lewis believes management and the board are generally in the best position to determine when the extension of a business combination deadline is needed. We therefore generally defer to the recommendation of management and support reasonable extension requests.

SPAC Board Independence

The board of directors of a SPAC's acquisition target is in many cases already established prior to the business combination. In some cases, however, the board's composition may change in connection with the business combination, including the potential addition of individuals who served in management roles with the SPAC. The role of a SPAC executive is unlike that of a typical operating company executive. Because the SPAC's only business is identifying and executing an acquisition deal, the interests of a former SPAC executive are also different. Glass Lewis does not automatically consider a former SPAC executive to be affiliated with the acquired operating entity when their only position on the board of the combined entity is that of an otherwise independent director. Absent any evidence of an employment relationship or continuing material financial interest in the combined entity, we will therefore consider such directors to be independent.

Director Commitments of SPAC Executives

We believe the primary role of executive officers at SPACs is identifying acquisition targets for the SPAC and consummating a business combination. Given the nature of these executive roles and the limited business operations of SPACs, when a directors' only executive role is at a SPAC, we will generally apply our higher limit for company directorships. As a result, we generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves in an executive role only at a SPAC while serving on more than five public company boards.

Shareholder Proposals

Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders, support effective ESG oversight and reporting, and encourage director accountability. Accordingly, Glass Lewis places a significant emphasis on promoting transparency, robust governance structures and companies' responsiveness to and engagement with shareholders. We also believe that companies should be transparent on how they are mitigating material ESG risks, including those related to climate change, human capital management, and stakeholder relations.

To that end, we evaluate all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis with a view to promoting long-term shareholder value. While we are generally supportive of those that promote board accountability, shareholder rights, and transparency, we consider all proposals in the context of a company's unique operations and risk profile.

For a detailed review of our policies concerning compensation, environmental, social, and governance shareholder proposals, please refer to our comprehensive *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives*, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.





Overall Approach to Environmental, Social & Governance Issues

Glass Lewis evaluates all environmental and social issues through the lens of long-term shareholder value. We believe that companies should be considering material environmental and social factors in all aspects of their operations and that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that allow them to understand how these factors are being considered and how attendant risks are being mitigated. We also are of the view that governance is a critical factor in how companies manage environmental and social risks and opportunities and that a well-governed company will be generally managing these issues better than one without a governance structure that promotes board independence and accountability.

We believe part of the board's role is to ensure that management conducts a complete risk analysis of company operations, including those that have material environmental and social implications. We believe that directors should monitor management's performance in both capitalizing on environmental and social opportunities and mitigating environmental and social risks related to operations in order to best serve the interests of shareholders. Companies face significant financial, legal and reputational risks resulting from poor environmental and social practices, or negligent oversight thereof. Therefore, in cases where the board or management has neglected to take action on a pressing issue that could negatively impact shareholder value, we believe that shareholders should take necessary action in order to effect changes that will safeguard their financial interests.


Given the importance of the role of the board in executing a sustainable business strategy that allows for the realization of environmental and social opportunities and the mitigation of related risks, relating to environmental risks and opportunities, we believe shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders and promote director accountability. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental or social risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental and social risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. In such instances, we will generally recommend against responsible members of the board that are specifically charged with oversight of the issue in question.

When evaluating environmental and social factors that may be relevant to a given company, Glass Lewis does so in the context of the financial materiality of the issue to the company's operations. We believe that all companies face risks associated with environmental and social issues. However, we recognize that these risks manifest themselves differently at each company as a result of a company's operations, workforce, structure, and geography, among other factors. Accordingly, we place a significant emphasis on the financial implications of a company's actions with regard to impacts on its stakeholders and the environment.

When evaluating environmental and social issues, Glass Lewis examines companies':

Direct environmental and social risk — Companies should evaluate financial exposure to direct environmental risks associated with their operations. Examples of direct environmental risks include those associated with oil or gas spills, contamination, hazardous leakages, explosions, or reduced water or air quality, among others. Social risks may include non-inclusive employment policies, inadequate human rights policies, or issues that





adversely affect the company's stakeholders. Further, we believe that firms should consider their exposure to risks emanating from a broad range of issues, over which they may have no or only limited control, such as insurance companies being affected by increased storm severity and frequency resulting from climate change or membership in trade associations with controversial political ties.


Risk due to legislation and regulation — Companies should evaluate their exposure to changes or potential changes in regulation that affect current and planned operations. Regulation should be carefully monitored in all jurisdictions in which the company operates. We look closely at relevant and proposed legislation and evaluate whether the company has responded proactively.

Legal and reputational risk — Failure to take action on important environmental or social issues may carry the risk of inciting negative publicity and potentially costly litigation. While the effect of high-profile campaigns on shareholder value may not be directly measurable, we believe it is prudent for companies to carefully evaluate the potential impacts of the public perception of their impacts on stakeholders and the environment. When considering investigations and lawsuits, Glass Lewis is mindful that such matters may involve unadjudicated allegations or other charges that have not been resolved. Glass Lewis does not assume the truth of such allegations or charges or that the law has been violated. Instead, Glass Lewis focuses more broadly on whether, under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the nature and number of such concerns, lawsuits or investigations reflects on the risk profile of the company or suggests that appropriate risk mitigation measures may be warranted.

Governance risk — Inadequate oversight of environmental and social issues carries significant risks to companies. When leadership is ineffective or fails to thoroughly consider potential risks, such risks are likely unmitigated and could thus present substantial risks to the company, ultimately leading to loss of shareholder value.

Glass Lewis believes that one of the most crucial factors in analyzing the risks presented to companies in the form of environmental and social issues is the level and quality of oversight over such issues. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. When companies have not provided for explicit, board-level oversight of environmental and social matters and/or when a substantial environmental or social risk has been ignored or inadequately addressed, we may recommend voting against members of the board. In addition, or alternatively, depending on the proposals presented, we may also consider recommending voting in favor of relevant shareholder proposals or against other relevant management-proposed items, such as the ratification of auditor, a company's accounts and reports, or ratification of management and board acts.





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
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APPENDIX B – DESCRIPTION OF SECURITIES RATINGS

Corporate and Municipal Long-Term Bond Ratings

Standard & Poor's ("S&P") Corporate and Municipal Long-Term Bond Ratings:

The following descriptions of S&P's long-term corporate and municipal bond ratings have been published by Standard & Poor's Financial Service LLC.

AAA - An obligation rated 'AAA' has the highest rating assigned by S&P. The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is extremely strong.

AA - An obligation rated 'AA' differs from the highest-rated obligations only to a small degree. The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is very strong.

A - An obligation rated 'A' is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. However, the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is still strong.

BBB - An obligation rated 'BBB' exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.

BB, B, CCC, CC, and C - Obligations rated 'BB', 'B', 'CCC', 'CC', and 'C' are regarded as having significant speculative characteristics. 'BB' indicates the least degree of speculation and 'C' the highest. While such obligations will likely have some quality and protective characteristics, these may be outweighed by large uncertainties or major exposures to adverse conditions.

BB - An obligation rated 'BB' is less vulnerable to nonpayment than other speculative issues. However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions which could lead to the obligor's inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.

B - An obligation rated 'B' is more vulnerable to nonpayment than obligations rated 'BB', but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely impair the obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.

CCC - An obligation rated 'CCC' is currently vulnerable to nonpayment, and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. In the event of adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, the obligor is not likely to have the capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.

CC - An obligation rated 'CC' is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment.

C - A 'C' rating is assigned to obligations that are currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment, obligations that have payment arrearages allowed by the terms of the documents, or obligations of an issuer that is the subject of a bankruptcy petition or similar action which have not experienced a payment default. Among others, the 'C' rating may be assigned to subordinated debt, preferred stock or other obligations on which cash payments have been suspended in accordance with the instrument's terms or when preferred stock is the subject of a distressed exchange offer, whereby some or all of the issue is either repurchased for an amount of cash or replaced by other instruments having a total value that is less than par.

D - An obligation rated 'D' is in payment default. The 'D' rating category is used when payments on an obligation, including a regulatory capital instrument, are not made on the date due even if the applicable grace period has not expired, unless Standard & Poor's believes that such payments will be made during such grace period. The 'D' rating also will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of similar action if payments on an obligation are jeopardized. An obligation's rating is lowered to 'D' upon completion of a distressed exchange offer, whereby some or all of the issue is either repurchased for an amount of cash or replaced by other instruments having a total value that is less than par.

Plus (+) or Minus (-) - The ratings from 'AA' to 'CCC' may be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative standing within the major rating categories.

NR - This indicates that a rating has not been assigned or is no longer assigned.

Moody's Investors Service, Inc. ("Moody's") Long-Term Corporate Bond Ratings:

The following descriptions of Moody's long-term corporate bond ratings have been published by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Moody's Analytics Inc.

Aaa - Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, with minimal credit risk.

Aa - Obligations rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low credit risk.

A - Obligations rated A are considered upper-medium grade and are subject to low credit risk.

Baa - Obligations rated Baa are subject to moderate credit risk. They are considered medium-grade and as such may possess certain speculative characteristics.

Ba - Obligations rated Ba are judged to have speculative elements and are subject to substantial credit risk.

B - Obligations rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk.

Caa - Obligations rated Caa are judged to be speculative of poor standing and are subject to very high credit risk.

Ca - Obligations rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default, with some prospect of recovery of principal and interest.

C - Obligations rated C are the lowest rated class of bonds and are typically in default, with little prospect for recovery of principal or interest.

Modifiers: Moody's appends numerical modifiers 1, 2, and 3 to each generic rating classification from Aa through Caa.

The modifier 1 indicates that the obligation ranks in the higher end of its generic rating category; the modifier 2 indicates a mid-range ranking; and the modifier 3 indicates a ranking in the lower end of that generic rating category.

Additionally, a "(hyb)" indicator is appended to all ratings of hybrid securities issued by banks, insurers, finance companies, and securities firms. By their terms, hybrid securities allow for the omission of scheduled dividends, interest, or principal payments, which can potentially result in impairment if such an omission occurs. Hybrid securities may also be subject to contractually allowable write-downs of principal that could result in impairment. Together with the hybrid indicator, the long-term obligation rating assigned to a hybrid security is an expression of the relative credit risk associated with that security.

Moody's U.S. Municipal Long-Term Bond Ratings:

The following descriptions of Moody's long-term municipal bond ratings have been published by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Moody's Analytics Inc.

Aaa - Issuers or issues rated Aaa demonstrate the strongest creditworthiness relative to other U.S. municipal or tax-exempt issuers or issues.

Aa - Issuers or issues rated Aa demonstrate very strong creditworthiness relative to other U.S. municipal or tax-exempt issuers or issues.

A - Issuers or issues rated A present above-average creditworthiness relative to other U.S. municipal or tax-exempt issuers or issues.

Baa - Issuers or issues rated Baa represent average creditworthiness relative to other U.S. municipal or tax-exempt issuers or issues.

Ba - Issuers or issues rated Ba demonstrate below-average creditworthiness relative to other U.S. municipal or tax-exempt issuers or issues.

B - Issuers or issues rated B demonstrate weak creditworthiness relative to other U.S. municipal or tax-exempt issuers or issues.

Caa - Issuers or issues rated Caa demonstrate very weak creditworthiness relative to other U.S. municipal or tax-exempt issuers or issues.

Ca - Issuers or issues rated Ca demonstrate extremely weak creditworthiness relative to other U.S. municipal or tax-exempt issuers or issues.

C - Issuers or issues rated C demonstrate the weakest creditworthiness relative to other U.S. municipal or tax-exempt issuers or issues.

Modifiers: Moody's appends numerical modifiers 1, 2, and 3 to each generic rating category from Aa through Caa. The modifier 1 indicates that the issuer or obligation ranks in the higher end of its generic rating category; the modifier 2 indicates a mid-range ranking; and the modifier 3 indicates a ranking in the lower end of that generic rating category.

Fitch Ratings Ltd. ("Fitch") Corporate Bond Ratings:

The following descriptions of Fitch's long-term corporate bond ratings have been published by Fitch, Inc. and Fitch Ratings Ltd.

AAA - Highest credit quality. 'AAA' ratings denote the lowest expectation of credit risk. They are assigned only in cases of exceptionally strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely to be adversely affected by foreseeable events.

AA - Very high credit quality. 'AA' ratings denote expectations of very low credit risk. They indicate very strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events.

A - High credit quality. 'A' ratings denote expectations of low credit risk. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered strong. This capacity may, nevertheless, be more vulnerable to adverse business or economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings.

BBB - Good credit quality. ‘**BBB**’ ratings indicate that expectations of credit risk are currently low. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered adequate but adverse business or economic conditions are more likely to impair this capacity.

BB - Speculative. ‘**BB**’ ratings indicate an elevated vulnerability to credit risk, particularly in the event of adverse changes in business or economic conditions over time; however, business or financial alternatives may be available to allow financial commitments to be met.

B - Highly speculative. ‘**B**’ ratings indicate that material credit risk is present. For performing obligations, default risk is commensurate with the issuer being rated with an Issuer Default Rating (“IDR”) in the ranges ‘BB’ to ‘C’. For non-performing obligations, the obligation or issuer is in default, or has deferred payment, but the rated obligation is expected to have extremely high recovery rates consistent with a Recovery Rating of ‘RR1’ (outstanding recovery prospects given default).

CCC - Substantial credit risk. ‘**CCC**’ ratings indicate that substantial credit risk is present. For performing obligations, default risk is commensurate with an IDR in the ranges ‘B’ to ‘C’. For non-performing obligations, the obligation or issuer is in default, or has deferred payment, but the rated obligation is expected to have a superior recovery rate consistent with a Recovery Rating of ‘RR2’ (superior recovery prospects given default).

CC - Very high levels of credit risk. ‘**CC**’ ratings indicate very high levels of credit risk. For performing obligations, default risk is commensurate with an IDR in the ranges ‘B’ to ‘C’. For non-performing obligations, the obligation or issuer is in default, or has deferred payment, but the rated obligation is expected to have a good recovery rate consistent with a Recovery Rating of ‘RR3’ (good recovery prospects given default).

C - Exceptionally high levels of credit risk. ‘**C**’ indicates exceptionally high levels of credit risk. For performing obligations, default risk is commensurate with an IDR in the ranges ‘B’ to ‘C’. For non-performing obligations, the obligation or issuer is in default, or has deferred payment, and the rated obligation is expected to have an average, below-average or poor recovery rate consistent with a Recovery Rating of ‘RR4’ (average recovery prospects given default), ‘RR5’ (below average recovery prospects given default) or ‘RR6’ (poor recovery prospects given default).

Defaulted obligations typically are not assigned ‘D’ ratings, but are instead rated in the ‘B’ to ‘C’ rating categories, depending upon their recovery prospects and other relevant characteristics. This approach better aligns obligations that have comparable overall expected loss but varying vulnerability to default and loss.

Plus (+) or Minus (-) The modifiers “+” or “-” may be appended to a rating to denote relative status within major rating categories. Such suffixes are not added to the ‘AAA’ obligation rating category, or to corporate finance obligation ratings in the categories below ‘B’.

The terms “investment grade” and “speculative grade” have established themselves over time as shorthand to describe the categories ‘AAA’ to ‘BBB’ (investment grade) and ‘BB’ to ‘D’ (speculative grade). The terms “investment grade” and “speculative grade” are market conventions, and do not imply any recommendation or endorsement of a specific security for investment purposes. “Investment grade” categories indicate relatively low to moderate credit risk, while ratings in the “speculative” categories either signal a higher level of credit risk or that a default has already occurred.

Fitch's Municipal Bond Long-Term Ratings:

The following descriptions of Fitch's long-term municipal bond ratings have been published by Fitch, Inc. and Fitch Ratings Ltd.

AAA - Highest credit quality. 'AAA' ratings denote the lowest expectation of default risk. They are assigned only in cases of exceptionally strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely to be adversely affected by foreseeable events.

AA - Very high credit quality. 'AA' ratings denote expectations of very low default risk. They indicate very strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events.

A - High credit quality. 'A' ratings denote expectations of low default risk. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered strong. This capacity may, nevertheless, be more vulnerable to adverse business or economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings.

BBB - Good credit quality. 'BBB' ratings indicate that expectations of credit risk are currently low. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered adequate but adverse business or economic conditions are more likely to impair this capacity.

BB - Speculative. 'BB' ratings indicate an elevated vulnerability to default risk, particularly in the event of adverse changes in business or economic conditions over time; however, business or financial alternatives may be available to allow financial commitments to be met.

B - Highly speculative. 'B' ratings indicate that material default risk is present, but a limited margin of safety remains. Financial commitments are currently being met; however, capacity for continued payment is vulnerable to deterioration in the business and economic environment.

CCC - Substantial credit risk. 'CCC' ratings indicate that default is a real possibility.

CC - Very high levels of credit risk. 'CC' ratings indicate default of some kind appears probable.

C - Exceptionally high levels of credit risk. 'C' ratings indicate default appears imminent or inevitable.

D - Default. 'D' ratings indicate a default. Default generally is defined as one of the following:

- failure to make payment of principal and/or interest under the contractual terms of the rated obligation;
- the bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other winding-up or cessation of the business of an issuer/obligor; or
- the coercive exchange of an obligation, where creditors were offered securities with diminished structural or economic terms compared with the existing obligation.

Structured Finance Defaults – “Imminent” default, categorized under ‘C’, typically refers to the occasion where a payment default has been intimated by the issuer, and is all but inevitable. This may, for example, be where an issuer has missed a scheduled payment, but (as is typical) has a grace period during which it may cure the payment default. Another alternative would be where an issuer has formally announced a coercive debt exchange, but the date of the exchange still lies several days or weeks in the immediate future.

Additionally, in structured finance transactions, where analysis indicates that an instrument is irrevocably impaired such that it is not expected to pay interest and/or principal in full in accordance with the terms of the obligation’s documentation during the life of the transaction, but where no payment default in accordance with the terms of the documentation is imminent, the obligation will typically be rated in the ‘C’ category.

Structured Finance Writedowns - Where an instrument has experienced an involuntary and, in the agency’s opinion, irreversible “writedown” of principal (i.e. other than through amortization, and resulting in a loss to the investor), a credit rating of ‘D’ will be assigned to the instrument. Where the agency believes the “writedown” may prove to be temporary (and the loss may be “written up” again in future if and when performance improves), then a credit rating of ‘C’ will typically be assigned. Should the “writedown” then later be reversed, the credit rating will be raised to an appropriate level for that instrument. Should the “writedown” later be deemed as irreversible, the credit rating will be lowered to ‘D’.

Notes: In the case of structured and project finance, while the ratings do not address the loss severity given default of the rated liability, loss severity assumptions on the underlying assets are nonetheless typically included as part of the analysis. Loss severity assumptions are used to derive pool cash flows available to service the rated liability. In the case of public finance, the ratings also do not address the loss given default of the rated liability, focusing instead on the vulnerability to default of the rated liability.

Plus (+) or Minus (-) - The modifiers “+” or “-” may be appended to a rating to denote relative status within major rating categories. Such suffixes are not added to the ‘AAA’ Long-Term Rating category, or to Long-Term Rating categories below ‘B’.

Municipal Short-Term Bond Ratings

S&P’s Municipal Short-Term Bond Ratings:

The following descriptions of S&P’s short-term municipal ratings have been published by Standard & Poor’s Financial Service LLC.

SP-1 - Strong capacity to pay principal and interest. An issue determined to possess a very strong capacity to pay debt service is given a plus (+) designation.

SP-2 - Satisfactory capacity to pay principal and interest, with some vulnerability to adverse financial and economic changes over the term of the notes.

SP-3 - Speculative capacity to pay principal and interest.

D - ‘D’ is assigned upon failure to pay the note when due, completion of a distressed exchange offer, or the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of similar action and where default on an obligation is a virtual certainty, for example due to automatic stay provisions.

Moody's Short-Term Ratings:

The following descriptions of Moody's short-term municipal ratings have been published by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Moody's Analytics Inc.

MIG 1 - This designation denotes superior credit quality. Excellent protection is afforded by established cash flows, highly reliable liquidity support, or demonstrated broad-based access to the market for refinancing.

MIG 2 - This designation denotes strong credit quality. Margins of protection are ample, although not as large as in the preceding group.

MIG 3 - This designation denotes acceptable credit quality. Liquidity and cash-flow protection may be narrow, and market access for refinancing is likely to be less well-established.

SG - This designation denotes speculative-grade credit quality. Debt instruments in this category may lack sufficient margins of protection.

Fitch's Short-Term Ratings:

The following descriptions of Fitch's short-term ratings have been published by Fitch, Inc. and Fitch Ratings Ltd.

F1 - Highest short-term credit quality. Indicates the strongest intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments; may have an added "+" to denote any exceptionally strong credit feature.

F2 - Good short-term credit quality. Good intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments.

F3 - Fair short-term credit quality. The intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments is adequate.

B - Speculative short-term credit quality. Minimal capacity for timely payment of financial commitments, plus heightened vulnerability to near term adverse changes in financial and economic conditions.

C - High short-term default risk. Default is a real possibility.

RD - Restricted default. Indicates an entity that has defaulted on one or more of its financial commitments, although it continues to meet other financial obligations. Applicable to entity ratings only.

D - Default. Indicates a broad-based default event for an entity, or the default of a specific short-term obligation.

Commercial Paper Ratings

S&P's Commercial Paper Ratings:

The following descriptions of S&P's commercial paper ratings have been published by Standard & Poor's Financial Service LLC.

A-1 - A short-term obligation rated 'A-1' is rated in the highest category by Standard & Poor's. The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is strong. Within this category, certain obligations are designated with a plus sign (+). This indicates that the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on these obligations is extremely strong.

A-2 - A short-term obligation rated 'A-2' is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher rating categories. However, the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is satisfactory.

A-3 - A short-term obligation rated 'A-3' exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.

B - A short-term obligation rated 'B' is regarded as having significant speculative characteristics. Ratings of 'B-1', 'B-2', and 'B-3' may be assigned to indicate finer distinctions within the 'B' category. The obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation; however, it faces major ongoing uncertainties which could lead to the obligor's inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.

B-1 - A short-term obligation rated 'B-1' is regarded as having significant speculative characteristics, but the obligor has a relatively stronger capacity to meet its financial commitments over the short-term compared to other speculative-grade obligors.

B-2 - A short-term obligation rated 'B-2' is regarded as having significant speculative characteristics, and the obligor has an average speculative-grade capacity to meet its financial commitments over the short-term compared to other speculative-grade obligors.

B-3 - A short-term obligation rated 'B-3' is regarded as having significant speculative characteristics, and the obligor has a relatively weaker capacity to meet its financial commitments over the short-term compared to other speculative-grade obligors.

C - A short-term obligation rated 'C' is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.

D - A short-term obligation rated 'D' is in payment default. The 'D' rating category is used when payments on an obligation, including a regulatory capital instrument, are not made on the date due even if the applicable grace period has not expired, unless Standard & Poor's believes that such payments will be made during such grace period. The 'D' rating also will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of a similar action if payments on an obligation are jeopardized.

Dual Ratings – S&P assigns "dual" ratings to all debt issues that have a put option or demand feature as part of their structure. The first rating addresses the likelihood of repayment of principal and interest as due, and the second rating addresses only the demand feature. The long-term rating symbols are used for bonds to denote the long-term maturity and the short-term rating symbols for the put option (for example, 'AAA/A-1+'). With U.S. municipal short-term demand debt, note rating symbols are used with the short-term issue credit rating symbols (for example, 'SP-1+/A-1+').

Moody's Commercial Paper Ratings:

The following descriptions of Moody's commercial paper ratings have been published by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Moody's Analytics Inc.

P-1 - Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-1 have a superior ability to honor short-term debt obligations.

P-2 - Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-2 have a strong ability to honor short-term debt obligations.

P-3 - Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-3 have an acceptable ability to honor short-term obligations.

NP - Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Not Prime do not fall within any of the Prime rating categories.

Note: Canadian issuers rated P-1 or P-2 have their short-term ratings enhanced by the senior-most long-term rating of the issuer, its guarantor or support-provider.

Fitch's Commercial Paper Ratings:

The following descriptions of Fitch's commercial paper ratings have been published by Fitch, Inc. and Fitch Ratings Ltd.

F1 - Highest short-term credit quality. Indicates the strongest intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments; may have an added "+" to denote any exceptionally strong credit feature.

F2 - Good short-term credit quality. Good intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments.

F3 - Fair short-term credit quality. The intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments is adequate.

B - Speculative short-term credit quality. Minimal capacity for timely payment of financial commitments, plus heightened vulnerability to near term adverse changes in financial and economic conditions.

C - High short-term default risk. Default is a real possibility.

RD - Restricted default. Indicates an entity that has defaulted on one or more of its financial commitments, although it continues to meet other financial obligations. Applicable to entity ratings only.

D - Default. Indicates a broad-based default event for an entity, or the default of a specific short-term obligation. The modifiers "+" or "-" may be appended to a rating to denote relative status within major rating categories. Such suffixes are not added to the 'AAA' Long-term rating category, to categories below 'CCC', or to Short-term ratings other than 'F1'. (The +/- modifiers are only used to denote issues within the CCC category.)